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There is no doubt that science education

is con-

sidered to be an important element in the lives of children.

Numerous innovative attempts over the last ten to fifteen
years have contributed greatly to improving the quality of

science instruction in elementary schools.

Even though the

progress that has been made is encouraging, there

is a

growing concern that the field of science education as

whole requires

a

a

philosophical and theoretical perspective

that can guide the development of curricula, the prepara-

tion of teachers, teaching strategies and evaluation.
a

Such

philosophical and theoretical scheme can then serve as

the integrated system around which the teaching of science

can be organized.
This dissertation addresses the issue of science

curriculum development based on the organismic philosophy
and theoretical framework of the Anisa Model.
vi

From an

.

organismic perspective the justification for any
curriculum
is that

tial.

it should sustain the actualization of human
poten-

A natural science curriculum can foster children's

understandings about the physical world so that the resultant actualization of their potential can be organized

around the attainment of technological competence.

This

means that children will gradually begin to understand,

discover and apply the laws and principles of natural
science in such a way that the quality of life can be con-

tinually improved.

The primary goal of the natural science

curriculum, then, is the development of technological competence in interacting with the physical environment.
The purpose of this dissertation is:
(1)

To investigate the extent to which an organis-

mic philosophy is consistent with contemporary

advances in the field of natural science.
(2)

To interpret the role of natural science in

human growth and development from an organismic

perspective
(3)

To show how an organismic philosophical per-

spective can guide the development of

theoretical framework for

a

a

possible

natural science cur-

riculum, the goal of which is the attainment of

technological competence.
(4)

To indicate the way in which an organismic view

addresses the issue of integrating natural
Vll

.

science with the overall curriculum.
(5)

To set forth the distinguishing features of
the

proposed theoretical framework based on an

organismic perspective

in

comparison with other

science curricula that have been developed.
The proposed framework for the natural science

curriculum includes

a

detailed outline of the most funda-

mental laws and principles of physics, chemistry, biology,
geology, astronomy and ecology, together with

a

description

of the psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and

volitional processes that are involved in the attainment of

technological competence.
From a functional point of view, the proposed frame-

work may be used to prepare teachers to teach science and/or
to generate learning experiences in natural

children

viii
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CHAPTER
SCIENCE EDUCATION:

I

STATE OF THE FIELD

It has only been within the last one hundred years

that science has become a necessary and legitimate component in the public school curriculum in the United States.

The first innovation in elementary school science according
to Rosen (1963) was the introduction of geography in the

Boston schools and this led to the creation of

a

new indus-

try in 1784--the manufacturing of scientific apparatus for

schools.

The real entry of science was felt with the rise

of the Pestalozzi object teaching movement in the late

1850’s (Smith, 1963).

Objects were placed before children

to develop their perceptive faculties.

For example, they

had to name the object, describe its parts and state the

relationships among the parts.
(1870’s)

At about the same time

the writings of Herbert Spencer were becoming pop-

ular, particularly his essay "What Knowledge is of Most

Worth?" which pointed to the overwhelming importance of
science in the school curriculum (Showalter, 1975; Smith,
1975)

.

The influx of new views on science spurred American

universities to announce the acceptance of physics and chem
istry toward entrance requirements.

By the early 1900

's

study.
elementary school science was established as nature

2

Ihe modern trend towards

teaching science as inquiry

rather than passive observation has its roots in the philo-

sophy of pragmatism as espoused by William James and John
Dewey.

In the 1920’s,

Dewey’s emphasis on the knowledge of

the methodology of science as a valuable tool for the

growing child ousted the traditional nature study approach
(Dewey

,

1966)

.

Integration of the processes of inquiry and the ac-

cumulated knowledge of science in

a

curriculum has been

a

continuous concern for the National Society for the Study of

Education (NSSE)

.

An important first step by NSSE was the

publication of the Thirty-first Yearbook

in 1932 which was

devoted to A Program for Teaching Science emphasizing integrated science teaching.

Science Edu cation

in

In 1947,

the Forty-sixth Yearbook,

American Schools

,

focused on attitudes,

values and affective factors as they related to science and
society.

The most recent document, the Fifty-ninth Year-

book (1960) on Rethinking Science Education stressed critical thinking, scientific process and inquiry.

Since 1960, the National Science Teachers Association has organized numerous committees and conferences to

investigate and articulate position statements on science

education in relation to goals, teaching methods, cuiiicuresearch
lum innovations, teacher education, evaluation and

procedures.

The aim has always been to continually upgrade

3

the quality of science teaching so that there is meaning
and

relevance for the child.
Science Boom of the Sixties
The major impetus to science teaching in schools was
the launching of Sputnik by the Russians in 1957.

education in the U.S. blossomed as

a

Science

direct reaction to

Sputnik (Saadeh, 1973) and the U.S. Office of Education,
the National Science Foundation and other public and pri-

vate organizations funded heavily projects on science cur-

riculum innovation.

During the years 1960-1970, elemen-

tary and secondary school teachers witnessed what Brandwein
calls "the Revolution in Science Teaching" (Rosen, 1963) or

what is now referred to as "the science boom of the sixties."

Fontaine (1970), in reviewing some of the federal

programs for the improvement of school science and mathematics states that during the fiscal year of 1969, over 400

projects at the pre-college and undergraduate levels were

supported by the National Science Foundation at an estimated
cost of $142 million.

In the Ninth Report of the Internat-

ional Clearinghouse on Science and Mathematics Curricular

Developments Internationally (1975), Lockhard piesents

a

1956survey of K-adult science curricula for the years

education
1974, a span of 18 years during which science

programs mushroomed all over the
data reveals the following:

w orld.
r

A reworking of his

4

Continent

Numbers of Curricula
Developed 1956-1974

Africa

15

Asia

50

Australia

17

Europe

87

Latin America

17

North America

206

Total

392

Of the 206 curricula in North America, 201 were

developed in the United States.

Many of the curricula

started at Kindergarten and went through to adult levels.
Considering the tremendous significance of early childhood
education, it is noteworthy that not

a

single curriculum

was developed specifically for the preschool level in

those 18 years.
A comparison of Fontaine's figures of 400 projects
in one year and Lockhard's data of 201 curricula over 18

years shows quite
a

a

Possible reasons for such

difference.

large discrepancy could be that

(1)

many of the question-

naires sent out in Lockhard's survey were not returned by
the individuals or curricular organizations who had de-

veloped programs, or

(2)

many of the curricula developed

in 1969 were short-term projects which no longer exist.

factor

(2)

is

indeed

a

If

possibility, then the expenditure of

vast sums of money on short-term operations has to be

accounted for more seriously.

It could be that funding

5

agencies are aware of the problems as no new science
curricula have been appearing in the last few years.
New Elementary School Science Curricula
in the United States
The new science curricula were developed by numerous agencies,

teams and individuals who held widely dif-

fering philosophical and theoretical perspectives about
the organization of the subject matter, the emphasis on

the processes of science, and the attitudes and values to
be inculcated in the child.

In an attempt to demonstrate

the unity of science, various concepts were proposed as

being the fundamental realities of natural science.
In 1966,

lished

a

the Educational Policies Commission pub-

report entitled "Education and the Spirit of

Science" which outlined seven values that undergirded the

whole scientific enterprise, e.g., values such as longing
to know and to understand; questioning of all things;

demand for verification; consideration of consequences.
Livermore (1964) of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, indicated that there were

fourteen processes that characterized the method of

scientific investigation.

Processes such as the follot^ing

were emphasized: observing, classifying, inferring, hypothesizing, formulating models.
In 1964,

the National Science Teachers Association

6

documented

a

Theory into Action paper in which seven major

conceptual schemes were set forth as the unifying principles that cut across all of natural science.

The schemes

were outlined as a guide to curriculum planners in the

elementary and secondary school.

Most of the statements

were written in terms of matter and energy.

For example,

all matter is composed of units called fundamental par-

ticles; units of matter interact; matter exists in the form
of units which can be classified into hierarchies of organization.

Since the schemes were outlined in accordance with

physical science concepts, the proposed guide became

a

controversial issue.
Bentley Glass (1965) vehemently opposed the seven
conceptual schemes, particularly from

a

biologist's point

He stated that it was not possible to express

of view.

adequately the unique characteristics of
by referring solely to matter and energy.

a

living organism

The present-day

debate on reductionism is an expression of the same sentiment.

From

a

psychologist's standpoint, Ausubel (1964)

criticized the new matter and energy approach as being too

philosophical and too general for elementary and secondary
school students.
A counterview to Glass and Ausubel was presented

by Shamos

(1966)

who felt that the conceptual schemes of

science reflected the greatest intellectual achievements
cui
of man and as such should be the focal point of the

7

riculum.

Shamos then became the principal director of
the
Conceptually Oriented Program in Elementary School
Sciences
(COPES) which was based on the seven conceptual
schemes.
It

is

worth noting Ausubel's criticism in relation to the

following statement by Shamos in the preface of one of the

curriculum units on the Conservation of Energy Sequence;
The materials require some sophistication in
science on the part of the teacher, a sophistication which the average elementary school teacher
does not have.
Consequently, we suggest that
only science specialists or teachers with more than
the usual background in science consider trying
this curriculum
(1967 iv)
.

.

.

:

The notion of identifying unifying principles in

science is valid and worthwhile.

Conceptual schemes do aid

in focusing on what is most important in science content,

but the manner in which they are stated should reflect the

distinctive features of the physical and life sciences.
In an effort to show that curriculum development is
a

continuous process, the National Science Teachers Asso-

ciation (1971) issued a revised position statement on
school science education for the seventies.

Helpful

recommendations on goals, values, process and content are

presented as ideas to be considered when planning
riculum.

a cur-

Many of the new science curricula of the sixties

reflect a diversity of approaches in relation to selection
of content and process.

The goal has been to show the

unity of science but in some curricula this

is

difficult

placed
to discern because of the great emphasis that is

8

on either content or process.

Hurd and Gallagher (1968) review twelve of the most

well-known science and mathematics curricula

in their book

New Directions in Elementary Science Teaching

.

The three

programs that have been used most widely are the Elementary
Science Study, the Science Curriculum Improvement Study,
and Science--A Process Approach.

A brief overview will

illustrate the general thrust of each program.
The Elementary Science Study (ESS) does not appear
to have any specific philosophy or theory of learning

supporting it.

However, it does not seem to be psychologi-

cally unsound or scientifically trivial.

Children are

viewed as natural scientists and allowed to explore and

manipulate materials according to their own inclinations
and needs in an unstructured manner.

The main purpose is

to motivate children to explore the world.

Much of the

philosophy and psychology of Piaget, Dewey, Hunt, and
Berlyne are evident in ESS even though it

is not explicitly

stated (Rogers and Voelker, 1970).
The Science Curriculum Improvement Study (SCIS) has

been guided by the work of Robert Karplus (1964; Karplus
and Thier, 1967).

The goal of the SCIS is the development

of scientific literacy through the provision of scientific

activities in the early elementary school (Thomson
1970)

.

£[

Voelker,

The program focuses on the conceptual framework ox

childscience as being the most crucial aspect about which

9

ren should learn.

SCIS has been guided and influenced by

the recent developments in psychology and reflects the
ideas of Dewey, Piaget, Bruner, and Almy (SCIS Teachers

Handbook, January 1974).

The approach to the teaching of

science appears to be well-planned and educationally sound.

Science--A Process Approach (S-APA)

,

as

its name

implies, is designed to teach the processes of science to

children.

The cumulative learning model of the psychologist

Robert Gagne has guided the development of this program
(Gagne, 1963 and 1966; Livermore, 1964).

The major prin-

ciple is the learning of general i zable process skills which
may be transferred across many subject matters.

Effectiveness of the New Science Curricula
What has been the impact of the new elementary

science curricula?

Innumerable research studies have in-

vestigated the effects of the most popular science curricula such as ESS, SCIS and S-APA on children’s interests
and cognitive abilities, teaching styles and methods of

teacher education.
these studies.

It

would be impossible to mention all

A variety of research surveys summarize a

great deal of information: Dunfee (1967); Gallagher (1972),

Reichard (1973); Saadeh (1975); Rowe and deTure (1975) and

Voelker

§

Wall

(1976).

According to Rowe and deTure (1975), editois of the
many
Science Education Information Report, the results of
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of the research studies indicate the positive
effects of

the new approaches of teaching- science on young
children.

Most of the programs developed over the last ten years

help language, logic and interests to grow among disad-

vantaged and handicapped children.

These groups of child-

ren benefit during the first three years of school from

activity-oriented science.

Middle and upper class elemen-

tary school children show relatively less benefit as the

programs stand at present.

Many of the early science cur-

ricula focus on sorting, classifying and ordering, etc.,

which are valuable learning experiences for the disadvantaged child whose environment may lack opportunities for
these kinds of interactions.

The authors suggest that the

disadvantaged children who are usually denied science because they need to "catch up on basics" should be given more
science.

Programs that are more challenging have to be

developed for the advanced primary grade students.
Many of the programs are organized in detailed
scope and sequence charts with particular activities for

each grade level.

Even though the new curricula are de-

velopmental ly -based to some extent, teachers do not appear
to have a great deal of flexibility or experience in indi-

vidualizing instruction, especially with the more advanced
child.

Scope and sequence charts are useful because they

reflect systematic and careful planning but they have the

disadvantage of introducing rigidity.

11

Ihe positive results of some of the research
in

science education has helped to provide answers
to some

specific issues that have been of concern to science
educators.

However, the overall conclusions drawn by the

authors of research surveys and appraisals of the future

direction of the new curricula are disappointing.
Rowe and deTure (1973) conclude that the quantity
of research efforts in elementary school science has fallen
off.

Also, relatively little information is available on

the cumulative impact of four to five years of elementary

science.

The authors state that even though many school

districts have now had almost four to six years or more
of exposure to and experience with some of the new projects,

very little research is being published

effects of science instruction.

on.

the long-term

This kind of evaluative

information is vital in assessing the worth and the appropriateness of science programs.

Curriculum developers, in

the early years of innovation, complained that the types

of attitudes, values and processes of inquiry which they

were trying to develop would take time.

Although ample

time has elapsed, no long-term gains have been demonstrated.

Livermore (1968)

,

who was involved in the develop-

ment of Science--A Process Approach, reiterates the fact
that the proponents of many of the new programs profess

either explicitly or implicitly that their approaches should
foster an enthusiasm for and understanding of science that

12

should continue beyond high school.

However, little has

been done to determine whether, and if so, to what
extent
these programs do indeed have such an effect.

Saadeh (1973), in an extensive review of the research on the direction of the new science programs, presents a pessimistic survey.

He tries to assess curriculum

development, the effectiveness of science curricula, instructional procedures and teacher- training programs.

The studies

that Saadeh cites are impressive and the immediate reaction
is to say that the situation really cannot be that hopeless.

However, the reality of the situation cannot be ignored.

Many critics attack the new science curricula particularly
on the score of how they were developed.

In an evaluative

report on curriculum development in science, Herbert Smith
notes that
For more than a decade, professional scientists have
been almost exclusively responsible for national curriculum reform. Their influence is evident in the
emphasis on the structure of science, the cognitive
and abstract aspects of the discipline, the difficulty of the material, the grade level at which
abstract concepts are introduced, and laboratory
The wisdom of some of
and inquiry experiences.
the new emphases was questioned by a few skeptics,
but the scientists’ judgments were uncritically
accepted for a time, even strangely enough, by most
(1969:398)
science educators.

A similar sentiment on the "crises of principle in

curriculum” was echoed by Schwab.

He found that out of

five widely-used high school science curricula, four were

controlled and developed by subject matter specialists such
that the educators' contribution was negligible and that

13

of curriculum specialists "near the vanishing point"
(1970:
19).
v/as

In elementary school science programs, a
psychologist

the guiding force in S-APA but again curriculum special-

ists were not included.

The ESS program was greatly influ-

enced, in an advantageous manner, by educators who had

some expertise in curriculum development.

The criticism that scientists influenced the de-

velopment of programs more than curriculum specialists has
some merit to it, particularly when one considers surveys
that indicate the decrease in science achievement in ele-

mentary and secondary schools.

Saadeh (1975) cites various

authors who charge that many curricula emphasize science as
an end in itself rather than pointing out the value of

science in solving social and practical problems.

They urge

that the subject matter should be made more relevant to the

needs of the student and not only geared to the academically

superior student.

Scientific literacy does not only mean

the intellectual understanding of science, but also learning how to apply the principles of science to problems that
7

are encountered in everyday life and to the persistent

challenges that beset mankind.
That the new science curricula have not had the
impact they were expected to have was shown in

a

recent

survey conducted by the National Assessment of Educational

Progress (NAEP)
the survey.

.

Ahmann et al

It was

.

(1975)

cite the lesults of

found that the knowledge of fundamental

14

scientific facts and principles declined among young
American students between the years 1969 and 1973.
Comparing
the results of the 1969-70 and 1972-73 national assessments
of science indicates that 9-year-olds, 13-year-olds, and

17-year-olds tended to perform less well in 1972-73 than
their counterparts had about three to four years ago.

The

questions in the survey covered four broad educational
goals of science: knowledge of basic facts and principles
of science; the processes of science; understanding the

investigative nature of science and attitudes about the
value and appreciation of science.

Achievement declined

in the biological and physical sciences, but the greatest

drops were in the physical sciences.

It was notable that

the performance of black students did not improve at all

three levels, whereas some extreme rural and South-eastern
groups did improve relative to national norms.

Another

noteworthy finding was that the science performance of
girls has not improved, but appears to be declining at

about the same rate as the boys.
of the survey, Ahmann et al

.

In assessing the results

conclude that the downward

trend of science performance may only reflect the unusual

emphasis that was given to science education in the wake
of Sputnik.

The results 1972-73 may really indicate a re-

turn to more normal levels of achievement which probably

existed before the 60s.

Since we live in

a

scientific and

technological age, the concluding remarks of the authors

15

should be of grave concern to educators:
We must decide whether the observed decline in
science achievement can be tolerated, or, quite
to the contrary, whether we should reject even a
"steady state" and insist upon improved levels of
science achievement during the next four years.
(Ahmann et al
1975:25)
.

,

It could be that the decline of enrollment and

achievement in the physical sciences, especially at the
high school level, may be related to the complexity of the
ideas and the lack of input by curriculum specialists and

educators in many of the new science curricula.

Many

authors have recently documented the problem in the

physical sciences (Bates, 1975; Ignatz, 1975; Rowe, 1975).
Bates states that between 1948 and 1964 the proportion of
twel fth- grade students enrolled in physics in the United

States dropped from 26 percent to 19 percent.

By 1971

only 16% of senior students were choosing phys ics - - less
than one student in six.

Reasons for the decline appear

to revolve mainly around the abstract nature of physics

concepts which students have difficulty in understanding.
Because students are in high school, they are assumed to
be in the formal operational stage and capable of dealing

with abstract ideas.

However, preliminary evidence from

studies by Renner and Stafford suggest that only 30-50% of

high school age students in the United States function at
the formal operational level (in Bates, 1975).

A solution

concrete
to the problem has been the inclusion of more

-

16

manipulation of materials while studying abstract
concepts.
Another area of apparent inadequacy in the new
science curricula has been in the effectiveness of "process education."

The goal of many new programs was to

teach children the processes of science, i.e., the processes of inquiry which are considered to be the basic
tools of the young scientist.
'

Process Education

*

Cole (1972) in

a

book on

tries to assess to what extent the pro-

cess-oriented curricula have been used, what changes they
have effected in educational practice and whether they

realized their potential.

His conclusion is discouraging-

not much has been done with the new curricula of the

sixties.

Cole cites John Goodlad, who after an extensive

survey of educational practices, says that the process-

centered innovations have been "blunted on the classroom
door" (Cole, 1972, p.

20).

Unfortunately, classroom prac-

tice has changed little--the needs of the children are not

being met emotionally or socially, lessons are dull, boring
and meaningless, teacher-directed learning from authorita-

tive textbooks and workbooks are still prevalent.

In a

similar vein, Lippit observes the brute fact that
Our research is now rich with examples of opportunities provided, but nothing gained; with new
curricula developed, but lack of meaningful
utilization; with new teaching practices invented,
but nothing spread; with new richer school environments, but no improvement in the learning
(in Cole, 1972:20).
experience of the child.

Writing specifically about the program Science--A
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Process Approach, Saadeh (1973) cites research which
indi-

cated that the attempt to teach science from

approach results in
presentation.

a

a

pure process

spottiness and somewhat incoherent

This particular science program focuses on

process to such an extent that the learning of content
incidental.

is

Process and content are subject to develop-

mental considerations and systematic organization.

Commenting on the effectiveness of teacher- training
in the new science projects, Herbert Smith, a former presi-

dent of the National Science Teachers Association, appears
as

a

harsh, but realistic critic.

In considering the

largest and most expensive in-service program in the history
of science education, the National Science Foundation Insti-

tute Program, Smith states that

These institute programs were viewed at their
inception as emergency arrangements. Unfortunately,
the history of such government activity is that
the emergency structures take on the character of
permanent fixtures. ... It still remains to be
demonstrated that the institutes have had a high
(1966:800).
degree of effectiveness.
It

is

revealing to discover that science educators

were essentially excluded from effectively participating in
the NSF Institute programs.

Smith goes on to point out

that millions of dollars were expended to partially educate

scientists in the fundamentals of public education and the
needs of teacher education programs.
as

Not many authors are

forthright as Smith in exposing the political factors

that influenced the science innovations of the sixties
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after the launching of Sputnik

I

.

trying to keep pace

In

with the Russians, the child who was being educated was
for
the larger part by-passed and the focus fell upon the new

curricula.

The priority in the educational process has to

be the nature of the individual who is being educated- -new

curricula, new methods of teaching, teaching machines,

audio-visual aids and facilities are all secondary factors,

necessary but not sufficient in upgrading the quality of
education.
As a final note, many authors indicate that the

research studies in elementary science education suffer
from major inadequacies.

Haney et al

.

pointed to four

weaknesses in the studies they examined for the years 19651967:

lack of precise terminology, poorly defined variables,

brief treatment periods on unrepresentative groups, and
inadequate instruction (in Gallagher, 1972).

In a summary

of research in science education during 1968-1969 (elemen-

tary level)

,

Gallagher (1972) found many of the weaknesses

identified by Haney and his colleagues to be still observable.

In addition,

Gallagher states that the quality

of reporting is usually poor and faulty experimental design
was common.
In light of the various challenges that have yet to

be met in science education, Tyler (1968) cautions against
an uncritical acceptance of the new science curricula.

grams should be carefully analyzed in terms of goals,

Pro

.

.
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attitudes, processes and products as they relate to
the

society in which children have to live.

Need for a Philosophical and Theoretical
Perspective in Science Education
Despite the interest, time, effort, and money that
have been expended in improving science education, the

heart of the problem remains unaddressed.

A survey of the

literature indicates that this is

a

the history of science teaching.

This is summed up by

critical juncture in

Pella's (1966) comment that science education has been

floundering for many years because individuals are concerned

with make -shift remedies rather than trying to reach the
source of the problem.

In fact,

it

is

somewhat paradoxical

that scientists have not brought the methods of science to

bear on the improvement of science instruction (Skinner,
1968)

Other eminent science educators echo the same
sentiments.

Paul DeHart Hurd, a leading educator in the

field, addresses the challenge with insight and indicates
the urgent need for a theoretical framework in science

education
Not to establish a theoretical position means that
we continue to attack educational problems on a
haphazard basis, always pot- shotting and fragmenting our efforts rather than making a broad attack
(1971:244)
on the frontier of the unknown.
,

Because the tendency is to operate on an atheoretical basis, every investigation is a separate problem.

With-

. .
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out an underpinning of theory, many research findings
are

lost "in a fog of contradictions" (Hurd, 1971:244)
and have

no impact on the educational process.

not

Research results do

each the classioom teacher and the experiences and

i

accumulated insights of the teacher are never heard by the
investigator.

The rich and rewarding interplay between

theory and practice is left untapped.
The reason proposed by St. John for the lack of

viable theory in science education

is

that whatever form of

theoretical framework that exists (if indeed it does)

based upon common sense.

is

These frames of reference vary

with each investigator or with each new curriculum that
developed.

a

is

A viable theory which is based on synthesis of

the research findings of human growth and development should

be able to offer direction, leadership, power, and economy
to the field and provide a basis for decision making (St.

John

,

1966)

The function of a theory is to make simple the

complex and bring order to confusion.

Education has been

dependent upon the social sciences for so long that it
has ignored the formulation of any theoretical framework.

Pella (1966) identifies some of the factors that need to
be considered in developing

a

workable theoretical base

for science education, namely, philosophy, the nature of

learning, the nature of knowledge, and the natuie of the

curriculum

2i

In the area of early childhood education
llowe

(1975)

has proposed a theoretical basis for science
activities.

Her thesis is that pre-school teachers do not have

a

ra-

tional basis for making decisions as to what science ex-

periences are appropriate for the very young child.

Howe

proposed Piaget’s theory of the stages of intellectual
development as
operate.

a

possible base from which teachers can

Certainly knowledge of development

is

an in-

valuable guide in teaching, but an effective theoretical
scheme has to be more comprehensive and address other
issues rather than just cognitive growth.

proposal has merit in that it

is

one of the few articles

that confronts the issue of formulating

a

theoretical

Bowen (1975) offers Ausubel's learning model as

scheme.
a

However, Howe's

conceptual framework that can guide science education

research.
Not only is a theoretical framework necessary in

science education but the necessity of an underlying

philosophical perspective
authors.

is

also emphasized by various

Showalter (1975) states that

a

philosphic

rationale that can reflect the unity of the sciences will
be useful.

Raven (1979), in an article on

a

philosophical

basis for selecting science curriculum content, leans to-

wards Margenau's metaphysical requirements of how scientific knowledge is gained.

As a most insightful science

educator, Hurd states that "We can contribute to the im-
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provement of our field (i.e., science education) by
exposing our educational theories to philosophic
criticism"
(1971:244)

.

The power of a philosophical perspective is elo-

quently described by Whitehead.

He suggests that a philo-

sophy not only molds the life of the individual but it
also influences our type of society and even our civilization.

He claims that

Philosophy is the attempt to make manifest the
fundamental evidence as to the nature of things.
Upon the presupposition of this evidence, all
understanding rests ... It makes the content
of the human mind manageable; it adds meaning
to fragmentary details; it discloses disjunctions
and conjunctions, consistencies and inconsistencies.
(1968b 48-49)
:

The position that

I

am setting forth and justifying

in this dissertation is that the fragmentation in science

education cannot be dealt with unless educational theory
and practice as a whole are guided by general philosophical

principles.

For science education, as the particular focus,

the philosophical scheme of thought should be compatible
w

r

ith the advances in contemporary scientific thought.
In the next chapter, two broad streams of philo-

sophical thought, namely, mechanistic and organismic, will
be examined for the purpose of discerning which scheme

would be of most value to science education.

I

submit that

the kind of philosophical perspective that would be most

useful is one which includes an understanding of the nature
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of man, the essence of physical reality, and how
these

two concerns are related.
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CHAPTER

II

TOWARD A SHIFT IN THE PARADIGM OF

CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT
A survey of the Western philosophical tradition

indicates the existence of two major antithetical systems
of thought; namely, the mechanistic system and the organismic system (Montalenti, 1974).

For centuries, the pro-

ponents of these two schemes were opposed to each other.
Now, in the twentieth century, there appears to be a

gradual acceptance of some of the fundamental principles
of the philosophy of organism by adherents of the mechan-

istic tradition.

Essentially, the change is occurring

in the contemporary scientific conception of the nature of

man, the nature of the physical universe and the nature of
life.
In the language of Thomas Kuhn, this change in our

A para-

world view constitutes

a

"paradigm shift" (1970).

digm may be defined as

a

shared scheme of thought from which

arise certain scientific traditions.

For example, it is

common to read about "Ptolemaic astronomy" or "Newtonian

mechanics."

The prevailing tradition or paradigm is al-

ways accepted as the most workable system in relation to
our understanding of particular phenomena.

In time,

anomalies or unexplainable events are recognized.

Thio
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casts doubt on the established paradigm.
a nev.

scheme of thought is proposed.

At this point,

If the new scheme

or paradigm not only accounts for the anomalies but
also

includes ideas that worked in the past, then people will

eventually rally behind it and
example

,

a

"shift" occurs.

For

this kind of a shift in paradigm occurred when

Einstein's theory of relativity superceded the older Newtonian views of absolute space and time.

The change in

our mental conception of the universe as a result of this

paradigm shift has been fundamental - -physical events, life,
people and feelings are all viewed as being relative rather
than fixed and absolute.
Roots of the Mechanistic and Organismic
Systems of Thought

The roots of the mechanism versus organism contro-

versy date back to the philosophical thought of the early
Greeks (Montalenti, 1974; Smith, 1976).

mechanism

is

Atomism or

most clearly associated with the Greek philo-

sopher Democritus.

He held the view that the phenomenal

world was composed of an infinite number of small, invisible particles which came together and then fell apart

purely by chance and at random.

Aristotle vehemently challenged the Democritean
position on the fortuitous nature of existence.

Instead,

he proposed a teleological theory, which stated that events

;
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in nature do not happen at random but do so with an
end
in view.

The word teleological is derived from the root

teleos" which in Greek means end, complete or perfect.
So,

for Aristotle, the end state was one of the most impor-

tant reasons for the occurrence of any event.

He included

this notion of the end state in the "doctrine of the four

causes."

The concept of "cause" was used in a much broader

and general way than it is used today.

The four causes may

be defined as follows:
(a)

Material cause is that from which something
created

(b)

Formal cause is the form, design of pattern
of a thing;

(c)

Efficient cause is the action which effects
some change from the original state, and

(d)

Final cause is the reason why things happen
(i.e., the end or purpose).

is

The introduction of the final cause or internal

purpose represented
universe.

a

more organismic conception of the

That is, efficient causes cannot account solely

for why events occur in the world.

A philosophy of

mechanism, however, holds that all physical events can be

explained solely in terms of efficient causation and denies
the operation of any internal purpose or final cause.

The

rise of the physical sciences in the seventeenth century was

characterized by the mechanistic views of Newton and strict
empiricism.
Today, in the latter half of the 20th century,
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there is a pressing and critical urgency to move beyond

atomism and mechanism while still retaining the advantages
of a successful mechanistic methodology.

Scientists are

becoming aware of the need for integrative and holistic
approaches to understanding man and the universe.

Issues

such as fulfillment, consciousness, purpose or goal-

directedness

organization, systems, hierarchy and emergence

,

have been, and will continue to be, discussed and debated
by scientists and philosophers of science (Koestler and

Ayala and Dobzhansky, 1974).

Sinythies,

1969

view or

new paradigm is needed to account for the notions

a

;

mentioned above.

A new world

Ultimately, any new successful paradigm

that is formulated by scientists has relevance for the

educator who has to distill and synthesize the accumulated

knowledge into

a

coherent and effective educational system.

In trying to discern the shift from extreme mechan-

ism to even moderate organismic views,

I

will concentrate

on the major issues that appear to be of greatest concern
to scientists.

For the sake of clarity, the issues may be

grouped into three broad categories, namely
(1)

the organization of systems

(2)

hierarchical structuration and integration

(3)

efficient and final causation.

To show the impact of these concerns upon con-

temporary scientific thought, the discussion will be placed
in a broader context and include the physical,

life and
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social sciences.

Organismic Principles in Contemporary
Scientific Thought

Organization of Systems
The rise of the organismic or systemic view of

nature heralded the age of synthesis and integration.
Ortega y Gasset, with great insight, says
The need to create sound syntheses and systematizations of knowledge
will call out a kind
of
genius which hitherto has existed only
as an aberration; the genius for integration.
Of
necessity this means specialization, as all
creative effort inevitably does; but this time
man will be specializing in the construction of
the whole.
(in Laszlo, 1973:35).
.

.

.

.

.

.

Holistic understandings of the world are by no
means new.

Two millennia ago, the famous symbol of the

"Ouroboros" (the snake eating its tail) was well known in
ancient China and in Alexandria.

It expresses the notion

of "the one, the all" which implies "that one entity in-

corporates into itself in some sense all other entities in
the universe" (Waddington, 1975:2-3).

Five hundred years

ago, the German philosopher Nikolaus von Kues said, "ex

omnibus partibus relucet totum," that "from every part,
the whole shines forth"

(Donath, 1973:117).

This idea

remains valid even today when all the part-whole phenomena

prove the material unity of the universe.
In trying to understand the organization of systems
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it

is

first necessary to define the concept, "organization.”

The concept of organization is of crucial importance
in the
-

sciences.

Bertalanffy (1968a) states that organization was

not considered as an integral aspect of

a

mechanistic world

in which isolated events were investigated.

In

fact, the

2nd principle of thermodynamics discussed the destruction

of order, but contained no corresponding principles for the

establishment of order and organization.

Bertalanffy goes

on to point out that Whitehead never failed to emphasize

that "an atom, a crystal, or a molecule are organizations.
In biology, organisms are, by definition, organized things”

(Bertalanffy, 1968a:47).

It was Berta?_anf fy

,

who in the

late 1920s originated the phrase, "organismic biology,” to

indicate the necessity of regarding the living organism
as an organized system.

Sinnott, in discussing the problem of organization
from

a

biologist's point of view, makes reference to

Whitehead's philosophy of organism.

He says that

Our problem, though first the task of the biologist, must evidently transcend his domain and
The list of philosoenter that of philosophy.
to
deal with it is
undertaken
have
phers who
them, perhaps,
among
notable
considerable. Most
part of
important
is Whitehead, who based an
not
organization,
his system upon the fact of
universe.
only in living things but throughout the
Biology for him is the study of the larger organThe
isms and physics that of the smaller ones.
notion
the
by
replace
would
he
particle
of
notion
(1950:42)
or organism.
In Whitehead's cosmological scheme, organisms are

30

viewed as actual entities which are the final real
things
of our perceptions and conceptual understanding.

ganization of these actual entities

is

The or-

governed by various

principles such as the principles of process and relativity.

An organism’s becoming or actualization is ex-

emplified in the process of change from one thing to
another; at the same time the becoming of one organism

is

related to the becoming of every other organism in some
way, such that

"...

in each concrescence"
as used here means

every item in its universe is involved
(Whitehead, 1969:27).

Concrescence

literally the growing together of

unity of experience.

a

Further on, he says that

Thus the ultimate metaphysical truth is
atomism.
The creatures are atomis
But
atomism does not exclude complexity and universal relativity.
Each atom is a system of
all things.
(1969:41)
.

It has

.

.

to be understood that Whitehead’s termin-

ology does not carry the usual meanings that we attribute
to certain words.

In the quote above, "atomism" reflects

the root meaning of the word, "unspl i ttable

,

that each organism can only be understood as

which is more than the sum of all its parts.

and means

"

a

whole
Organization,

then, for Whitehead is synonymous with interrelatedness or
a

universe of relations.
The notion of "systems" as

a

complete set of ele-

ments with mutual interrelations (Blauberg et al

.

,

1973)

has gained widespread influence in the physical, life and

,
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social sciences.

General systems theory was initiated and

developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in response to the
fragmentation and over- special izat ion of knowledge.

Ber-

talanffy defines general system theory as
the scientific exploration of "wholes" and
"wholeness" which, not so long ago, were considered metaphysical notions transcending the
boundaries of science. Hierarchic structure,
stability, teleology, differentiation, approach
to and maintenance of steady states, goaldirect edness -- these are a few of such general
system properties
(in Laszlo, 1973:xviii)
.

.

.

.

.

.

General system theory was developed as an interdisciplinary

approach toward the unification of science but the achievement of this goal remains yet to be seen.

A fruitful line

of enquiry blossomed into what may be called computerized

investigations such as systems analysis, systems engineering, cybernetics, information theory, etc., which are
The concern in this dis-

based on mechanistic notions.

sertation is with those aspects of system theory which may
be identified as "systemic," i.e., the relationship between

parts and wholes, mutual interconnections, goal - directedness
etc.

Laszlo clarifies the systemic aspect of systems theory

when he writes that

...

to have an adequate grasp of reality we
must look at things as systems, with properties
Systems of various
and structures of their own.

kinds can then be compared, their relationships
within still larger systems defined, and a general
the system view always
context established.
treats systems as integrated wholes of their subsidiary components and never as the mechanistic
aggregate of parts in isolable causal relations.
14 - 15 )
( 1972
.

:

.

.

32

System properties, which are in essence similar

to

the basic propositions of an organismic philosophy,
pre-

sent a view of the universe as unified diversity.

The

ancient Ouroboros and the modern holon (after Koestler,
1969)

are indicative of the necessity of seeing an entity

as a whole in its own environment and a part in the to-

tality.

The oft-quoted phrase "the whole is more than the

sum of its parts" becomes

a

reality when the collective

behavior, of the parts is considered in an organized

group.

As Weiss says

carrying out this upgrading process
... no more than restoring information content that has been lost on the way down
in the progressive analysis of the unitary universe into abstracted elements.
(1969:11).
.

is

.

.

.

.

.

in effect

In the realm of the physical sciences, modern

atomic physics has already made

a

departure from

a

strictly

mechanistic and particulate view of the physical world.
One of the most remarkable principles of atomic physics
was formulated by Wolfgang Pauli in 1925 and was called
the Exclusion Principle.

Simply stated, the Pauli Exclu-

sion Principle rules that no two electrons can occupy the
same position at the same time.

Therefore, the excluded

electron moves beyond to occupy the next empty shell.
Margenau, in writing about the singular status of this

principle, says that "the peculiar integrative significance of the exclusion principle passed from view and has
full
even now been rarely recognized in its philosophical

:
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ness”

(1972:63).

The philosophical significance is well-stated
by

Margenau
Prior to that time (before the exclusion principle) all theories had affected the individual
nature of the so-called "parts”; the hew prfnT-"
ciple regulated their social behavior. With
respect to a single particle it has nothing to
say.
And what it says for aggregates, though
most important, cannot be expressed in terms of
d ynamic regulation.
It is as though here, for
the first time, physics had discovered within its
own precincts a purely social law, a law that is
simple in its basic formulation and yet immense in
its collective effects.
Mechanistic reasoning,
already far behind, has gone out of sight as a
result of this latest advance.
(1950:442-3)
-

Thus, the tendency of two electrons to avoid each

other was of extraordinary importance and provided explanations for phenomena that give rise to the ordered sequences
and arrangements in physical objects.

Such apparently

"co-operative" effects in inorganic matter accounts for
such phenomena as atomic structure, chemical binding,

crystal shape, cohesion of solids, magnetism, electricity,
etc.
a

Margenau (1972) thus calls the exclusion principle

"postulate of symmetry."

From

a

systemic or organismic

perspective, this principle becomes meaningful because it
has no relevance for single electrons but only at the level

of the interrelations among electrons in

a

collective.

Similarly, in biology, living organisms display

phenomena that may be called "group behavior" (Weiss, 1969).
It

is only by

virtue of "ordered interactions (that)

.

.

.
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molecules become partners in the living process" (Weiss
1969:8).

A description of the- parts of the living organ-

ism do not account for the emergence of higher principles
in the whole.

Bertalanf fy

'

"organismic biology" of the

s

1920s is certainly applicable in modern biology today.

Weiss, in discussing living systems, states that
there is still

a

tendency amongst biologists

to

think that

given time and through the consistent application of the

analytic method and then the synthetic mode, will come to an

understanding of the phenomenon of life.

This view, he

says, is not adequate.

We are concerned with living organisms and for
those, we can assert definitely, on the basis of
empirical investigation, that the mere reversal of
our prior analytic dissection of the Universe by
putting the pieces togethe r again, whether in
reality or just in our minds, can yield no complete
expla nation of the behavior of even the most
e lementary living system
(1969:7)
,

.

An organismic perspective is concerned with the

unique characteristics of the whole as
as the

a system,

as well

relationship between the parts that constitute the

unified entity.

As important as analytic investigations

are, synthesis and integration are just as vital to give us
a

complete picture of the nature of reality.

Hier archical Structuration
and~Int egration
Lancelot Law Whyte, an eminent proponent of the

hierarchical nature of systems, traces the historical roots

.
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of the term "hierarchy” to the time of the Creeks.

"llier-’

archy" is derived from the Greek "hiero," holy, and

"arkhia," to rule.

According to Whyte

,

the earliest or

archaic meaning in Greek for "hiero" was "vigorous" or

"energetic," such that "hierarchy" could have meant "energetic control."

This meaning is remarkably similar to our

present day understanding of the hierarchical character of
systems

The concept of hierarchy may be defined generally
as "a set of things graded in levels by asymmetrical rela-

tions"

(Whyte, 1973:275) or

"

.

.

.

each integration level

implies the appearance of new qualities, new relationships,

which impose the need of new criteria of explanation"
(Montalenti, 1974:13).

Both these definitions relate the

notion of hierarchy to concepts of systems, wholeness,
order and interrelatedness.
Weiss

(1969) points out that the mere mention of

the term "levels" is a fundamental distinction between the

mechanistic and holistic means of explaining phenomena.
From a mechanistic point of view, all phenomena are reduced
to ultimate particles and whatever relationship exists among

them is seen as

a

set of continuous gradations from the

single elements to infinite combinations of them.

The

hierarchical nature of existence seems to imply some sort
of boundary condition as the transition is made from
to a higher level

(Polanyi, 1967, 1976).

a

lower

However, empirical

.
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study reveals that all existence is hierarchically
organized
and that more complex levels exemplify higher
principles of

operation.

Weiss states that even though different levels

exist, it is the organization of these levels in

wholeness that was the sensitive point.

a

"dynamic"

He says

.the systems concept is the embodiment of the
experience that there are patterned processes which
owe their typical configuration not to a prearranged, absolutely stereotyped mosaic of singletracked component performances, but on the contrary,
to the fact that the component activities have many
degrees of freedom, but submit to the ordering
restraints exerted upon them by the integral activity of the "whole" in its patterned systems
dynamics.
(1969:9).
.

.

Many hierarchical classifications of the physical

world have been postulated, most notably by Whitehead (1969),
Laszlo

(1973), Whyte (1973), and many others.

The most

frequently cited are those hierarchies which begin with

inorganic nature, that is, from elementary particles to
atomic nuclei, atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, ecosystems and a world system.

Whitehead’s scheme

is

radically

different in that he begins with human existence and works
his way in reverse direction to the ultimate happenings in
atoms.

This view is not in conflict with the part/whole

relationships and the hierarchical order of nature except
that in this scheme Whitehead is able to explain the emer-

gence of consciousness, purpose and intent ionality more

adequately
The problem of accounting for the phenomenon of
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hierarchical order has been largely the challenge of
the
life sciences (in particular, biology) in the form
of
reduct ioni siu

.

Barbour’s definition of reductionism makes

clear why this is a problem especially if it is seen as
the attributing of reality exclusively to the
smallest constituents of the world, and the
tendency to interpret higher levels of organization in terms of lower levels.
(in Thorpe,
1974:110)

Elementary phenomena in biology can be reduced to
physical and chemical explanation and this is always fully
valid and in fact necessary, as far as it goes, but if
these explanations are used to account for integrations
above the molecular level, then they are no longer adequate
or sufficient.

The enormous advances and successes in

molecular biology, genetics, and medicine would not have
been possible without the detailed analytic, reductionist
approach.

Ayala (1974)

Philosophy of Biology

,

,

in the Preface to Studies in the

analyzes the kinds of reductionism

that a scientist may espouse or reject.
types:

(1)

He identifies three

ontological reductionism, which reduces all

living phenomena to physical chemical processes and particles;

(2)

methodological reductionism, which

is

concerned

with the strategy of research, e.g., should lower levels
be studied first to explain the higher or should both

higher and lower levels be investigated?; and

(3)

epistemo-

logical reductionistic questions that ask whether "the

theories and experiential laws formulated in one field of

3d

science can be shown to be special cases of theories
and
laws formulated in some other branch of science?"
(Ayala,
1974. ix)

.

Most biologists can accept methodological re*

ductionism but differ in their acceptance of the other
two forms.
If the methodology is so successful,

then, as

Thorpe (1974) maintains, it is necessary to look very carefully into those specific areas in which it does fail.

It

appears that reductionism cannot explain the concept of

"emergence."

Broad’s definition of "emergence" is clear

and illuminating.

Emergence is the theory that the characteristic
behavior of the whole could not, even in theory,
be deduced from the most complete knowledge of
the behavior of its components, taken separately
or in other combinations, and of their proportions and arrangements in this whole.
(in Thorpe,
1974:110)
For example, the emergence of life in

a

cell can-

not be explained by simply putting together various combina-

tions of molecules.

In the field of animal behavior, con-

cepts such as memory, habituation, learning, peripheral

synthesis, etc., emerge which do not exist at the vegetable
level.

Similarly, at the level of human existence, the

unique capacity of consciousness, purposiveness, values,
moral intentions and religious convictions make their appearance.

It is indeed not possible to reduce these emer-

gent qualities solely to the operation of physical and

chemical processes even though without the material at the
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level of atomic and elementary particles,
these qualities

would not emerge.
Even in the realm of atomic physics Margenau
(1972)
identifies the emergence of more important laws at
higher
levels of complexity.

aescribe the state of

He states that it is possible to
a

small system of particles in terms

of position, velocity and forces as in Newtonian mechanics.

However, at the next level of aggregates such as

a

gas or

liquid it is useless to describe position, velocity and
force in terms of individual molecules.

Concepts such as

temperature, pressure, entropy, etc. are now necessary- - in

relation to single molecules these concepts have no meaning.
However, it is possible to infer through statistical

mechanics the collective properties of

a

gas if the posi-

tions and velocities of individual molecules are known.

The reverse, however, is not true.

Margenau says

that there is continuity of explanation
from below, but not from above.
One can go continually toward an understanding of matters on
the higher plane if one starts with knowledge on
the lower plane, though not in the reverse direcBut in this ascent, knowledge on the lower
tion.
plane becomes irrelevant because new concepts like
temperature, etc., emerge and these have no direct
(1972:42)
reference to particles.
.

.

.

Similarly, the behavior of individual elementary

particles is explained by the Schroedinger equation which
in a way is similar to Newton's

force, mass and motion.

2nd law as it relates to

If several elementary particles

of the same kind are present, then the more important Pauli
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Exclusion Principle operates.
In writing about social hierarchies, Arthur
Koestler

presents an interesting analysis of the individual as
part, and of society as

a

a

whole.

The single individual constitutes the apex of
the organismic hierarchy, and at the same time the
lowest unit of the social hierarchy.
Looking inward, he sees himself as a self-contained, unique
whole; looking outward as a dependent whole.
His self-assertive tendency is the dynamic manifestation of his unique wholeness as an individual;
his integrative tendency expresses his dependence
on the larger whole to which he belongs, his partness.
(1969:302)
.

.

.

Koestler states that the self-assertive tendency

is

associated with the biological concerns of survival at the
level of the individual.

The emotions that are triggered

through this tendency are defense and aggression, hunger,
fear and rage.

Integrative tendencies give rise to what may

be called "sel f- transcending or participatory" emotions

such as the human being's need to be part of

a

larger whole,

e.g., social groups, bonds and ties of affection, belief and

value systems.

The individual functions as an autonomous

being but at the same time is

a

part of, but different from,

the larger reality or nation.

An organismic perspective is concerned with patterns
of organization that are reflected at different integrative

levels.
a

A particular pattern of relations as exemplified in

whole is unique to that whole and cannot be reduced

pattern of the part.

to the
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Efficient and Final Causation
A satisfactory cosmology must explain the
interweaving of efficient and final causation
The two spheres of operation should be
interwoven and required, each by the other.
But neither sphere should arbitrarily limit the
scope of the alternative mode.
(Whitehead.
1958:28)
.

.

.

An organismic perspective, if it is to remain faithful to

its principles of wholeness and interrelatedness,

must acknowledge the operation of both efficient and final
causes.

Emphasis on one to the exclusion of the other leads

to contradiction.

The rejection of final cause dates back

to the 17th century and the rise of modern science.

The

inevitable outcome of the early empiricist scientific

philosophy led to the belief that
Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless,
colorless, merely the hurrying of material endlessly, meaninglessly
(Whitehead, 1967:54)
.

It was

this kind of a perspective that propelled the

French astronomer and mathematician Pierre Laplace, in the

mid-17th century, to formulate

a

called the "Laplacian Illusion."

principle which today is
He stated that if one

knew the exact position and motion of every atom then the
entire future of the world could be predicted.

Causality

'in this narrow sense is called determinism by which is

meant "that there are immutable laws that uniquely determine the future state of any system from its present state"
(Heisenberg, 1970:34).

:

.
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Even though such strict deterministic and mechan-

istic views are not adhered to so vehemently by scientists
of today, the notion of final cause or teleology, is not

readily affirmed.

Criticism of the use of teleological

concepts is traditionally based on several objections.

Mayr

,

a

strong opponent on this score, outlines the major

objections as being

(1)

teleological explanations impart an

unverifiable metaphysical or theological doctrine into
science;

the assumption that

(2)

a

pre-conceived future

goal was the cause of current events is contrary to the

concept of causality; and

(3)

teleological language seems

to involve "objectionable anthropomorphism"

(1974:93-94).

To overcome these objections in living organisms

which do display goal-seeking as intrinsic phenomena, the
term "teleonomy" was coined by Pittendrigh (in Mayr, 1974).
His reasoning went along these lines:

What it was that the biologist could not escape
was the plain fact--or rather the fundamental fact-which he must (as scientist) explain: that the objects of biological analysis are organizations (he
calls them organisms) and as such, are end- directed
Organization is more than mere order; order lacks
organization is_ end- directed.
end- dir ectedness
(Pittendrigh in a letter to Mayr, 1974:115).
,

Pittendrigh

'

s

intention was to describe the end- dir ected-

ness of a mechanistic system, the only kind of system that
was acceptable to scientists.

Mayr presents

a

modified

definition of teleonomy which is still strictly causal and

mechanistic

.
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A tel eonomic process or behavior is one which owes
its goal -directedness to the operation of a program.
(1974:98)

This definition refers only to living organisms and man-

made machines, in which

a

program may be the DNA code or

computer program, respectively.

a

At the level of evolutionary biology where scien-

tists are dealing with crucial issues such as the origin
of life and the emergence of man, the tendency to maintain

only an efficient causal explanation is still evident.

Waddington cites Mayr's views on 20th century Darwinism in
the following two postulates:

that all the events that lead to the production
of new genotypes, such as mutation, recombination
and fertilization, are essentially random and not
in any way whatsoever finalistic, and
(1)

(2) that the order in the organic world, manifested
in the numerous adaptations of organisms to the
physical and biotic environments is due to the

ordering effect of natural selection.
1962:85)

(Waddington,

From these postulates, the neo -Darwinists hold that

"natural selection is an ordering process which brings

design out of randomness" (Birch, 1974:227) and this
logically indisputable.
’

nomogenes is

'

.

.

.

Its

(Dobzhansky, 1974:312).

is

For Dobzhansky "Evolution is
'law,' nomos

,

is natural selection"

He goes further and attributes

creativity and the rise of the diversity of organic forms
to natural selection alone.

Mayr (1961) also subscribes to

the view that natural selection is the sole instrument of

evolution
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The crucial question

identified by Birch (1974)

is

when he asks whether natural selection

is

the one and only

ordering process in organic and biological evolution.
talenti (1974),

a

Mon-

neo-Darwinist who acknowledges the omni-

potence of natural selection, refers to the above sentiments
as

"unresolved questions."

The rise of phenomena such as

consciousness and purpose in man do not receive adequate

explanations from the process of natural selection.
It appears that other factors have to be included

if goal - directedness

be accounted for.

,

consciousness and intentions are to

Waddington notes that

We have considerable grounds for believing
then, that mentality in the broad sense, or at
least behavior (biologists tend to be very timid
about mentioning the mind)
is a factor of importance in evolution
The situation is that
existing modes of behavior [themselves controlled,
with greater or lesser latitude, by heredity] combine with the external circumstances to determine
(1962:91)
the nature of the effective environment.
,

.

.

.

He expands on the notion of "mentality" in what he calls
a

four-factor theory of evolution comprised of "the genetic

system, the natural selective system, the exploitative
system, and the developmental or epigenetic system" (Waa-

dington, 1975:270).

The exploitative system is the area

in which the organism or entity has some "internal determi-

nation" in interacting with the environment.
(1962)

cites the example of letting loose

rabbit in an open grassland.

a

Waddington
hare and

a

Instinctively, the hare makes

or a
its home in the open field and the rabbit in the hedge

4 5

bank.

However, it is not possible to predict exactly where

in the field or which actual site in the hedge will be

chosen.

For Waddington, having been deeply influenced by

Whitehead, it is the interaction between the internal state
of the organism and the external pressures of the environ-

ment that constitute the epigenetic principle reflected in
the shift to organismic thinking in evolution (Waddington,
1962 )

.

Internal determination is one of the main propositions of the Whiteheadian organismic thesis.

Whitehead

terms it the "subjectivist principle," that everything is
in part determined by its own internal

state.

This does

not imply that there is no external agency, such as the

environment, that influences this state.

But the environ-

ment does not fully determine the behavior of any given
entity.

In man,

the ability to determine the future course

of his evolution is unbounded.

Consciousness and the

capacity for symbolization allow man to store information
in his memory, make plans for the future, and so affect what

he will become.

The subjectivist principle in man is trans-

lated into subjective aim or purpose or intentionality

.

If

man is viewed as an integral part of nature, having evolved
from other forms, then that which is inherent in man must
also exist in some form in other levels of existence.

Whitehead says
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Mankind has gradually developed from the lowliest forms of life, and it must therefore be explained in terms applicable to all such forms.
But why construe the later forms by analogy to the
earlier forms? Why not reverse the process? It
would seem to be more sensible, more truly empirical, to allow each living species to make its own
contribution to the demonstration of factors inherent in living things.
(1958:15)
The contribution of existence at the mineral, vege-

table and animal levels is that some internal determination
exists in what they become, but not as consciousness, pur-

pose or aspirations which are unique to man.

A stone has

very little determination over what it becomes, but even so
its atoms have some determination over where they finally

reside.

Similarly, in the plant and animal spheres, some

internal state is operative, in

much more evident in animals.

a

small way in plants, but

The subjectivist principle

is W hitehead’s equivalent of final cause in evolution;

ran-

r

domness and chance are characteristic of events which are
not completely determined by some external agency.
In his major work, Process and Reality

,

Whitehead

accords the notion of efficient and final causation

ticular status in his categorical scheme.

a

par-

He claims

That every condition to which the process of
becoming conforms in any particular instance, has
its reason either in the character of some actual
entity in the actual world of that concrescence,
or in the character of the subject which is in the
process of concrescence. This category of explanaIt
tion is termed the "ontological principle."
efficient,
of
could also be termed the "principle
(1969:29)
and final, causation."

The efficient cause in the evolutionary process is

.
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natural selection, which acts upon the organisms that already exist in tne physical world.

Final cause is

a

factor

in the character of the subject or the internal "urge" or

determination towards self-completion in the process of
becoming
Charles Birch (1974), in an essay on "Chance, Necessity and Purpose" in evolution, examines the issue of

teleology from

Whiteheadian perspective.

a

He cites the

views of Thomas Huxley on evolution and teleology.

The doctrine of evolution is the most formidable
opponent of all the commoner and coarser forms of
Teleology
Nevertheless, it is necessary to
remember that there is a wider teleology which is
not touched by the doctrine of Evolution, but is
actually based upon the fundamental proposition of
Evolution. The proposition is that the whole
w orld, living and non-living, is the result of
mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of
the powers possessed by the molecules of which the
primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed.
If this be true, it is no less certain that the
existing world lay potentially in the cosmic vapor
The teleological and the mechanical views of
nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive.
(Huxley, in Birch, 1974:228)
.

.

.

r

.

.

.

The key phrase, "the existing world lay potentially
in the cosmic vapor" can be interpreted in terms of White-

head’s organismic philosophy, which elaborates upon the

process of translating potentiality into actuality.

All

the determinate actual entities in the world of existence

did not arise out of nothing--the potential for actualization existed.

Something does not come from nothing, but

from something, and for Whitehead this something is the
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realm of potentiality or possibility, which has the
capacity
for actualization in some future state.

Birch explains the notion of potentiality in evolu-

tion as follows:
We tend to take for granted the potentialities
nascent in the unevolved cosmos from its foundations and w ithout which the emergence of life and
consciousness would not have been possible. Potentialities are unseen realities.
In Huxley's statement is the idea of the potentiality of the phenomena of the universe residing in the primordial
particles.
Far from being a preformist view this
is an epigenetic view of nature.
There is no
necessity that what is potentially possible must
eventuate. What eventuates depends upon chance
and circumstance.
(1975:228)
r

The philosophy of organism as set forth by White-

head is comprehensive enough to account for not only final
cause as internal determination and the potential for
realization, but also for natural selection as the efficient cause in the process of evolution.
In the field of atomic physics,

the Pauli Exclusion

Principle and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle are in
essence measures of the internal determination in

a

system.

Heisenberg, in discussing the statistical nature of quantum theory, says
that quantum theory actually forces us to
formulate these laws precisely as statistical laws
(1970:
and to depart radically from determinism.
.

.

.

39)

He continues:
in complete knowledge of a system must be an
essential par t of every formulation in quantum
.

.

.

theory

.

(1970:41)
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The very act of trying to measure the position
and

velocity of an atomic particle- obscures the required
data.
Under these conditions the particle "behaves" differently.

Heisenberg provides examples of some of these

uncertainty relations in quantum theory.

alpha-radiation of

a

In discussing the

radium atom, he says that quantum

theory, through statistical laws, can give some information
of the probability of an alpha particle leaving the nucleus

but it cannot predict at what precise point
in time emission will occur, for this is uncertain
in principle.
We cannot even assume that new laws
still to be discovered will allow us to determine
this precise point in time
41 )
( 1970
.

.

.

.

.

.

:

Similarly, in calculating the strength of an atomic
bomb, only the upper and lower limits of the magnitude of

explosion can be predicted.

Exact calculations are im-

possible because it depends on the behavior of only
atoms when the detonation occurs.

a

few

The particular atoms

which will take part in the fission cannot be predicted
precisely.

That is, the atoms which actually participate

in the process must somehow be determined internally in the

system.

In Whiteheadian terms this is the subjectivist

principle in operation, that is, the final cause or "purpose"
is to some extent determined by internal relations

in the

collective system of atoms.
Even in the social sciences, ever since the diver-

gence of psychology from philosophy, man has been conceived
of in mechanistic terms or just efficient causes.

The sig-
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nificant event was the publication of Newton's Principi
a

which set forth the major principles of classical
mechanics.
The prevailing idea was that the behavior of man could
be

explained in terms of Newton's mechanical model.

Science

viewed man in terms of input and output and cause and
effect explanations of behavior which created the vision
of

a

robot or

a

puppet.

Michael Polanyi (1974) discusses

this notion in a thoughtful manner, having first been

a

scientist and then turning to philosophy to disclose the

nature of the scientist's thought, his beliefs and convictions, and his influence upon society.

He says, "A complete

causal interpretation of man and human affairs disintegrates
all rational grounds for men's convictions and actions.

leaves you with

a

It

picture of human affairs construed in

terms of appetites and checked only by fear" (Polanyi, 1974:
64)

.

This view was widely held by experimental psycholo-

gists in the early 1900s in the established behaviorist

tradition.

Psychological thought processes were explained

by efficient causes, i.e., cause and effect relationships.

The notion of man as being guided by final cause, i.e., the

ingression of purpose and will in his life was ruled out
as unscientific.

Any evidence that lay outside the suc-

cessful methodology was ignored.

Scientists spend years of

their lives patiently designing experiments for the purpose
of proving that animals are only motivated by psychological
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drives and needs.

Whitehead's comment

is

apt:

"Scientists

animated by the purpose of proving that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study" (White-

head, 1958:16).

Purpose is the driving force in man; it gives direction, guidance and power in the pursuit of
and meaningful life.

a

successful

Society is plagued with individuals

who are on the verge of absolute despair or who display
crass hedonism because of
(1971),

a

purposeless existence.

Towers

in citing Frankl's notion of the "existential

vacuum," states that the insignificance of man has been
caused by

astronomy, which is the science of the in-

(1)

finitely large;

(2)

the uncertainty principle, which robs

us of any belief in certainty and stability; and (3) psycho-

therapy, which analyzes and reduces praiseworthy human actions to nothing but inner, unconscious, unresolved drives

The result has been the overwhelming spirit

and conflicts.

of "being adrift in

a

totally meaningless universe."

Frankl

says that

We may define the existential vacuum as the frustration of what we may consider to be the most
basic motivational force in man, the will to
It is an inherent tendency in man
meaning.
to reach out for meaning to fulfill, for values
(1969:398-400)
to actualize.
.

.

.

However, the rise of humanistic psychology and organismic

philosophy have presented the necessity of viewing man as
being who is purposeful, forms goals, makes choices, and

a

.
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who is endeavoring to become his unique, individual self
(Rogers

,

1964)

Just focusing on efficient causes either in nature
or in man presents only a limited view of reality.

An

organismic perspective in adhering to the principle of
relatedness seeks to reunite both the external and internal
aspects of events in nature and in human experience.

Ef-

ficient and final causation reflect the patterned unity
that is necessary if we are to have any meaningful under-

standing of reality.
Toward an Organismic Perspective
in Science Education
The preceding discussion on the organization of
systems, hierarchical structuration and integration, and

efficient and final causation was undertaken so that the

organismic perspective in scientific thought could be made
Certainly not all scientists would sub-

more explicit.
scribe to such

a

viewpoint.

However, in trying to ascer-

tain where contemporary scientific thought stands, one

necessarily focuses on the work of those who are at the
forefront of knowledge, those prominent figures who see
the growth of our understanding about reality in an evolu-

tionary perspective.

These are the scientists who effect

revolutions in our accustomed and comfortable ways of
seek
thinking, who capture visions of the future, and who
to interpret the totality of reality.

The new patterns of

.
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thinking in science, imperceptible as they may seem,
pervade our consciousness and have the power, as Whitehead
claims, "to recolor our mentality."

Anshen, in the Pre-

face to the World Perspective series, clearly describes the

impact of the scientific view of reality:
For our problem is to discover a principle of
differentiation and yet relationship lucid enough
to justify and to purify scientific, philosophic
and all other knowledge, both discursive and intuitive, by accepting their interdependence. This
is the crisis in consciousness made articulate
through the crisis in science. This is the new
awakening.
(1971 :xi)

The point of view adopted in this dissertation is
that an organismic philosophy can accommodate the merits
of mechanism but can also transcend its limitations with
an emphasis on wholeness, unity and organism and so pro-

vide a comprehensive view of the nature of man and the

nature of physical reality.

Whitehead’s process philosophy

or philosophy of organism was found to be the most expan-

sive, particularly in the range of issues which it could

address
The organismic philosophy advanced by Whitehead
views the universe as being characterized by change and

dynamic interactions rather than static actuality.

Change

implies process which automatically presupposes potentiality.

Potentiality becoming actuality

philosophy of organism.

is

the central thesis of a

Any active, developing, open sys-

to
tem, rather than maintaining a steady state, can be seen
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exhibit the powerful processes of change, growth and
adaptation.

At every moment these dynamic systems are in

the process of actualizing a potential state of being.

Whitehead states that "the actual world

is

a

process, and

that the process is the becoming of actual entities"
(1969:27)

.

Man, as a flexible and active system, is also an

integral part of this hierarchically structured universe.
He may be viewed as being in

a

continuous, dynamic process

of development and transformation with the capacity to pert

petually actualize his potentialities and fulfill his intentions and aspirations.

potentiality

is

The perpetual actualization of

manifested in the tremendous strides that

man has made in the fields of science, medicine, and technology, such that he has the power to constantly improve
the quality of his life, if these powers are used wisely.

Maintenance of

a

high quality of life is conditioned by the

continuous translation of potentiality into actuality at an
optimal rate.

Whitehead (1958) postulates the facilitation

of actualization of potential as the primary purpose of life,

since the aim of survival is not only to live but to be
alive in a more satisfactory manner.
I

propose that science education should appeal to

that
the central proposition of the philosophy of organism:

be found
the reality of all of creation on every level is to

accepted as
in the process of becoming and that man must be
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a

purposeful being who has the power to actualize his

potential and contribute to the collective survival of
mankind.

Science curriculum development then, in its

broadest sense, will have to focus not only on fostering
the growth of understanding of scientific concepts, but

also on how that knowledge is to be applied.

The following chapter sets forth

a

possible ap-

proach to solving some of the problems raised in Chapter
I.

The Anisa Model is presented as one viable scheme that

incorporates an explicit philosophical base (derived from
the work of Alfred North Whitehead)

,

and a coherent theo-

retical framework that can address the issue of science

curriculum development in

a

wider context.
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CHAPTER

III

THE ANISA MODEL: AN INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM FOR

UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE
ACTUALIZATION OF HUMAN POTENTIAL
The abstract, general principles of

a

philosophical

scheme of thought do not directly issue in action.

principles need to be translated into
cal framework that can guide practice.

a

These

coherent theoreti-

Jordan

6

Shephard,

in describing the role of philosophy, say that

A more specific function of philosophy is to
stimulate the formation of theory from which
testable hypotheses may be deduced.
(1972:23)

Broudy, in the following statement, touches on the

need for

a

comprehensive theory in education:

This unifying principle is a theory of education
which rationally weaves together the objectives of
the culture, life outcomes, school outcomes, the
training of teachers, specialists and administrators, as well as the facilities and resources
by means of which the whole enterprise goes or
The consistency of this theory, its
falters.
inclusiveness and sophistication, its faithfulness
to the demands of the culture, to social reality,
to the facts of pedagogical life constitute criteria for curriculum decisions that transcend
It is, I shall argue, the only
establishments.
rationally defensible basis for educational de(1966:18)
cisions.

Without such an integrative framework, educational

practice will to

a

large extent remain ineffective.

Frag-

mentation, frustration and the lack of meaningful experiences are frequent problems that plague teachers.

The
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accumulated knowledge from experience and research findings has to be organized into a useable form and
this can-

not be done unless a coherent body of theory is formulated

(Jordan and Streets, 1973).

Information on human growth

and development, learning, and teaching can be so organized
that the classroom teacher has the benefit of

from which to operate.

a

solid base

A teacher can then be freed from

being tied to specific instances and activities and can
use the general theoretical principles as

a

guide to prac-

tice.

The continual interplay between theory and practice
is

well-stated by Belth:
Most important, we are freed from the impossible
distinction between theory and practice in educating.
The study of education, then, can be
the study of practice which is developed on the
grounds of some definable, analyzable theory of
man, knowledge, experience and value.
(1965:35)
In this manner,

tice informs theory.

theory guides practice, and prac-

At its best,

a

theory should be pre-

dictive and if the predictions are not borne out, then
changes have to be made in the theory.

viewed as

a

If education is

process of unfoldment of the developing indi-

vidual, then educational theories have to be flexible and

tentative so that new research findings on human growth
and learning can be continually incorporated.

Tentativeness, relativeness and predictability
are guiding principles in theoretical construction and re
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construction.

The power of theories are most familiar
in

the natural sciences and in mathematics.

Briefly, theories

are sets of abstract, conceptual constructs from
which in-

ferences can be made about the world (Belth, 1965).

theory is a tool that aids in going beyond that which

directly observable.

In some cases,

A
is

theories are based on

experimental evidence and said to be inductive; in other
cases theories are derived deductively from fundamental

propositions about the nature of reality, but they
have to be substantiated inductively.

For example, Ein-

stein’s general theory of relativity was deduced from pro-

positions about the nature of gravity and light, but the
theory was accepted after experimental confirmation.

Similarly, in education, what goes on in the child's

mind cannot be observed but has to be inferred from behavior
or products of behavior such as written work.

In most

cases, only content or factual knowledge can be assessed by

tests or observation.

However, since so much of learning

and the effects of teaching cannot be seen directly,

theories that are based on fundamental assumptions about
the nature of the child and on research findings are essential

.

The plea by science educators for

a

viable theory

in science education can now be viewed in some perspective.

Science education could be rendered more effective if there

were

a

comprehensive theory about the nature of the child,
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learning and the teaching process.

The challenge to

science education is acute, as reflected in the words of
Hurd: "We now have sixty years of cumulated research in

science teaching and yet little notion of where we stand
on practically any question"

(1971:246).

The Philosophy and Theory of the
Anisa Model^
The Anisa Model is the expression of the hope that
it is possible to create a scientifically-based educational

system that can equip parents, teachers and children with
the power to be in charge of their own destiny.

Anisa may

be viewed as a socio- cultural endeavor whose aim is to show

people how to obtain and use knowledge, so that not only
will their own potential be actualized, but also, they can

contribute to the betterment of the society in which they
live.

Such a task is not easy and comfortable.

It calls

for a sustained, prolonged and systematic effort that can

effect changes in the traditional ways of perceiving,

thinking, feeling and willing.
Over the last fifteen years efforts have been ex-

brief discussion has been drawn from articles
published on the Anisa Model, namely: D. Jordan and R. Shephard, "The Philosophy of the Anisa Model." World Order reprint 7(1) (Fall 1972P: 23-31); D. Jordan and D. Streets, "A
New Basis for Educational Planning," Young Children 28(5)
(June 1973) 289-307 Jordan and Streets, '“Guiding the Process of Becoming: The Anisa Theories of Curriculum and
Teaching," World Order reprint 7(4) (Summer 1973):29-40.
Every major proposition will therefore not be documented.
^"This

:

;
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erted in the direction of establishing the fundamental

premises of the Anisa Model.

An explicit philosophy with

carefully defined first principles forms the foundation
upon which the Anisa Model rests.

The process or organis-

mic philosophy of the philosopher, mathematician and logician, Alfred North Whitehead, was adopted in an attempt to

transcend the limitations of
istic view of man.

a

mechanistic and material-

Whitehead's philosophy of organism

serves to highlight those features that are characteristic
of man, such as consciousness, will, purpose and creativity.

An organismic perspective is essential and vitally needed
if we are to view education as the process of drawing out

the latent, inherent potentialities of every individual.

Man's growth or becoming is characterized by the continual

translation of potentiality into actuality such that the
primary focus of development is on process rather than
static actuality.
The organismic philosophical perspective served as
a

framework so that the accumulated knowledge about human

growth, development and learning could be synthesized into
a

comprehensive, coherent, and logical body of educational

theory.

Explicit theories of development, curriculum,

teaching, evaluation and administration have been derived
from the basic philosophical principles and address the

issue of how the actualization of potential may be effected.

The Anisa theory of development identifies two
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basic categories of potentialities: biological potentialities which are released through proper nutrition, and

psychological potentialities which are actualized through
learning.

Psychological potentialities may be further

classified as psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitional potentialities.

The separation and

distinction amongst the different categories of psychological potentialities was made only for the ease of under-

standing and fostering

a

particular dimension of develop-

ment; it is fully understood that every act of experience

will involve all five categories, each to
lesser extent.

a

greater or

The theory affirms that development as

a

whole is sustained through interaction with the environment.

Thus the quality of environment influences the

quality of the interaction which in turn influences development

.

The theory of curriculum describes what informa-

tion is to be learned (content)
(process)

,

,

how it is to be learned

and what children do to learn both content and

Content curriculum goals are organized around the

process.

hierarchical classification of environments- - in ascending
order from mineral, vegetable, animal, human to the unknown.

A grouping of the first three environments repre-

sents the physical environment (the realm of natural

science)

.

Process curriculum goals are arranged around

the categories of psychological potentialities, so that in

.

.
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interacting with the environment, psychomotor, perceptual,

cognitive

affective and/or volitional processes may be

,

actualized
In interacting with the environments,

a

learner

will utilize three interrelated symbol systems: mathematics, language, and the arts.

Some environments may

be mediated predominantly by one mode of symbolization,

whereas at other times

a

combination of modes may be used.

Potentialities, when they are actualized, are ex-

pressed as patterned uses of energy.

When the learning of

some content is fused with the patterned use of energy
(process)

,

attitudes and values are formed which reflect

the character and personality of the learner.

Interaction

with the physical, human and unknown environments results
in the formation of material, social and philosophical

values respectively.

Upon these values rest the higher

order competencies, that is, technological, moral and
fiducial.

The combination of the three higher-order com-

petencies results in self- competence or personal effectance,
i.e., learners who are self - competent

,

with balanced and

wel 1 - integrated personalities who can take charge of their
own learning by knowing how to apply their knowledge to
life
In searching for an integrative system that could

answer some of the issues facing science education,

I

found

coherence of
the comprehensiveness, conceptual clarity and
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the Anisa philosophy and theory to be particularly
at-

tractive (see Figure I).

Since the focus of this dis-

sertation is on science curriculum development,
the Anisa Theory can serve

generation of
a

a

a

I

feel that

valuable function in the

possible framework for the development of

natural science curriculum.
Science and the Actualization of
Human Potential
The attempt to place education on

a

scientific

basis has been a major goal of the Anisa Model.
ly,

According-

the study and the teaching of science occupies an

important place in the theoretical framework of the Model.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an elabo-

ration of some of the Anisa propositions as they relate
to science and the investigation of nature,

the process of

symbolization, the formation of material values, the attain-

ment of technological competence and its relation to
moral and fiducial competence.

Purpose of Science

Throughout recorded history man has been driven by
his quest for explanations and answers about the phenomena
in the physical world.

This process of inquiry, together

with the desire to know and to understand, was the impetus
to the rise of modern science.

Not only is there the
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search to know why and how things happen, but there

is

also

the drive to find relationships between events and
see how
all events are integrated into the unity of existence.

Bronowski

,

in describing the scientific endeavor,

the goal is
.

.

.

.

.

to find nature one,

a

says that

coherent unity

that every research carries the sense of drawing

together the threads of the world into

a

patterned web”

(1967:138)

The desire to explore, to discover order and

patterned relationships has been amply demonstrated and
documented in the field of psychology and
ing briefly.

is

worth review-

One can understand the power of the need to

find and create order when its relationship to survival is

made more evident.

Gibson (1967), in her extensive work

on perceptual learning, states that out of the welter of

stimuli that impinge on the sense organs, the organism extracts certain bits of information.

It is the detection

of the distinctive features of objects and events and their

patterns of invariant relations that
the organism.

is

of most value to

These invariant features and relationships

aid in the reduction of uncertainty and hence create order

and

a

sense of predictability and stability.

The organism

or the individual gains meaning from ordered events and not

from disordered or chaotic situations.

In the continual

reduction of subjective uncertainty, survival can be sustained and enhanced.

Reinforcement for the detection of

.
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of invariants may be provided by external rewards
or know-

ledge of the results but primarily the satisfaction

is

internal

Psychologists, such as Berlyne (1966) also suggest that curiosity and exploration act as strong internal

motivating factors.

Berlyne found that there were two

kinds of exploratory responses.

Firstly, specific ex-

ploration occurs when an organism

is

disturbed by lack of

information and thus left prey to uncertainty and conflict.

Activities such as science, philosophy and mathematics bear
a

close affinity to this type of exploration, with curio-

sity being the motivating factor.

ploration is of

a

Secondly, diverse ex-

more general type where what is sought is

an optimum amount of novelty, surprise, complexity, change
or variety.

Berlyne has investigated this latter type in

many experiments with subjects ranging from young infants
to adults.

Complexity, irregularity and incongruity of

pattern was investigated.

An optimum range of these fac-

tors increased exploratory behavior, but if they were

extremely irregular, then the responses declined.

Even

babies of 3-9 months were attracted by patterns that were

more complex as these possessed more internal contour.
In man the spirit of inquiry into nature is more

than the desire to know and to understand.

It also en-

tails the sense of achieving mastery or gaining control

over nature by applying its laws.
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In his classic paper on "Motivation
Reconsidered:

The Concept of Competence," White (1959) reviews the
various

theories of motivation based on primary drives and presents
a

new conceptualization which accounts for the previous

gaps.

Competence is defined as "an organism’s capacity to

deal effectively with its environment" (White, 1959:297).

Exploration, play, manipulation and producing changes serve
to create a certain "feeling of efficacy"

in dealing with

the environment, a sense of mastery and satisfaction over

environmental situations.

These types of activities lead

the organism to discover how the environment can be changed

and the consequences that flow from these changes.

motivating force behind such behavior

"competence motivation" or effectance.

is what

The

White terms

It is directed,

selective, persistent and satisfies an intrinsic need to
deal effectively with the environment.

Above all, this

view of effectance has adaptive and survival value.
A further discussion by Whitehead on the role of

curiosity helps to make the connection between the impelling power of curiosity and the conceptual understanding
that accrues from such a drive.

In the following quota-

tion, he extends our conception of curiosity and endows
it with added significance:

'curiosity' somewhat trivializes
In the
that inward motive which has driven man.
craving
the
means
'curiosity'
greater sense
of reason that the facts discriminated in experiIt means the refusal to be
ence be understood.
.

.

.

the word

.

.

.
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satisfied with the bare welter of fact, or even
with the bare habit of routine. The first step
in s c i enc e and philosophy has been made when it
is grasped that every routine exemplifies a principle which is capable of statement in abstraction from its particular exemplification.
(1967a: 141)

The statement of general principles in abstraction
from the immediate facts stand as

a

testimony to some of the

greatest achievements of the mind of man.

Broad, general-

ized propositions that could be articulated led to the

formation of theories and laws about the working of nature.

Having general theoretical conceptualizations about the

numerous events in the physical world has allowed man to
display

a

sense of mastery or competence in dealing with

natural phenomena.

Through these theories man now has the

power to test out possible consequences of certain events,

make predictions about novel events and plan and choose
alternative routes of inquiry and action.
what Whitehead calls

’’the

He can make

creative advance into novelty."

The purpose of science in the conceptual, intellectual and theoretical vein may be seen as possessing a

transcendent function: philosophical and theoretical knowledge about nature provide man with

a

vehicle with which he

can transcend his present lack of understanding and per-

petually move beyond into the realm of unknown possibilities.

Application of theoretical knowledge in uplifting
the quality of lifs of mankind is also an important func-

tion of science.

The distinction that is frequently made
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between 'pure science' and 'applied science’
and unnecessary.

is artificial

Both areas feed each other, as is evident

in Whitehead's statement about the rise of modern
science:

Invention stimulated thought, thought quickened physical

speculation" (1976c:

5).

Much of the poverty, disease, and ill-health in
the world have been successfully attacked by advances in

science.

Scientific and technical progress have certainly

given men all over the world visions of the power of science.

However, for all the advances in science and technology, the
level of the conscious awareness of preserving the earth as
an inhabitable planet has yet to be realized.

Pollution,

depletion of energy resources, and the threat of nuclear

destruction haunt us daily.

As Huxley says,

human race is, in fact, surrounded by

realized possibilities,

ploration" (1957:15).

a

a

"...

the

large area of un-

challenge to the spirit of ex-

The time has certainly arrived when

the challenge to discovery and invention has to be closely

allied to moral concerns.

Science does not exist in isola-

tion from the people--its true power lies in its capacity
to enhance the quality of survival of mankind, both intel-

lectually, emotionally and physically.

Mediation of the Physical Environment
Through the Process of Symbolization
Interaction with any environment can be mediated by
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the use of symbols.

One of the propositions of the Anisa

Model is that there are three symbol systems which mediate
our encounters with the world; namely, mathematics, lan-

guage and the arts.

Scientific investigation of nature

depends upon the use of math and language (e.g., English

terminology) primarily; the role of the arts per se

is

negligible except in the sense of aesthetic awareness and
holistic integration of various events into some unitary
experience, which is a vital concern in science.
The process of symbolization is defined by Marks

(1976:91) as "the capacity to use (entities) symbols to

represent abstractions (conceptions or meanings)

The

data of experience are received through perception (sight,

hearing, smell and touch) and are repsented by symbols.

A

symbol is an entity that can stand for something else in the
For example, words, numbers, pictures or

absence of it.

graphs are symbols.
For Whitehead any phase of human experience has
two aspects -- intell ectual and aesthetic, i.e., the act of

symbolization may be seen as logical and/or aesthetic
(1968b; 1969).

2

Interactions which are designed to insure

^For a detailed elaboration of the role of symbolization and abstraction in the Anisa Model see Marks (1976).

^Current developments in the Anisa Model center
around the explication of the logical and aesthetic modes
Since these developments are still
of symbolization.
process, this dissertation will not dwell on these facts
great detail.

m

m
.
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control of the environment depend on scientific
understanding and this is only possible when symbols are
used to sus-

tain logical modes of thought.

zation are used as

a

Logical modes of symboli-

means of expressing the 1:1 corres-

pondence between appearance and objective reality, i.e.,
the representations are as accurate, precise and true to

the original as possible.

The scientist in the logical

investigation of nature is analytic and endeavors to be as
objective as possible.

However, it is fallacious to assume

that scientists are wholly objective in their interactions

with the physical environment.

From an interact ionist

point of view, the unity of experience is exemplified in the

integrated action of the subjective and the objective, the
internal and external states of the organism.

scientific thought

is

The nature of

marked by the interplay of these two

elements: while a scientist attempts to be as objective as

possible in the light of the given evidence, he

is nonethe-

less continually guided by inner, subjective states--pur-

poses, intentions, aspirations.

Despite its air of strict

empiricism and objectivity, science can be understood
a

deeply humanistic endeavor.

Polanyi, in

a

as

discussion on

objectivity in science, recalls how scientific theory came
to be reduced to a ’’convenient contrivance" in the modern

mind.

It appears, however,

that reality as painted by

science cannot escape being viewed from

perspective.

He claims that

a

singularly human
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as human beings, we must inevitably see the
universe from a center lying within ourselves and
speak about it in terms of a human language
shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse.
Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human
perspective from our picture of the world must
lead to absurdity.
1 )
( 1958
:

The human perspective that Polanyi speaks about may
be seen as the aesthetic mode of symbolization in the scien-

tific process in inquiry.
a

Aesthetic symbolization serves as

means of expressing the subjective or internal phase of

human experience.

The logical analysis of nature is ac-

companied by an intimate sense of awe, wonder and joy in
the harmony of existence.

A scientist expresses this sub-

jective experience of nature in the elegance and beauty of
the mathematical formulations or in the simplicity of

general principles.
On the one hand, it is true to say that scientific

inquiry is primarily

a

logical, rational, and analytic

process, but on the other hand it

is

inadequate because it

fails to account for the integrative and holistic aspect of

thought.

The problem appears to be one of emphasis and

purpose rather than deliberate exclusion.

In the logical

and aesthetic modes of symbolization, the purpose for the

expression is different and therefore the principles of

translation or method of representation also differs.

A

scientist will use precise, systematic, mathematical
formulae to describe the laws of gravity whereas the artist
may write

a

poem, paint

a

work of art of create

a

dance to
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describe the same law.

The scientist will rarely use

aesthetic symbols to express his discoveries but only
logical symbols like language and mathematics.

However,

the general frame of reference within which he operates

proceeds from aesthetic assumptions such as the order of
nature and the unity of all existence.
The patterns in nature are represented symbolically
in a variety of ways by scientists:

mathematical formulae

and graphical representations describe the relationships

between phenomena in the physical world; accurate works or
treatises are written about the principles and laws of

physics, chemistry, biology and geology; and diagrams

which are precise, pleasing in appearance and true to
form are used to represent plants, animals, molecular structures and geological formations.

In all these instances,

the goal is to clarify the 1:1 correspondence between ap-

pearance and reality.
Whitehead’s philosophy expressed the relationships
among the notions of appearance, reality, truth, beauty,

science and art.

He says that the method of investigation

in science is dedicated to the pursuit of truth.

The mean-

ing of this is made more explicit by Whitehead (1967) in
his discussion of appearance and reality: reality is that

which exists or that which is.

Appearance is only an

’’incredibly simplified edition of real ity” -what is seen or

observed is limited to our human way of looking and under-
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standing.

The measure of truth exists insofar as
appear-

ance corresponds with reality, which of itself
can never be
known directly. Whitehead writes that "Truth is
the con-

formation of Appearance to Reality.

This conformation may

be more or less, also direct or indirect" (1967:241).

Experimentation and investigation can make closer and
closer approximations to the way things are and so present
a

clearer picture of events in the world.

Scientific laws

are never more than an approximation to the truth, although
at times

it may be a very close one

(Huxley, 1957).

Beauty, for Whitehead, is "the mutual adaptation of
the several factors in an occasion of experience"

(1967:252);

that is, it represents the integration of various items into
a

patterned unity of experience.

Integration, pattern and

unity are elements of order and in this sense the scientist's
search for the order of nature is the pursuit of beauty.
At a deeper and less obvious level, the universe is har-

moniously well-ordered, which makes Whitehead's claim fitting: "The teleology of the Universe is directed to the

production of Beauty" (1967a:265).
Traditionally, beauty has been associated only or

primarily with artistic pursuits and the implication
that science and art are somehow incompatible.

is

Bronowski

says that the dichotomy between science and art has been

one of "the most destructive modern prejudices" (1967:9),
and C.P. Snow (1959) has amply described the schism in his
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.

Science and art, when truly sig-

nificant, incorporate both truth and beauty.

For the

scientist, the discovery of the laws of nature

beautiful truth, and for the artist,

a

is

a

work of art is

a

truthful beauty.
Role of Mathematics in Science
As mentioned previously, the primary means of in-

quiry in science is through the processes of logical
thought that can be clearly symbolized.

Language and

mathematics are the tools of the scientist.

However, at

higher and higher levels of generality, mathematics becomes the indispensable instrument of explanation and

expression.

Historians and philosophers of science concur on
the point that the rise of modern science in the 16th and

17th centuries would not have occurred without mathematics

(Whitehead, 1967c; Butterfield, 1965; Kemeny, 1969; CasA concise and brief descrip-

sirer, 1944; Toulmin, 1960).

tion of the history of mathematics can be found in White-

head's work (1968a: 285-286;

1

967c

:

1

9- 37)

.

The Greeks were

thought to have created the sciences of geometry and number
by reviving and expanding some of the pre-existing ideas

from the Egyptians and the Phoenecians.

Pythagoras was the

first man to have delved into an understanding of the impor-

tance of number as an abstract entity.

From the medieval

s

.
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period until today, the most sophisticated forms of

mathematical theories have been developed: algebra, trig-

onometry and differential calculus to Riemannian geometry
and catastrophe theory.

In most instances of scientific

discovery, new forms of mathematical equations had to be

developed to fit the observed facts, e.g., Heisenberg discovered matrix calculus, which was invaluable in calculating some of the properties of atomic systems; Von Neumann

extended Heisenberg’s conception to

a

statistical matrix

calculus which combined the basic propositions of quantum

mechanics and probability theory (Margenau, 1950).

Some-

times, mathematical structures are entirely deduced to

explain the harmony of the world.

Piaget, as an eminent

mathematician and logician in trying to explain the harmony
that exists between mathematics and the real world, says:

deduction sometimes takes place before and
not after the experiment, that is, in anticipation
But even more striking and more common is
the construction of purely abstract mathematical
structures, which afterward serve as indispensable
frameworks for physical phenomena, without having
been intended as such beforehand. Well-known
examples of this are Riemann’s expression of space
and Einstein's use of tensorial calculus as well
as the many geometric and algebraic models used
(1971:341)1
in microphysics.
.

.

.

.

.

.

The key phrase in the above quote is the "c.onstruc1

Einstein, in the early 40s, suggested to Piaget
that an investigation of the child's understanding of
time, velocity and movement would be of interest to episPiaget then, published The Development of Child'
temology.
Conception of Time and The Development of the Child's Conception of Movement and Speed (Ginsburg 5 Opper 1969)
,

.
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tion Oi purely ab s tr act mathcinat ical structures."

To

abstract or the process of abstraction is the power
that

underlies symbolization.

According to Marks (1976)

word abstract or abstraction commonly refers to

,

the

"

thought that entertains ideas and that is based on but

is

essentially divorced from concrete experience"

and

(p.

47)

may be taken literally to mean the separation between the
actual and the ideal.

The scientist's capacity to antici-

pate as expressed in the above quote by Piaget reflects
the ability to think in terms of the ideal state or the

possibilities that could be.

The formulation of the great

theories and laws in science could never have been achieved

without man's capacity for abstraction and the urge to

transcend his present state of knowledge and move into the
realm of potentiality.

Hypothetico- deduct ive thought

allowed Galileo to conceive of

a

purely isolated system

(which never occurs in nature) and which led to his science
of dynamics

(Cassirer, 1944:49; Whitehead, 1967c:46).

Einstein, in his autobiography, discusses the

power of abstract thought in investigating nature and the
"free play with concepts:"
Out yonder there was this huge world, which exists
independently of us human beings and which stands
before us like a great, eternal riddle, at least
partially accessible to our inspection and thinkThe contemplation of this world beckoned
ing.
The mental grasp of this
like a liberation
the frame of the given
within
world
extra personal
aim half-consciousiy
highest
possibilities swam as
mind's eye. (1970:
my
and half-unconsciously before
.

5)

.

.
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Heisenberg (1971) reports on Einstein's remarkable
"thought experiments" which reflected his mental grasp
of
the inmost essence of physical phenomena.

In

the early

days of the formation of the uncertainty principle,
Einstein

would present innumerably imaginary experiments to refute
the new law.

He would present an experiment at breakfast,

and if after a whole day of discussion the uncertainty

principle was not shaken, by next morning he was ready
with

a

new imaginary experiment more complicated than the

previous one.
Much of the emphasis in Piaget's work has been on
the development of abstract conceptual thought in children.

Piaget (1970a) describes the understanding of logico-

mathemat ical relations as the most basic form of knowledge.
The young child, in learning to conserve, has to learn that

certain aspects of objects remain invariant even after

transformations occur.

The qualities of number, substance

and area have to be abstracted from the perceptual input
and held in the mind's eye though changes take place in
the environment.

The notions of abstraction, ideal, actual and good
in relation to mathematics was first explored by the Greek

thinkers.

The Greeks instinctively searched for general

abstract principles that explained the nature of reality
(Whitehead, 1967c) and it was Pythagoras, who in his study
of music, discovered the independent existence of ratios
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between numbers that could express musical
intervals
(Cornford, 1971).

It was Plato,

however, who maintained

the overwhelming importance of math in relation
to the

ideal forms in nature- -he continually sought for
the "forms
in the facts"

(Whitehead, 1969:25).

In a discussion on

"mathematics and the Good," Whitehead notes that
Human intelligence can conceive of a type of things
in abstraction from exemplification.
The most obvious disclosures of this characteristic of humanity
are mathematical concepts and ideals of the Good-ideals which stretch beyond any immediate realization.

Any practical experience of exactness of realization is denied to mankind: whereas mathematics,
and ideals of perfection, are concerned with exactness.
(1968a:104)
The abstract formal properties of mathematics are

exactly suited to the scientific description of events.

Abstractions help us to deal with the forms of relationships or with the unchanging aspects of reality.

White-

head, as a mathematician with few equals, explains the

abstract nature of mathematics in

a

clear manner.

it applies to everything, to tastes and to
sounds, to apples and to angels, to the ideas of
The nature
the mind and to the bones of the body.
of all
indifferent,
of the things is perfectly
four.
make
things it is true that two and two
Thus we write down as the leading characteristic
of mathematics that it deals with properties and
ideas which are applicable to things just because
they are things, and apart from any particular
feelings, or emotions, or sensations, in any way
connected with them. This is what is meant by
(Whitecalling mathematics an abstract science.
head, 1972:2)
.

.

.

Scientific laws are usually expressed in the form
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Ox mathematical equations because they exemplify
the opera-

tion of general principles apart from every specific in-

stance.

Discovery of patterned relationships in nature

is what concerns

the scientist and "Mathematics is the most

powerful technique for the understanding of pattern, and
for the analysis of the relationships of patterns

(White-

head, 1968:109).

Dealing in the realm of abstract principles confers

upon science its power of prediction and explanation.

Con-

sequences of events and alternative solutions can be con-

ceived of theoretically before the events actually transpire.
Man is thus able to gain control over the physical environment and endeavor to enhance and sustain the quality of life
of mankind.

Whitehead sounds
science and abstraction.

a

cautionary note in relation to
The procedure of analysis in

exact thought is vital and necessary but
the sense of reality" (1968a 11 3)
:

.

"...

By this he means that

science investigates parts of reality but

hensive philosophical scheme

is

it weakens

a

more compre-

needed to interpret all

aspects of the ultimate nature of reality.
Science education, then, should infuse children

with

a

sense of the truth and beauty in nature.

Mathe-

matics and language are necessary logical tools for expressing the precise cause and effect relationships in physical

events.

However, the aesthetic mode of symbolizing the
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imaginative joy in the beauty and harmony of nature should
not be neglected.

Formation of Material Values
Through Scientific Inquiry
Since the formation of values is

a

characteristic

of man and the Anisa Model is concerned with the actualiza-

tion of human potential, it necessarily addresses the role
of values and attitudes in the development of the individual.

The Anisa theory of value formation has been elaborated

upon by Raman (1974)

.

The aim of this section is to review

the major propositions of the Anisa value theory and to try
to make explicit the kinds of values,

attitudes and feelings

that are actualized through scientific inquiry into the

physical world.
Trying to find
presents

a

a

definition of the term ’value’

bewildering task because the word has been used

in so many ways.

The Oxford Dictionary (1971 edition) has

numerous meanings for ’value' but the one that
to the present context is:

is

"the relative status of

applicable
a

thing,

or the estimate in which it is held, according to its real

or supposed worth, usefulness or importance."

would associate value with something that

worthy or important.

is

Most people

deemed to be

The problem with this commonly-held

view is that it is not always possible to discern the values
congruence
that a person holds because there is a lack of
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between value statements and acts of behavior.

Very often,

the behavior that is observed is exactly the opposite
of
a

value that is verbally claimed to be strongly held.

An operational definition that appears to be more

useful has been suggested by Jordan and Streets (1973) and

Raman (1974).

These authors state that interaction with

the environment occurs in

a

patterned manner and that the

resulting actualization of potential or the release of new
energy for use by the individual is structured in certain
ways.

The new energies are not expressed in

random manner, but in

a

patterned fashion.

a

haphazard or

A value, then,

may be defined as relatively enduring patterned uses of

energy such that it reflects certain new ways of perceiving,
thinking, feeling, intending and doing things.
tion allows one "to see” what values

a

This defini-

person holds because

energy will be expended in ways that are observable and

predictable, i.e., the energy use defines the values.
Interactions with the different environments, i.e.,

physical, human and unknown, are characterized by different

patterns of energy utilization or values.

Patterns of

interactions with the physical environment are material
values.

Social values are defined as those aspects of

interactions that relate to the human environment.

Patterns

of interactions with the unknown environment are called

philosophical values.
In order to define material values,

it

is

necessary
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to define the term "physical” environment more closely.

The term "physical" refers to those aspects of the environ-

ment which human beings can interact with and which can be
analyzed in terms of efficient causation.

This definition

does not include those elements of the environment and

those interactions with the environment which can only be

effectively explained in terms of psychological causality.
For example, in the human environment, there are aspects

of the human body which can be analyzed in terms of ef-

ficient causation and which would be the subject matter of

natural science.

However, there are important aspects of

human beings that can only be analyzed effectively in terms
of psychological causation and therefore would be dealt

with in the social sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc,).

Material values, then, focus primarily on the efficient causation aspect of interactions.

This does not

mean that final causation, purpose of internal determination is excluded in efforts to understand the nature of

physical events.

As discussed in Chapter II, it is neces-

sary to consider both efficient and final causation if
one is to truly understand physical phenomena.

Given the Anisa definition of value as the

relatively enduring patterned utilization of energy, it
more
is not possible to say whether particular values are

desirable or less desirable until some relative standard,
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criterion or ideal has been established.

One such relative

standard adopted by the Anisa Model is whether or not values
(energy uses) are effective in gaining mastery and control

over one's interactions with the environment.

White's (1959) paper on competence motivation
in understanding this idea.

Robert
is

helpful

He identifies competence or

effectance as the ability to interact as effectively as

possible with the environment so that
achieved.

a

sense of mastery is

Because competence enables one to control one's

interactions with the environment and so enhance the quality
of survival

,

White postulates that human beings will be in-

trinsically motivated to attain competence.

Some values

then can be judged as being more effective or less effective to the extent that they help or deter

a

interacting effectively with the environment.

person from
Therefore,

competence is one standard or ideal against which values
can be judged, and may be defined as the optimal organiza-

tion of energy utilization to achieve particular objectives.
To insure the best use of their energy, scientists

put their efforts into trying to expose the fundamental

relationships or patterns of relationships among events
in the physical environment.

One can say that the utiliza-

tion of their energy is organized around the discovery of
the fundamental laws and principles of science.

These laws

and principles are usually stated as "optimal formulations,"
of the
that is, they reflect the best possible statements

.

.

35

patterned relationships among physical events under ideal
circumstances
In fact,

some of these laws and principles which

have been articulated in natural science are stated in

a

form that explicitly reflects an optimal or ideal nature,
e.g., the Ideal Gas Law.

This law and other laws in

natural science can be said to be ideal or optimal formulations because they describe relationships that obtain

only under conditions that never actually exist.

Hence,

the relationships can never be observed exactly.

Laws and

principles are ideal statements of relationships which can
be confirmed by their increasing approximation to observed

events

The laws and principles of natural science are

formulated on the basis of some ultimate ideals or fundamental assumptions.

These ultimate ideals lure the

scientist to reach out continually into unknown territories.
Order, truth, beauty, elegance and simplicity are some of
the ultimate ideals that guide scientists in the optimal

formulations of relationships between events.

Whitehead

claims scientists hold an "instinctive conviction in the

Order of Nature" (1967c 4)
:

Watson, in describing the

-

search for the structure of DNA, says that he was driven
"by the belief that the truth, once found, would be simple
as well as pretty" (1968 ix)
:

.

All of the requirements of

overwhelming
order, beauty, truth and simplicity reflect the

86

guiding influence of ultimate ideals in the
formulation of
scientific laws and principles.

Attainment of Technological Competence
Throug h the Discovery and Application of Scientific Knowledge
Often, the word "technology" is viewed in a

restricted sense as meaning machinery or weaponry.

possible to place our understanding of the word in
context.

It
a

is

larger

According to the Oxford Dictionary (1971 edition),

technology means "A discourse or treatise on an art or
arts; the scientific study of the practical or industrial

arts."

The root word is from the Greek "teckne" which

refers to an art or craft.
is

Usually, the artistic element

excluded from our usage of technology.

Whitehead states that science consists of two
levels: theoretical and practical, which correspond to

what is most frequently heard "science and technology."
He acknowledges the essential unity of the two when he
says

Science is a river with two sources, the practical
source and the theoretical source. The practical
source is the desire to direct our actions to
The theoretical
achieve pre- determined ends.
source is the desire to understand. ... I most
emphatically state that I do not consider one
source as in any sense nobler than the other, or
cannot see why
I
intrinsically more interesting.
than to busy
understand
it is nobler to strive to
actions.
one's
oneself with the right ordering of
(1967b: 103-104)
.

.

.

The practical and the theoretical are inextricably
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interwoven.

In the above quote the "right ordering of

one’s actions" in science derives from the logical and

coherent theories that are formulated and then put to use
in the proper manner that can be of service to mankind.
It would appear that Whitehead’s comment in relation to

the practical side of science involves a moral concern,

particularly in relation to how scientific knowledge
used.

is

Certainly, the word technology today carries conno-

tations of automation, war and destruction.

The goal of

the Anisa science curriculum is to harmonize the desire to

understand the physical world and to direct the resultant
knowledge to practical and useful ends.
Historically, the modern scientific revolution came
about largely throughout "the merging and mutual stimulation of the separate traditions of scholarly, speculative

science and experimental craftsmanship and technology"
(McKenzie, 1973:7).

The rise of the industrial system in

the 17th century stimulated thought and this in turn in-

creased the investigation into the laws of nature (Whitehead, 1967c; Butterfield, 1965).

In the times of the

Egyptians, even though astronomy involved systematic observation, technological advances were not made because
there was no practical impetus to experiment.

Similarly,

generathe Greeks took the first steps in abstraction and

understand
lization, but the Greek intellectual "desired to
the world rather than control and change it"

(McKenzie,
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1973:4).

Invention or practical uses of knowledge really

began in the 16th century with mining, metallurgy, and the
creation of waterwheels, which led to the early growth of
the factory system.

Together with the rise of experimental

science in the 17th century and movement of the Renaissance, modern science and technology was firmly established.

Today, in the late 20th century, the intellectual
rift between what is called "pure science" and "applied

science" is evident.

The former term implied knowledge for

the sake of knowledge and is thought to be better than the

application of the knowledge.

The fallacy of this type of

reasoning is that neither science nor technology can exist

without each other.

What needs to be made clear is that

both pursuits are infused with the element of artistry-that form, elegance, harmony, simplicity and beauty are

fundamental guiding principles in the practical and theoretical aspects of science.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the

original usage of the word ’tekne’ included

a

was based on the ideal of artistry or beauty.
in the Anisa Model,

meaning that
Therefore,

competence in discovering and applying

the laws and principles of natural science is called tech-

nological competence.
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Definition of Technological
Competence

~

*

Technological competence can be defined as the conscious ability to understand, discover and apply the optimal formulations, or the laws and principles of natural

science in such

a

way that it maximizes the capacity to

interact effectively with the physical environment.

Tech-

nological competence also includes the ability to interact

effectively with the physical environment in

a

way that

gives one the feeling that the quality of one's viability
is

enhanced.

Since effective interaction with the physical

environment is related to one's feeling of enhanced viability, the definition of technological competence can be
seen to include both objective or logical, and subjective
or aesthetic, elements.

The logical aspect of the definition of techno-

logical competence is related to the accurate formulation
of laws and principles in relation to the physical environ-

ment such that there is

appearance and reality.

a

one to one correspondence between

The laws and principles of natural

science may be called optimal formulations because they
reflect the most perfect or the best representation of
physical events at this point in time in the intellectual

evolution of man.

As we develop better instruments for

observation and measurement, and can refine our descriptions
of relationships among events, then the laws and principles
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will be further developed to accommodate the new insights.

Describing relationships in terms of efficient

causation is

a

logical process, i.e., it involves analytic

thought processes.

As mentioned previously,

final causa-

tion is also vital in understanding the operation of the

universe.

However, the relationships involved in final

causation are quite complex and are more difficult to identify clearly.

Efficient causation

is

a

description of

physical cause and effect relationships in which there

is

some kind of transfer or transformation of energy so that
two or more events are necessarily connected.

This con-

nection may be quite complex and may require explanations
in terms of interaction rather than in terms of simple

linear succession of events.

However, the relationship

will always be explained in terms of efficient causes.
Since the laws and principles describe cause and effect

relationships, it could be said that they describe the

transfer or transformation of energy in physical events.
The non-logical, subjective or aesthetic aspect
of the definition of technological competence is related
to the notion of enhanced viability in both a theoretical

and practical sense.

An optimal formulation

possible theoretical formulation of

a

is

the best

relationship (or

relationships) among events such that order, beauty, elegance, simplicity and harmony are reflected in the state-

ment of the relationship.

The intuitive sense of order,
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and the organization of elements in an elegant and
simple

style depends upon the scientist's subjective or aesthetic
awareness.

There is

a

'feeling' that the diverse elements

fit together in a unified manner, and give an impression

of beauty and wholeness.

The practical part of the subjective experience

is

that because one is effect ive- - can make things work--there
is a feeling of enhanced viability when the optimal

formu-

lations are applied in interactions with the physical

environment.

A person who can apply the laws and prin-

ciples of natural science will have

a

sense of mastery of

competence in being able to interact effectively with the
physical environment.
A law or principle, if it meets or fulfills all the

aesthetic requirements and the logical necessity of truth
and accuracy, is said to be an optimal formulation.

The

test of the formulation, however, lies in practice, i.e.,
to whatever degree it works, then to that degree it is

true, and if it is true then it should reflect the elements

of order, beauty, elegance and simplicity.

formulation can be applied in

a

An optimal

manner that increases the

quality of life and guarantees survival.

The actualization

of human potential then, on the one hand, finds expression
in the attainment of technological competence, and on the

other hand it is sustained by it.
Since technological competence

is

related to the
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lives and the actualization of potential of individuals
in

relation to the human environment, it must necessarily be

constrained by moral concerns.

For example,

a

murderer can

be a technologically competent person because the principles
of killing are well understood and can be applied in the

best possible manner.
this w ay
T

,

However, when they are applied in

the viability of the victim is drastically

reduced to zero.

From the point of view taken in the Anisa

definition of technological competence, we would say that
the murderer is technologically competent but not morally

competent because moral concerns are completely ignored.
Ultimately, the overall viability of an individual or
individuals is affected by the close relationship between

technological, moral and fiducial competence.

nological competence is

a

Thus, tech-

subordinate achievement whose

ultimate value is determinable by appeal to moral (social)
and fiducial

(philosophical) concerns.

These are briefly

discussed in the next section.
Relationship Between Technological,
Moral and Fiducial Competence
In the Anisa Model,

the balanced and harmonious

integration of technological, moral and fiducial competence results in personal effectance.

A person who can

understand, discover and apply the basic laws and prinhuman
ciples which guide interactions with the physical,

.
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and unknown environments so that viability is enhanced,
can
be said to have personal effectance.

Usually the ultimate

goal of growth and development is to achieve personal

effectance
Moral competence may be defined as the conscious

ability to understand the basic principles of human interactions and to apply them in such

bility is enhanced.

a

way that social via-

Relating to people in

hances their viability will reflect

a

a

way that en-

certain level of moral

competence.
Fiducial competence may be defined as the conscious

ability to generate and be guided by fundamental assumptions or principles about the nature of ultimate unknowns.

Such ability is based on faith.

principles have

a

To the extent that these

truth-value, they will, when applied

result in enhanced viability.

This competence has been

called fiducial competence because effective organization
of our interactions with the ultimate unknowns must be

based on faith, trust, confidence or reliance.
fiducial is derived from the Latin root
trust or confidence.

f iducia

The word

meaning

Without fiducial competence, courage

and hope are non-existent and fear is sovereign.

Fear is

an internal emotional state that influences interaction

patterns and to the extent that it has no justification,
it will impair development.

The detailed relationship between technological

.
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and moral competence, and technological and fiducial

competence, will be discussed more fully in the following
sections

Technological and Moral
Competence
The relationship between science and moral concerns

surfaces when our knowledge of the laws of nature
to practice.

is put

In the purely investigative activities and

theoretical constructions in science, morality
to be an issue.

is not

likely

Polanyi, in describing the moral indif-

ference that is appropriate on this level in modern science,
cites Fisher:
We attempt, so far as our powers allow, to understand the world, by reasoning, by experimentation,
In this process moral
and again by reasoning.
or emotional grounds for preferring one conclusion to another are completely out of place.
(in Polanyi, 1958:153)

Experiments are designed to discover valid relationships as they exist in the physical environment.

Re-

gardless of the scientist's personal moral convictions or
emotions about reality, the experimental evidence
final word.

is

the

As Whitehead declares, there is a "remorseless

inevitableness" (1967c:ll) about the laws of nature.
However, in the application of scientific knowledge,
the issue of morality assumes importance.

There are, of

course, moral and ethical questions involved in the type
of experiments that are conducted by scientists, particu-
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larly in the fields of genetics and embryology.

The con-

cern here is the effect of the application of scientific

knowledge on the lives of men, women and children all over
the world.

The Anisa Model would maintain that to be

nologically competent person
ficient qualification for

a

is

a

a

tech-

necessary but not suf-

fully actualized human being.

Being aware of the impact of the application of one's

knowledge on other human beings

is

equally vital.

Thus

moral competence must be acquired along with technological

competence.

To be morally competent means that in one's

encounters with other people, one endeavors to behave in
a

manner such that the needs, emotions and actions of others

are taken into consideration.

Because of the implications of scientific knowledge
for the survival of society and the individuals within it,

moral standards cannot be ignored by scientists.

The view

that science is amoral, that it is without morality of

any kind, is tied to the technical exploitation of knowledge.

Large-scale industrial and economic concerns have

contributed to the problems of pollution and conservation.
The build-up of the world's arms race reflects the direct

participation of scientists in activities that are not
wholly conducive to uplifting the quality of the life of
man.

In a recent report in Scientific American (April 1976)

of the world's
it was documented that the cumulative total
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military expenditures between 1960 and 1974 was nearly four
trillion dollars.

The authors of this report stated that
-

this potential for cataclysmic destruction represents:
an immediate and heavy burden on the world economy.
It is destructive whether or not the weapons are
put to use in war.
It contributes to inflation,
retards economic and social development, and
diverts resources urgently needed for human wellbeing.
Until it can be put under control, it
undermines the national and international security
which it is intended to protect.
( Scientific
American April 1976:54)
,

Einstein’s comment in the following quote
noting.

worth

is

"Concern for man himself and his fate must always

form the chief interest of all technical endeavor, in order
that the creations of our minds shall be

a

blessing and

not a curse to mankind" (in Andrews, 1974:380).
If scientists are technologically competent it

does not necessarily follow that they will be morally com-

petent too.

A brilliant and successful methodology can

breed an indifference to morality, right judgment and good
conduct.

Polanyi's insight into moral judgments and intel-

lectual understanding is valuable.
But moral judgments cut much deeper than intellectual valuations. A man may be consumed by
an intellectual passion; he may be a man of
genius, yet be also sycophantic, vain, envious
Though a prince of letters, he
and spiteful.
For men are
would be a despicable person.
valued as men according to their moral force
.

.

.

(1958:214-15)
advances
It is evident then that technological
values,
should be subservient to, and guided by, moral

.
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because ultimately all discoveries have an impact on
the
life of humanity.

Von Bertalanf fy

•

s

optimism is encourag-

ing when he says that science "may still be able to pre~

sent a grand view and become deeply humanistic in its

endeavor" (1968b 68- 69)
:

Science education has to meet the challenge of

how to present science as

a

humanistic endeavor.

Hurd

states that "the task is to invent and then mould the

future to suit human needs, but within

a

firm system of

moral and ethical considerations" (1975:307).
to say that with an emphasis on values,

nology, science education can become

with

a

a

He goes on

society, and tech-

reasonable venture

future orientation.

Technological and Fiducial
Competence
We continually confront unknowns in the course of
our lives and instead of being paralyzed by the thought of
not knowing something with certainty, we must learn to
deal with such circumstances in some way.

People who are

crippled by contemplating the unknown future lack fiducial
competence.

Their effectiveness as individuals is greatly

reduced or severely impaired.

Those who do organize their
The idea

lives effectively do so on the basis of xaith.

of faith has religious connotations because one of the

main purposes of religions has been to provide

a

framework
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for reJating to the unknown on faith.
is

Fiducial competence

often related to traditional functions of religion.

However, in this dissertation, fiducial is used purely as
a

psychological term, and refers to the capacity to face

unknowns through trust, which everyone must do, whether he
regards himself as

a

religious person or not.

In a chapter on

presents

a

’Religion and Science,' Whitehead

remarkable conception of the essential charac-

ter of religion in general psychological terms:

Religion is the vision of something which stands
beyond, behind and within, the passing flux of
immediate things; something which is real, and yet
waiting to be realized; something which is a remote
possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts;
something that gives meaning to all that passes,
and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all
reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and
the hopeless quest.
(Whitehead, 1967c:192)
He concludes by saying that religion "is an adven-

ture of the spirit,
is not

a

flight after the unattainable" that

couched in safety and comfortable ways of thinking.
This insight into the nature of religion, when

applied to the work of scientists in their eternal quest
after truth in the vast unknown "which stands beyond" is

clearly

a

fiducial act.

The step into the unknown is

marked by an act of faith.

Whitehead (1967) states that

scientists hold an instinctive conviction or instinctive
faith in the order of nature; for Polanyi (1974) such con-

victions contain "fiducial elements," that is, trust or

confidence in nature.

Men have always tried to achieve
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definite convictions or form ideas about the material
world.

Polanyi says that "no part of the human race has

ever been known to exist without

system of such con-

a

victions and it is clear that their elimination must

mean intellectual death" (1974:23).
In essence,

certainty.

faith is courage in the face of un-

Without this faith, trust, or conviction,

scientists would be immobilized.

The description by

Polanyi of the dynamism of human faith seems to echo

Whitehead's sentiments.

Polanyi remarks that

There is no way of approaching a hidden meaning
than by entrusting ourselves to our intimations
of its yet unseen presence.
And such intimations are the only path toward enlarging and upholding our intellectual mastery over our surroundings.
(1974:125)
The relationship between technological and fiducial

competence is important because children have to learn how
to relate to the world of physical phenomena, which for the

most part are not directly observable or capable of being
fully understood.

countered.

There are always unknowns to be en-

Einstein describes how as

a

child of

4

years of age, seeing the behavior of the needle of

compass made

a

or

5

a

deep and lasting impression upon him.

His

reaction as he recalls was that "something deeply hidden
had to be behind things" (1970:9).
The insatiable desire to want to know about the

world, the dedication to the pursuit of truth and the

ability to have faith in the order of nature, are qualities
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that should be fostered in children so that the

of spirit

adventure

can be kept alive and alert.

The next chapter will discuss the nature of scientific thought and its development in children as

paration for the presentation of
a

natural science curriculum.

a

a

pre-

possible framework for

.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE DEVELOPMENTAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF

CHILDREN'S SCIENTIFIC THINKING
The development of

a

curriculum should be guided

by ideas that explain how the child develops an awareness
of the world, i.e., of people, of objects, of plants and
In particular,

animals.-

a

science curriculum should be

guided by information on a child's developmental under-

standing of physical reality or the natural world.

How

does a child come to think and know about physical phe-

nomena?

What are the distinguishing characteristics of the

developmental sequence that can be of assistance to the

curriculum developer?

If a science curriculum is to meet

the needs of children, developmental- epistemological con-

siderations are absolutely vital, especially since all
children, even though they are the same age, are not at all

similar in their understandings, past experiences and
attitudes
Before launching into

a

discussion on children and

scientific thinking, it will be useful to consider the
epistemological basis of contemporary science, i.e., how
do scientists, who reflect a mature level of thinking,

come to know about physical reality?

Essentially this ques

do to
tion comes down to considerations of what scientists
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find out about nature.

The reason for including this dis-

cussion on the scientist's thought is that it

valuable to have

a

basis of comparison so that the danger-

out fallacy of believing that
can be avoided.

is always

a

child is

a

miniature adult

There may be similarities between how

a

child thinks about physical events in the world and how

a

scientist proceeds in his investigations, but essentially
a

child's thought is qualitatively different.
The Nature of Scientific Thinking
In reviewing the nature of scientific thinking, the

question arises as to whether science
covery.

is

invention or dis-

Is the organized thought which we call science a

construction of the human mind because of our need to represent the physical world in

selves?

a

meaningful manner to our-

Or, do scientists just describe what they see?

To

construct or invent means to devise, to build or to originate mentally; to discover means to find out, to reveal,
to uncover.

In practice,

the scientist is both an inventor

and a discoverer.
To find out what scientists actually do is not easy

because they rarely write about the process itself.

Scien-

tists very seldom describe when precisely the hypothesis

occurred to them or when it was that they made

a

prediction.

accounts
One has to rely on the philosophers of science for
called
of the scientist's procedure or what is customarily
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'scientific method,'

i.e., what is it that goes on in the

head when discoveries are made.

Medawar cites Einstein,

who said that if you want to know what methods

a

theo-

retical physicist employs, stick closely to one principle:
"don't listen to their words, fix your attention on their

deeds" (Medawar, 1969:10).
Cohen and Nagel present

a

useful definition of

scientific method, since it can be applied in many situations:

"...

scientific method is simply the way in which

we test impressions, opinions, or surmises by examining
the best available evidence for and against them" (1934:
192 )

.

The method is the means by which scientists find
out about events and the relations among events in the

physical world.

Such relations are found to be invariant

and ordered, i.e., they are constant and remain so even

under certain transformations.

Scientists are primarily

concerned with finding causal relations or causal order in
the physical environment.

tionship is one event
it

is

preceded by

a

(B)

The essence of

a

causal rela-

occurs only, and always, when

certain other event

Event A is then said to cause event
always involves

a

B.

(A)

or events.

The relationship

transfer of energy in some form which

necessarily connects the two or more events.

Whitehead

in science
emphasizes the notion of physical causality

when he says that there

is
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the inexpugnable belief that every detailed
occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents
a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying
general principles. Without this belief the incredible labors of scientists would be without
.

.

.

m

hope.

(1967c 12)
:

Ultimately

thorough understanding of the funda-

a

mental relationships inherent in and among phenomena leads
to an articulation of the complex natural laws and prin-

ciples which operate in the physical environment.

The

power to control the socio- cultural evolution of man lies
in part in being able to predict the consequences of events

in the physical world and to plan accordingly to meet the

necessary changes.

Understanding causation increases the

probability that survival will be guaranteed and its quality

continually improved.
Rise of the Scientific Method:
The Role of Induction

Historically, the rise of the modern views on

scientific method can be traced back to the work of Francis
Bacon in the sixteenth century.

Aristotle’s powers of

observation and description were admittedly the very
earliest manifestation of some method but it was Bacon’s

work that initiated
method.

a

formalized statement on scientific

Bacon's view was that the simple deductive methods

in
of formal logic could not by themselves lead to progress

vith
science mainly because the rules of logic did not deal

discovery but only with the results of discoveries.

His

105

most important contribution was his awareness of the

problem of induction, i.e., "how
conclude

a

is

it ever possible to

material fact from another material fact?"

(Fowler, 1962:42).

The early Greeks had exercised

mum of observation in drawing their conclusions.

a

mini-

However,

Bacon maintained that in dealing with the physical world,
facts must be checked by observation of other facts and for

every line of reasoning, experiments should be conducted.

Fowler quotes Bacon as saying that "man can act and under-

stand no further than he has observed " (1962:42).

Even

though he outlined the processes of scientific discovery,
Bacon did not realize that in practice it
to test every possibility.

is not

possible

In this way, he neglected the

guiding factors that assisted the scientist in selecting

what to observe.

Imagination, inspiration and guiding

hypotheses were ignored in the act of discovery.
The next major contribution to scientific method
was by John Stuart Mill (early nineteenth century)

.

Mill

maintained that the most vital task of science was to discover causes and that the notion of causation only could

account for the observed sequence of events in nature.
Fowler (1962) comments that Mill’s main concern was to disthen
cover a method that worked in the natural sciences and

could be transferred to the social sciences.

Mill formu-

experilated Four Canons that could serve as guides for

between causes
mental inquiry and focused on the relations

.

106

and their effects.

In his outline of scientific proof,

Mill refused to acknowledge the role of hypothesis.
f e lt

He

that all scientific knowledge rested on pure induc-

tion alone.

Classical inductivism in science arose from

these positions taken by both Bacon and Mill, such that

observation and experimentation were accounted for but not
the role of hypothes is - format ion
Mill defined induction as "the process by which we
conclude- that what is true of certain individuals of

a

class

is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain

times will be true in similar circumstances at all times"
(in Fowler,

1962:74).

A clearer and more explicit definition of induc-

tion is given by Medawar.
is

a

He states that "Induction

.

.

.

scheme or formulary of reasoning which somehow empowers

us to pass from statements expressing particular 'facts’ to

general statements which comprehend them" (1969:23).
In both definitions,

the emphasis is on the ob-

servation of concrete events and the articulation of

a

general rule or principle which could explain all the ob-

served events.

Focusing on the experiences of the senses

only is in keeping with the tradition of strict empiricism,
a

view which states that if something is not verified by

observation then it is meaningless.
spective can only provide

a

An empiricist per-

simplified edition of reality

because it only focuses on appearance.

The limitations of
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totally objective knowledge

is

stressed by Whitehead when

he notes that
the exclusive reliance on sense-perception
promotes a false metaphysics. This error is the
result of high-grade intellectuality. The instinctive interpretations which govern human life
presuppose a contemporary world throbbing
with energetic values.
It required considerable
ability to make the disastrous abstraction of our
base sense-perceptions from the massive insistency of our total experience.
Of course, whatever we can do in the way of abstraction is for
some purposes useful - -provided that we know what
we are about.
(1967:219)
.

.

.

.

.

.

A major shortcoming of the inductive scheme is that

science is made out to be
activity.

a

wholly logical and objective

According to Whitehead, such

a

rigid method

"if consistently pursued, would have left science where
it found it"

(1969:7).

Einstein himself commented that

"There is no inductive method which could lead to the
fundamental concepts of physics

...

in error are those

theorists who believe that theory comes inductively from

experience" (in Fowler, 1962:95).
A rigid, totally logical process such as induction

fails to account for those internal, non-logical (outside
logic) factors that can guide the scientist.

Imagination,

inspiration and intuition cannot be objectively accounted
for, but they play a vital role in scientific research.

In

discussing the failure of the Baconian method of induction,

Whitehead claims that
What Bacon omitted was the play of a free imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence
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and logic.
The true method of discovery is like
the flight of an aeroplane.
It starts from the
ground of particular observation; it makes a
flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it lands for renewed observation rendered
more acute by rational interpretation.
(1969:7)

Imaginative construction enters into the formulation of theories and hypotheses.
an intuitive

In some cases there is

’hunch’ or just luck that guides observation;

in other cases the framing of a hypothesis or a theory

after observation is an imaginative act.

been known to dream of

a

Scientists have

solution to the problem, such as

Kekule, who discovered the structure of the benzene ring.
He dreamed of a snake catching its own tail in its mouth,

thereby forming

a

ring.

Polanyi, himself an eminent chem-

ist and philosopher of science, describes scientific re-

search in the light of non-logical and non-rational factors.
He says that

Though the task is definite enough, the solution
It is essential to
is none the less intuitive.
guess about the
right
the
with
science
in
start
All the time
progress.
further
of
direction
developcollecting,
constantly
the scientist is
surmises,
-conscious
half
ing and revising a set of
his
are
which
an assortment of private clues,
subject.
of
his
confidential guides to the mastery
.

.

.

(1974:18)

Another criticism of the inductive view
focus on facts alone.

the

Very rarely does a scientist just

collect facts upon facts.
on this score.

is

Even Darwin contradicts himself

In his autobiographical sketch he claimed

just colthat he worked on "true Baconian principles" and
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lected facts, but in

a

have an old belief that

letter to
a

a

friend he wrote "I

good observer really means

good theorist" (in Madawar, 1969:11).

discrimination is

a

a

Observational

theory-laden enterprise and most

authors agree with this view (Hanson, 1958; Madawar, 1969;
Pol any i

1974

,

;

Popper, 1962

;

Whitehead, 1967c).

Observa-

tion is selective and is related to the needs and interests of the scientist via some working hypothesis or

theory.

•

Modern Scientific Method: Induction
and Deduction or the Hypothetico"
Deductive Scheme
The predominant view of scientific method today is
that it involves both induction and deduction as well as

intuitive and imaginative processes.

Traditionally there

has been a history of opposition between the adherents of

one view or the other.

Deduction may be regarded as

a

scheme of reasoning that argues from the particular to the
general and if properly executed from true premises can
lead with certainty to the truth (Medawar

matical theory is

a

,

1959).

Mathe-

deductive system that derives its

theorems or proofs from true premises or axioms, and not
by observation.

Even Einstein claimed that "the supreme

task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal

elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by
pure deduction" (in Northrop, 1970:401).

However, it seems

no
pointless to focus on one or the other view since induction and deduction complement each other in the acquisition
of knowledge about physical reality.

Scientific method as induction and deduction involves the triad of observation, hypothesis formation and

experimentation.

The first step involves observation of

some event or phenomenon but no conclusions are drawn.

Then the hypothesis (or hypotheses) is formulated on the
basis of what is observed.

Campbell defines

a

...

in the following manner: "A hypothesis is

hypothesis
a

proposi-

tion which is put forward for consideration, and concerning
the truth or falsity of which nothing is asserted until the

consideration

is

completed” (1953:290).

In Campbell's definition, the hypothesis is asso-

ciated with doubt which consists of

a

suspense of judgment

rather than the inclination to disbelieve.
of how

hypothesis should be formulated

a

and Nagel.
a

"...

a

A description

is given by Cohen

hypothesis must be formulated in such

manner that deductions can be made from it and that conse-

quently

a

decision can be reached as to whether it does or

does not explain the facts considered" (1934:207).

Hypotheses can be regarded as suggested statements
of possible connections between actual facts and imagined
ones.
is

Hence the truth or falsity of the hypothesis itself

never tested or directly verified.

The hypothesis must,

can be
however, be stated in such a manner that predictions

Ill

deduced from it and then tested experimentally.

this

In

way, the hypothesis should finally provide an answer
to the

problem which generated the inquiry.
Confirmation of predictions
scientific method.
a

is a vital part of

Cohen and Nagel describe the value of

prediction in the following quote.

tion of prediction is to permit

a

"The logical func-

genuine verification of

our hypotheses by indicating, prior to the actual process
of verification, instances which may verify them"
210)

.

(1934:

Predictions indicate the power of the deductive

system of thought--if the premises (that is, hypotheses)
are true, then the conclusions can also be shown to be

true, even before any experiments are conducted.

A good

example of this can be seen in Einstein's formulation of
the general theory of relativity (1915) which made three

predictions.

The actual tests were not carried out until

1919 when all three predictions were confirmed.

Experiments or sets of experiments are designed to

confirm the predictions and so verify or validate the hypothesis.

A clear definition of verification is given by

Cohen and Nagel.

".

.

.a

function of verification is to

supply satisfactory evidence for eliminating some or all
of the hypotheses we are considering" (1934:210).

Rarely is there just one experiment that can

eliminate one or all of the hypotheses.

In most cases

scientists proceed through numerous experiments, some
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relevant and some seemingly irrelevant, to arrive
at some

degree of certainty.

A description of how Watson and Crick

uncovered the structure of DNA shows the numerous set-backs
suffered and hours of frustration spent over experiments
that appeared to lead nowhere (Watson, 1968).

ultimate test of verification

is

However, the

the assurance that what is

observed is as close an approximation to reality as can be,
otherwise we shall be out of touch with reality and be led
into error.

A theory may be viewed as a set of hypotheses or

propositions (Campbell, 1953) and as such
nor false.
that

it.

is

The overwhelming significance of

neither true
a

theory is

exhibits systematic connections between events and

is capable of deducing predictions that can be tested.

Science viewed as induction and deduction established itself as the official alternative to induction in
the middle nineteenth century.

Medawar describes the whole

process as the hypothetico-deductive scheme, and the main

modern advocate of this view is Karl Popper.

The hypo-

thetico-deductive scheme, as its name implies, places an
emphasis on the role of the hypothesis- -the formation of
the hypothesis is the generative act in scientific research.

The well-known philosopher, C.S. Pierce, said that "we must

entertain some hypothesis or else forego all further knowledge” and that hypothetical reasoning "is the only kind of

argument which starts

a

new idea" (in Medawar, 1969:46).

.

.
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Porterfield echoes similar sentiments on the value of
the
hypothesis

Imagination is the method of hypothesis, and hypothesis is an indispensable aspect of scientific
method.
For the field in which the scientist works
is a hypothetically constructed field.
(1941:111)

Medawar presents

a

sound and useful synthesis of

the various vital aspects of scientific method as it in-

cludes induction and deduction.

He says that

Scientific reasoning is an exploratory dialogue
that can always be resolved into two voices or
two episodes of thought, imaginative and critical,
which alternate and interact.
In the imaginative
episode we form an opinion, take a view, make an
informed guess, which might explain the phenomena
under investigation. The generative act is the
formation of a hypothesis
The process by
which we come to formulate a hypothesis is not
illogical but non-logical, i.e., outside logic.
But once we have formed an opinion we can expose
it to criticism, usually by experimentation; this
episode lies within and makes use of logic, for it
is an empirical testing of the logical consequences
of our beliefs.
(1969:46)
.

.

In the imaginative realm,

hypothesis is
tained.

phase.

a

the formulation of the

means by which possibilities are enter-

It is an inventive,

.

.

creative and constructive

The critical episode provides the basis for veri-

fication, justification or validation of the ideas that

have been entertained; it is

a

phase in which there is

a

discrimination of possibilities on the basis of empirical
evidence
The question posed at the beginning of this section

sought to address the issue of whether science was invention
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or discovery.

In reviewing the hypothet ico-deduct
ive

method, it is evident that scientific method

with the construction or invention of

a

is

concerned

system of beliefs

about the world and that it is also concerned
with dis-

covering whether the system is as close an approximation
to reality as possible.

Braithwaite claims that science

is

invention and discovery when he says that
Man proposes a system of hypotheses; Nature
disposes of its truth or falsity. Man invents
a scientific system, and then discovers whether
or not it accords with observed fact.
(1959:368)
The Interaction Between HypothesisFormation and Experimentation

Interactions between observation, hypothesis

formation and experimentation are indispensable to scientific method as

a

regulative and sel f- correct ive process.

Feedback is provided such that the performance can be monitored by the consequences of the acts undertaken (Medawar,
1969).

If the empirical evidence does not verify the

hypothesis, then changes have to be made either in the
original premise or in the experimental procedure.

Such

an active and dynamic view of thinking is very much in

line with the work of Piaget.

He says that

Scientific thought,, then, is not momentary, it is
not a static instance; it is a process. More
specifically, it is a process of continual con(1970a:2)
struction and reorganization.
Popper (1962) regards the continual interplay

11

between conjecture and refutation as the sel
feature of science.

f-

$

correct ive

His view is that conjectures

(that is,

hypotheses) are boldly put forward for trial and if they

clash with the observations, they are refuted.

Theories

are tested with the hope of obtaining, if possible, a 'de-

cisive refutation.

'

Popper also comments on how scientists

may come to hold or formulate erroneous propositions.

Ac-

cording to the traditional inductive views, error arises
from a misreading of the facts in Nature either through

blindness (poor observation) or prejudice.

The consequence

is that the inferences that are then drawn are mistaken.

Such an account of the role of error in science is inadequate- - theories are not, as

a

rule, found to be in error

because of mistaken or poorly interpreted information.
Usually, it is the contradictory evidence of new observations that highlight or indicate what the errors are in
the theory that is currently accepted.

The error does not

lie in poor initial vision, but in the ideas which were

previously held.
Scientific method, then,

is

a

valuable means by

which error can be taken out of our understanding of the
physical environment, thereby improving our technological
competence.

Usually our thinking

is of a routine charac-

ter, and we are only shaken into doubt if something un-

familiar presents itself to us or if we are moved by
curiosity.

Most of our beliefs rest on the unquestioned
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acceptence of current modes of thinking about
issues.
Cohen and Nagel (1934) in an analysis of our beliefs,
state
that when we are challenged we resort to various
methods,
such as
(1)

the method of tenacity, in which we cleave

tightly to our system of beliefs and deliberately
close out other evidence,
(2)

the method of authority, which is an appeal

to a highly respected source to substantiate the

views that are held,
(3)

the method of intuition in which propositions

are self-evident to the individual only and to
no one else, and
(4)

the method of science or reflective inquiry

which is

a

method that develops the utmost possible

doubt and which calls for the best available

evidence before

a

view can be accepted.

Cohen and Nagel continue that methods one to three
are not free from "human caprice and willfulness."

The

authors' appeal is to scientific method.
As a consequence, the propositions which are held
on the basis of these methods [that is, 1-3] are uncertain in the range of their application and in
If we wish clarity and accuracy,
their accuracy.
order and consistency, security and cogency, we
shall have to resort to some method of fixing
beliefs whose efficacy in resolving problems is
Such a
independent of our desires and wills.
conobjective
the
of
advantage
method, which takes
nections in the world around us, should be found
reasonable not because of its appeal to the idio
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syncracies of a selected few individuals, but
because it can be tested repeatedly and by all
individuals.
(1934:195)
The Development of Scientific Thinking
in Children
The preceding discussion examined the means by

which scientists construct
reality.

a

meaningful picture of physical

Scientific thinking was found to be synonymous

with scientific method, i.e., the actual application of
scientific method is an external manifestation of internal
thought processes.

We come to know the nature of the

thought of scientists by observing what they do and then

drawing inferences about their patterns of thinking.
Similarly, the thought processes of children can be

assessed most effectively by observing their actions and
listening to the kinds of statements that they make in
different situations.

It was precisely in this manner that

Jean Piaget developed his theories on how children think.

Naturally, information on the internal thought processes of

children is vital in the development of
lum.

a

science curricu-

Piaget’s writings on the intellectual development are

extensive, so only the most pertinent facts will be reviewed
here to provide a context within which

a

child's developing

notions of physical reality may be understood.
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Development of Th inking in Children:
A Piagetian Perspective
Piaget's theory of the development of thinking

essentially

a

is

construct ivist- interact ionist point of view.

The influence on development is neither biological matura-

tion nor environmental determination, but
both.

a

combination of

The resulting theory is an epigenetic one in which

'epigenesis'

is

defined by Piaget as the "sense of con-

struction by interactions between genome and the environment" (1970b :710).

From an int eractionist perspective there

is an interdependence between a knowing subject and the

object to be known such that it is impossible to dissociate the "knowing subject" from the "knowable object"

(Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, 1974).

The development of

psychological processes or patterns of thinking occurs
through a continual interplay between the individual and
the environment.

The goal is to achieve some sort of

equilibrium between the organization of psychological processes or structures and the functioning of these structures so that a reasonably stable picture of reality may be

maintained.

This is a dynamic equilibrium within which new

pieces of information can continually be integrated in

a

holistic manner.
For Piaget, then, human knowledge is essentially

active.

Knowledge grows through the transformation of

experience, not through the passive absorption of ideas
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presented by other agencies.

The following quotes express

Piaget's view of the construction of knowledge: "Knowledge
results from continuous construction, since in each act of

understanding, some degree of invention
(Piaget

,

1970a:77).

is

involved"

"Actually, in order to know objects,

the subject must act upon them, and transform them: he

must displace, connect, combine, take apart, and re-

assemble them" (Piaget, 1970b:704).
In the construction of a view of reality certain

stable relationships are sought between objects or events.
Gibson's work (1967) on the detection of perceptual in-

variance was discussed in Chapter III.

The detection of

patterns of distinctive features of objects and events
and their invariant relations aided in the reduction of

subjective uncertainty and so enhanced the survival of the
individual.

Bruner and his colleagues (1969) have postu-

lated that the detection of invariant features of objects,
events and people leads us to categorize or form classes
so that a response is made in terms of class membership

and not on the basis of each occurrence.

For these authors,

categorization is the major aspect of thinking and involves
"an act of invention" (Bruner et al

.

,

1969:2).

Piaget, in his book on The Construction of Reality
in the Child

(1954), identifies the major categories within

which invariant relations are sought.

These classes are

the spatial and temporal field, and causality.

Children
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gradually develop notions of invariance as they relate
to
features of objects (solids), liquids, weight, length,
area, density, volume, time, speed, velocity, number,

physical and psychological causality.

The understanding

of these concepts develops through stages that are essen-

tially invariant and qualitatively different.

Even though

all children do not pass through the same stage at

similar age, the sequence of development
At each stage, there is

thought of children.

a

is

a

still invariant.

qualitative difference in the

It is not a question of how much or

how little children’s thought resembles adult thought.
The point is that children's thoughts are completely different from the adult way of thinking.
Four major stages of intellectual development have

been identified by Piaget.

These stages can be distin-

guished by the following characteristic ways of thinking
(from Chittenden, 1970; Ginsburg and Opper, 1969):

Sensori-motor Stage (Birth to approx. 18 months)

.

As the name implies, this stage is characterized by sen-

sory and motor reflexive behavior.

The infant learns to

differentiate various features of the immediate environment and behavior can be modified in accordance with the

demands made by changes in this environment.

For Piaget,

this kind of activity in the early years reveals the origins of intelligent behavior.

Initially, the world is undifferentiated for the

.
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child.

At the end of this stage, objects and events in

the world tend to take on some identity of their own.

The

most significant feature of the sensor i -motor stage

the

is

attainment of object permanence, i.e., the realization that
an object still exists even if it cannot be perceived

directly
Pre-operational Stage (18 months to approx.
years)

.

6

With the onset of language and symbolic functioning,

children' are capable of mentally representing objects and

events.

This can be observed in instances of deferred imi-

tation, i.e., imitating

a

situation after some time has

elapsed, and in children's symbolic play.
Two major characteristics of this stage are

thought based on perception and

(2)

(1)

egocentric thought.

Young children are said to be percept-bound when their
judgments are formed purely on the basis of what

is

seen.

Such thought is essentially static and tied to the imme-

diate situation.

The egocentric nature of children's

thought is manifested in their preoccupation with "me”
or "I."

There is no differentiation between internal and

external environments or objective and subjective states,
so that "me" and the world outside are all one and the same.
It is difficult for children to co-ordinate other points of

view into their thinking as well because they do not
realize that others may think differently from them.
Concrete operational Stage

(6

years to approx.

1_1

)
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years

.

A profound re-orientation occurs at this stage

because children are not bound by their perceptions alone.
Their thinking is now transformative and reversible, i.e.,
they can perform changes, and move back and forth mentally.

Instead of being tied to the immediate situation, they

begin to make inferences about reality.

However, children

are still tied to the concrete rather than the abstract.

Characteristic operations that children can perform at this stage are classification, seriation and con-

servation.

The major attainment is that of conservation

which involves the realization that things remain invariant even after certain changes are made or occur.
Formal operational Stage (11 years oneward)
is

the stage when true abstract thought develops.

.

This

Possi-

bilities can be conceived, hypotheses can be formulated
and alternative strategies can be planned in the mind and
in the absence of the actual event or situation.

The Relationship Between Children's
Thinking and Their Questions About
Causal Order ~
The kind of invarient relations that are most sig-

nificant in interactions with the physical environment are
those that deal with causal order.

Understanding physical

causality is of supreme importance in the life of the child,
just as it is in the work of the scientist.

Causal know-

sophisledge, from simple associative beliefs to the most

.
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ticated forms of causal dependence and interdependence,
offers an assurance of control, security and practical

application.

Knowing

,

Isaacs, in

a

book on Children's Ways of

emphasizes the fact that

a

knowledge of the causal

structure of the world is indispensable to the growing
child.

He says that

Behind most of the checks which the child's
expectations or assumptions receive from the world,
there are unknown or insufficiently known or misconstrued causal facts; the right kind of explanation will disclose these to him.
Endless unexpected
happenings, failures of expected happenings, deviations or differences from the customary, will
turn out to be explained by unsuspected causes,
by intervening or preventing causes, unknown determining or conditioning causes. Thus, causes
and causal relations should come to be looked for
as the important controls of what does or does not
happen; and new or better causal knowledge, as the
most potent means to true and successful expectation, and the key to secure and controlling knowledge of the course of things. Thus followed up,
"causes" branch out into activating events on the
one hand, controlling structures, compositions,
natures, relations, etc., on the other hand. They
become extended to include every kind of relevant
or possibly relevant circumstances or conditions
or facts of immediate or wider setting; everything
which, if it were different, would make any given
Carried right through, causal
thing different.
course, eventually the basis
of
inquiry becomes,
for our most systematic and comprehensive investigation into the construction and controls, the
general structure, of our world; in other words,
(1974:50)
the warp and woof of science.

The development of

a

critical attitude of mind is

indispensable to the attainment of technological competence.
Scientific method is

a

valuable tool in helping children to

understand cause and effect relationships in the physical
environment
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Since cause and effect relationships are formally

expressed in the optimal formulations or laws and principles of natural science, it will be necessary to identify these laws and principles in

a

science curriculum.

The science curriculum should be organized in such

a

manner that children at different developmental levels can

understand the laws and principles.
The following chapter outlines some of the major
laws and principles of natural science and gives examples

of how they may be organized so that they are appropriate
for children in different stages of development.

Isaacs places the child’s desire to find out about

causal events within the broader context of the types of

questions that are asked concerning objects, events and
people.

The subject of children’s

’’why”

questions is ana-

lyzed thoroughly and an explanation is ventured as to why
they occur so frequently at certain ages.
is

Isaacs’

thesis

that children have a genuine ’epistemic’ concern about

the state of their knowledge.

Challenges to their systems

of belief regarding reality present the sense that some-

thing is wrong with their knowledge- - it may be some un-

suspected error, confusion, insufficient information or

misunderstanding.

Children do not formulate or articulate

this epistemic concern in

a

conscious manner, but they act

it out by posing the "why” question.
’’Why”

questions do not always ask for

a

causal
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explanation.

Because of their developing language ability

children may frame

a "why”

question but really be seeking

something other than an explanation.
of

The multiple usages

’why" make it somewhat difficult to discern exactly what

is being sought.

However, if

a

satisfactory answer is

not forthcoming, the unremitting "why” is bound to reappear.

Three basic types of "why" questions have been
identified by Isaacs (1974).

There are questions that seek

information, explanation or logical justification.

Informational Questions
Essentially, these questions seek to inquire into
motives, intentions, purposes, uses or functions.

They

are usually demands for familiar classes of information

These "why" questions are more

rather than explanation.

closely allied to question forms such as "where," "when,"
"what," "who" - -quest ions that arise out of simple ignorance or lack of knowledge and not from

ment and helplessness.
a

a

state of puzzle-

So when a child says "Why is this

cup?" the answer that is being sought is not an explana-

tion but something that has to do with the differences

between classes of objects such as cups, glasses, and mugs.
Explanatory Questions
This group of questions is derived from the initial

informational questions but becomes limited to causal inter-

.

:
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vention or control or analysis.
is one of

The real interest here

explanation which does involve

formation but this

is

a

measure of in-

of secondary importance.

Informa-

tion that is given is accepted if it really explains the

observed anomaly or confusion.

According to Isaacs this

type of "why” question is unmistakable in children from
about four years and onward.

surprise creates

a

A sudden jar or onset of

condition of disturbance and children

may ask such questions as

(from Isaacs)

’’When you hold up a fountain pen, why doesn't

the ink fall out?"

"Why don't we see two things with our two eyes?"
"You aren't dead, so why don't you get up?"

Answers to these questions are not simple to explain to
a child.

Adults may provide an acceptable answer by some

demonstration, identification of
some distinction.

a

rule or pointing out

However, it is evident that erroneous

notions and superstitions can creep into the child's
thought by the appropriateness and the truth-value of the

answer

Justificatory Questions
These questions are neither explanatory nor informational.

They demand the grounds for rules, commands

and prohibitions as they relate to behavior.

Principles

are sought-or reasons which presuppose some standard

.
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these may be moral, social or conventional standards of

individuals, families or of the society as

Children who ask "Why do

I

a

whole.

have to do what you say?" are

seeking what the basis of one’s authority might be.

The

difference between these types of questions and the other
two types is that an attitudinal or emotional factor may

be involved which may or may not lead to

rebuttal of ideas or disregard.

a

clash of views,

Discussion and an exchange

of ideas and beliefs are required when these "why" questions

occur

Children's understandings develop to

a

greater or

lesser extent depending upon their experiences as they
look for causal factors that control events.

A greater

voluntary interest develops in discovering causal relationships not only because it provides information but
also because it fulfills the need to bridge the gaps in
the child's knowledge that arise out of genuine puzzlement
or contradiction in experience.
is successfully sustained,

Once developed and if it

causal inquiry becomes an in-

valuable tool that can assist the child in learning to
understand the laws and principles that govern the organization of the world of nature.

Development of Children’s Understanding
of Physical Causality
and effect
A child's developing notions of cause

follow
relationships in the physical world appear to

a
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pattern or sequence.

Most of the systematic research has

tended to focus on children aged three or four.

Research

on infants is not so extensive but it is possible to

piece together

a

picture of the earliest form of causal

orientation from isolated reports.

Piaget's investigations

into the sensor i-motor stage of development are by far, in

an indirect manner, the most comprehensive treatment of

causal interest in very young children.

The sequence of

development begins with what may be termed "contingency
awareness," followed by

a

stage of pre-causal thought and

finally the period of true causal thinking.

Contingency Awareness
As early as a few weeks after birth, infants ex-

plore their environment both visually and physically.

When they discover that one action leads invariably
another in

a

to

regular fashion, a rudimentary form of

causal awareness begins to grow.

Stern reports that at

the age of three months, infants play with objects by

touching, rolling, dropping or holding them and in these
ways give themselves simple lessons in physics and geo-

metry (in Huang, 1943).

Gesell and Thompson found that

infants of nine months of age engage in ceaseless manipu
understandings
lations and initiate the development of later
of physics

(in Huang,

1943).

In a string toy experiment,

pull the
the authors found that infants would constantly
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string to bring the toy within their reach.

Piaget's book on The Origins of Intelligence in

Children (1952) is filled with numerous examples of children's developing notions of cause and effect relationships.

In the early stage, when the child is about one-

two months old, movements are usually centered on the

child's body, e.g., sucking

a

thumb or hand, waving the

arms or grasping other parts of the body such as
a hand.

a

foot or

During the next stage, called the "secondary cir-

cular reactions," (about three months) the child's actions
tend towards repetition.

After reproducing some of the

results that were discovered by chance by actions on the
body, the child then tries to repeat certain events in the

external environment.
are that

"...

The characteristics of this stage

the movements are centered on

a

result

produced in the external environment and the sole aim of
the action is to maintain this result; furthermore it is

more complex, the means beginning to be differentiated from
the end, at least after the event" (Piaget, 1952:157).

During the secondary circular reactions stage

children devote their energies to "procedures to make the
interesting spectacle last."

Piaget describes how his son,

paper knife, started shaking it so that the

when given

a

sound of

rattle (which he had played with previously)

a

could be reproduced.

In another example, his daughter

would shake her foot or body to cause swinging- - she had
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learned that this type of shaking could cause certain
things

,

e.g.

,

a

bassinet, to rock or swing.

other objects such as
above her

,

a

However, when

watch or eraser were just held

she would shake her feet to reproduce

interesting result.

a

previous

For Piaget, the activities of this

stage are the ’’highest intellectual manifestations of which
the child is capable”

(1952:207).

Later in the infant’s

development more deliberate exploration and simple experi-

mentation can be witnessed.
Watson (1966) postulated the term ’’contingency
awareness” to refer to any early form of causal association,

when the only reward was the observation of the event.
played

a

game with his two-month old son.

event was the opening and closing of

looked at Watson’s outstretched arms.

a

He

The contingent

fist when the child

When the child

turned away the activity ceased, but when his gaze fell on
the fist again the movement was repeated.

Learning the

contingency led to the repetition of the head-turning response.

Further experiments conducted by Watson and Ramey

(1972) utilized a contingency mobile which an infant could

activate by means of

a

pressurized pillow.

Eight week-old

babies learned to turn their heads frequently so that the

mobile would move.

The authors were surprized to discover

an emotional effect in that the infant's response was

accompanied by cooing, smiling and laughing.
cite

a

The authors

cautionary note that the experiment may have over-
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stimulated the infants, which may have some disadvantageous
consequences.

However, an important implication of this

experiment is that even very young infants find the de-

tection of causal relationships satisfying and rewarding.
Pre-Causal and Causal Thinking
In a book on The Child's Conception of Physical

Causal ity (1930)

,

Piaget investigated the underlying cog-

nitive structures that assist children in discovering cause
and effect relationships.

He utilized the clinical method

of interviewing children by presenting questions and demon-

strations on various natural phenomena such as air, clouds,
water, shadows, dreams and machines.

The answers that the

children gave fell into seventeen types, the first nine of

which were characteristic of pre-causal thought and the
remaining eight of causal thought.

According to Piaget,

before the ages of seven or eight children's explanations
of natural phenomena are basically magical, or animistic,

i.e., a belief that the physical world of objects, plants

and animals are endowed with life.

True causal thinking

appears at about seven or eight years of age but is not

prevalent until' eleven or twelve years of age.

Explana-

laws
tions now begin to be logical and refer to physical

explanations tend
and principles, and the earlier animistic
to disappear gradually.

physical
Piaget states that the development of
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causality is characterized by two major processes:

progressive objectification of causality and

(2)

the

(1)

the forma-

tion of temporal series.

The first process is related to the egocentric

world of the child- - subj ective elements predominate.

Pre-

causal children do not make the following distinctions:

between psychological or motivational factors and physical,
external events because there is very little differentiation

between the internal self and the outside world; between

muscular or body activity and mechanical action; and between the influence of the mind on the body and the influence of external objects on each other.

Because of the

basic lack of differentiation between themselves and the
external world, young children feel that they can make the

moon follow them, or that the moon likes to follow, that
objects float because they like to do so, that the clouds

walk and the moon goes with them, or that clouds move
because they feel cold.
The constitution of

temporal series is the second

a

Very

process that affects developing notions of causality.

young children (3-6 years) are not concerned about how long
it takes something to happen-

-

events in their lives are

either immediate or extra- temporal in nature.

The sun or

the moon follow as soon as the child begins to walk.

Pre

such
causal children believe in the immediacy of events
or contact
that no thought is given to any intermediaries
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between cause and effect relationships.

Children of four

or five years of age think that cars move only because of

the wheels, whereas an eleven or twelve year old may not

know all the details of operation of the car but will

presuppose

a

system of belts, pipes and chains.

Notions

of before and after may be present in precausal children

but it is the idea of a temporal order in time that is

absent, e.g., beginning, middle and end or the fact that

a

particular tree is the same tree during summer, winter,
fall and spring.
For Piaget, the stage of pre-causal thought is in-

explicable unless some system of internal origin

is

postu-

lated as an intermediary between the environment and the
mind.

The child begins without any distinction between the

self and the environment, and gradually an awareness of the

body as

a

separate entity develops.

that causality develops as an

a

Piaget does not believe

priori form, fixed in the

structure of the mind, for if this were so, then causality

should appear in its completed form at the outset.

Also,

the fact that causality evolves through so many types of

explanations leads Piaget to the conclusion that an under
standing of physical causality develops through interaction

with the environment and that the child passes through
continually
stages of development of structures that are
by changes.
adapting to the environment and being modified
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Criticism and Confirmation of
the Pre-Causal Stage
Piaget’s identification of the pre-causal stage as

being characterized by magical and animistic forms of
thought has not been accepted by many researchers in this
field.

Numerous studies have been conducted in the hope of

confirming Piaget's views.

The outcome has been mixed--

there are just as many studies that confirm pre-causal

thinking as there are studies that do not find any evidence for this early form of causal thought.
In a highly critical review of Piaget’s work, Huang

(1943) put forward the idea that children only sometimes

explain natural phenomena in animistic terms.

He studied

American and Chinese children and found that pre-causal
thought, especially mystical and anthropomorphic answers,

were completely absent.

Deutsche (1937) used some of

Piaget's questions to which she added ten simple physical

experiments, and discovered that children very rarely

relied on precausal forms of explanation.

Most explana-

concepts.
tions called upon physical or mechanical

Certain

that animistic
cross-cultural studies have also pointed out

with the Manus
explanations are not always prevalent- -Mead
Jahoda with children
tribes on the Admiralty Islands and
in West Africa

(in Laurendeau and Pinard,

1962).

would seem that the
On the face of this evidence it

existence of

a

or reprecausal stage should be abandoned

.
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jected.

However, there have been

a

series of investiga-

tions that have definitely confirmed the various types

of precausal thought.

Numerous studies by Russell and

Dennis (1939) with children of normal intelligence, with

American children and Zuni (Dennis and Russell, 1940) and
with Hopi children (Dennis, 1943) substantiate Piaget's
v i ew

The largest study supporting Piaget's results was

carried out by Laurendeau and Pinard (1962).

Using five

hundred children between the ages of four and twelve, they
reinvestigated whether precausal thinking existed.

Ani-

mistic explanations occurred with such frequency that the
existence of

a

qualitatively different form of thinking

in young children could not be doubted.

These authors also caution the ready acceptance of
the results of studies on physical causality.

Factors such

as the following should be carefully examined in the experi-

mental situations:

(1)

methods of investigation, e.g., the

use of certain types of questions, questioning techniques
and questionnaire format;
as regards age
8

(2)

types of subjects, especially

(some researchers used a questionnaire with

year olds since they could read and did not find any

precausal forms of thinking- - this is not unusual since true
causal thought begins to develop at about seven or eight
years); and

(3)

techniques of analysis, particularly in

of the
the identification, classification and definition
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different forms of precausal thinking.

Laurendeau and

Pinard conclude that the reality of the existence of precausal thought is far from being definitely resolved since
the evidence for its prevalence is so controversial.

Factors That Influence the Children’s
Understanding of Physical Causality
Even though the information on pre-causal thinking
is not so clear-cut,

the importance of children's develop-

ing notions of cause and effect relationships has been

acknowledged, particularly in the role of assisting children
to know the basic means by which the physical world func-

tions.

To overcome some of the methodological problems

involved in the technique of investigation, various re-

searchers have tried to identify the influence of relevant
situational factors.

Baldwin (1955) and Russell (1956)

have suggested that children revert to non-naturalistic

explanations when the phenomena that are being presented
are unfamiliar.

Children are therefore unable to explain

the cause and effect relationship in

a

reasonable manner.

Berzonsky's studies (1971, 1975) which represent the most
recent research in physical causality, also support the
events is
fact that a child’s familiarity with objects or
a

decisive factor in causal reasoning.

The role of experi-

familiarity and
ence in causal thought is related to that of
to investigate
has been shown to be necessary when trying
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child’s level of understanding of causal events
(Mogar,

1960; Huang, 1943; Berzonsky, 1975; Inbody, 1963).

Researchers have also discovered that the psychological state of the child affects an understanding of

physical causality.

Berger et al

.

(1969)

found that

children with severe psychogenic learning inhibitions used
developmental ly less mature concepts than normal children

when presented with physical events.

Reasons advanced for

this condition are that the disturbed parent-child rela-

tionship retards the initial development of causal concepts, or that parents unconsciously thwart the child’s

attempts to know and understand sequences of painful reality
events, or that parents preferred to handle situations with
the child by secrecy, deception and the distortion of

reality.

Nass (1956) found that the withdrawn child's

level of causal thinking was at

mature level than

a

a

significantly less

child who was not withdrawn.

Children

with withdrawal symptoms tend to find the environment
threatening and retreat into their own world and thereby
revert to prelogical modes of thought.
A close relationship exists between a child's

understanding of physical causality and psychological
causality (Whiteman, 1970) which has later implications
for moral development.

Kohlberg’s work on moral reasoning

and Selman's studies on social perspective- taking presup-

pose the development of physical causality especially in the

.
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progressive differentiation of the self and the external
environment.

Children learn to consider other people and

their feelings when they realize that they themselves are

separate entities.
Children’s Application of
Scientific Method

would be safe to conclude from the foregoing

It

discussion that the types of causal explanations that
children present reflect their level of scientific thinking.

The assumption is that the qualitative differences

in the explanations at different stages of development are

the external manifestations of an internal pattern of

organization of thought processes.

As was noted at the

beginning of this chapter, the scientist's mode of thinking
was inferred from the actions performed, i.e., scientific

method.

The processes of observation, hypothesis-formation,

prediction, and theory formation have been well-documented
in adult scientific thought.

In the case of young chil-

dren, the developmental progression of processes of scien-

tific method have not been thoroughly and systematically

investigated.

However, some information is available from

Piaget's experiments with physical phenomena (in Ginsburg
and Opper

,

1969)

in
A pendulum problem was presented to subjects

the pre- operational

,

concrete-operational and formal opera-
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tional stages of development.

The problem was to discover

the frequency of oscillation of the pendulum in relation
to four factors which could be manipulated- -height of

pendulum, length of string, weight of suspended object
and force with which the pendulum could be pushed.
It is

immediately evident that the problem

beyond the capability of

a 6 or

7

is

year old child, but it

does provide some insight into how the child might be

thinking.

The pre-operational child acted in

a

haphazard

manner- - testing was random, results were reported inac-

curately and expectations influenced observations.
the subjects did formulate hypotheses

However,

(even though they

were inaccurate), made observations, experimented by attempting to manipulate variables and drew conclusions
The concrete-

which were not in accordance with the results.
operational child showed

a

marked improvement-

-

a

number of

variables were investigated, results were observed ac-

curately and the solution to the problem was partially
correct.

The major deficiencies lay in poor experimental

design (which could be expected because there were too
many variables to manipulate) and incorrect inferences were
drawn.

Finally, the formal operational subjects (adoles-

cents) design the experiment properly at first, then
conclusions
observe the results accurately and draw logical

from the observations.

-

Hypotheses were carefully formulated,

variables were manipulated one at

a time and the conclusions

.
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were "certain and necessary" (Ginsburg and Opper, 1969:
188)

.

Clearly the pre-operat ional child's scientific
thinking is different from the adolescent's thought but
only in a matter of degree.

Not being capable of abstract

thought, young children have difficulty in conceptualizing

hypothetical combinations and mentally manipulating variables.

The concrete operational child has the beginnings

of abstract thought but is still tied to the concrete

situation.

As the child develops more complex cognitive

structures, then true scientific thinking will gradually

emerge
The ability to think in

a

scientific manner can

prove to be an invaluable tool for children, not only when
they are young but throughout their lives.

If children

are introduced to the application of the scientific method

when they are young, then they will have an opportunity to
gradually develop

a

critical attitude of mind in relation

to their experiences in the physical, human and unknown

environments.

One of the goals of education, according to

Piaget, is "to form minds which can be critical, can verify,

and not accept everything they are offered" (in Barber

and Hayes, 1973:13).

A critical mind will go

a

long way in helping to

prefree children (and adults) from error, superstition,

judice, dogma and fear.

Such beliefs, once established,
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have

a

tendency to persist in how people think, feel and

behave in certain situations.

The habitual patterned use

of energies in these directions then become very difficult
to eliminate.

To avoid the harmful and destructive effects

that can accrue from acting on the basis of superstition,

error and fear, children should be encouraged, when young,
to question,

possible.
a

investigate and verify statements as much as

When errors are not detrimental to the life of

child, they can serve as valuable experiences in learning

more about

a

particular event or phenomenon.

Errors have

the capacity to act as lures so that further hypotheses

can be formulated to test out some problem and in this way
a

solution that is closer to the truth, i.e.,

approximation to reality, can be achieved.

a

closer

The persis-

tence of the search after truth is described by Whitehead

when he claims that "It belongs to the self-respect of
intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final

unravelment" (1967c:185).
Situations will arise, more so with adolescents
and adults, when information about certain things will be

accepted even if all the facts are not known.

Such in-

stances occur when results are reported from certain fields
of specialization or when experts give their advice and

opinions.

Does

a

person have to blindly accept what

is

heard or what is read, or is there some means by which the

information can be assessed?

There appear to be three
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checks that can be fruitfully applied.

Firstly, the

validity of the information will depend on the source of
the information, e.g., was it read in
a

a

reputable journal,

not-so reputable newspaper, on television or from another

individual?

Secondly, the potential replicability or the

actual number of replications of the results will have to
be assessed.

Hearing of an isolated instance of

a

cure for

some disease does not lend authenticity or credibility to
the information because one does not know whether the cure

will be effective in other situations as well.

Thirdly,

the operation of different variables will have to be
If enough facts are available and there is a

checked.

sufficient level of understanding of the information, then
further examinations can be made.
tioned are all facets of

a

The three checks men-

scientific mode of thinking.

Dewey comments that science and its methods involve "an

intelligent and persistent endeavor to revise current

beliefs so as to weed out what is erroneous" (1966:19).
Whether children will try to check their ideas,
readjust their beliefs or extend their knowledge depends
to a large extent on the standard of explanation that

adults present (Isaacs, 1974).

Adults can encourage or

discourage the child’s explorations; they "can rebuff,
confuse, mislead and stifle it in endless ways" (Isaacs,
1974:53).

Isaacs concludes the section on children's 'why

thinking
questions and the development of their scientific
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by pointing out to adults that
But these are the factors that will beyond anything else decide the general character and level
of his intellectual life.
They will determine the
degree of control which actuality is allowed to
exercise over his notions and beliefs. Nothing
can be more fatal to growth in adequate knowledge, or in the capacity for objective judgment,
than the vitiation of that actual ity- control by
a low social standard of explanation.
If it
sanctions explanation by pretentious tautologies,
by arbitrary selections of partial causes, by
imaginary and mythological causes; if it seems to
authorize endless irrelevance, the divorce of
explanation from its occasions and function, its
confusion with verbal and formal self- justification (and the substitution of the latter for
enquiries into evidence) and if, moreover, it does
this all together in one anarchic medley- -the result will be self-evident.
Such a social standard
must continually tend to blunt alertness; to
confuse the functioning of such native functional
standards as we may possess; to discourage an interest which it hinders or leads astray from
achievement; and in general, to make us drift towards a state of chaotic muddle-mindedness which
then in turn can only, in a vicious circle, reBy continuous efforts to counterproduce itself.
act its consequences, impelled and sustained from
the one direction in which we have achieved successful integrative growth, i.e., science, and
the scientific attitude and method, we may indeed
keep them under control and even very slowly and
laboriously gain a little upon them. But at the
very best, the most part of the work of our special
socially delegated organ of cognitive growth must
thus be w asted, so long as we are content with a
general social and educational standard of explanation which lags so far behind that which science
itself has reached, and which is the basis for all
(1974:52-53)
its achievement.
r

The next chapter will outline the framework for

a

natural science curriculum within the context of the over
all curriculum.

This framework will form the basis from

which development ally- sequenced science concepts and activities could be elaborated in greater detail.
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CHAPTER

V

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR A NATURAL SCIENCE

CURRICULUM BASED ON AN
ORGANISMIC APPROACH
From an organismic perspective, the natural science

curriculum should reflect the characteristics of wholeness,
integration and relatedness.

It

is

important then that

these organismic characteristics be incorporated in the

organizational format of the natural science curriculum.
This chapter will outline one possible logical

structuring of the framework of the natural science cur-

riculum rather than

a

developmentally-based structure.

reason for presenting the logical scheme first

is

The

that it

can provide a base from which developmentally- sequenced

science curriculum goals can be planned and implemented.

Developmental information on the nature of children’s

scientific thinking is vital if such curriculum goals are
to be outlined and executed

(see Chapter IV)

.

Chapter

VI will present prototypical sequences of developmentally-

based science curriculum goals.
Before discussing the logical structure of the

framework of the natural science curriculum in the Anisa
Model, it will be useful to understand the nature of

curriculum in general.

To provide the context for this
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discussion, die Anisa Iheory of Curriculum will be pro*

sented and its relationship

to'

the framework for a natural

science curriculum will then be explored.
The Anisa Theory of Curriculum
In the Anisa Model, curriculum is defined as

being ’’comprised of two interrelated sets of educational
goals and what children do, usually with the help of peers
and adults to achieve these goals"

1973:30)

(Jordan and Streets,

The two sets of goals are: process goals and

content goals.

Process goals refer to the "hows" of learn-

ing and depend on the classification of a person's poten-

tialities and how they become actualized.

Content goals

refer to the information to be learned by the person.

The

organization of the information (content) to be learned

is

congruent with the classification of the environments

according to Whitehead's ontological levels (physical,
human and unknown) and upon the formation and utilization
of basic symbol systems
arts)

(mathematics, language and the

to convey the information.

What children do (the

interaction component) represents those activities that
children engage in to attain the goals of the curriculum.
Process and content goals, specific formation and

utilization of symbols, and types of interactions are all
V

further exposition of the Anisa Theory of Curriculum will be presented by Lawrence McCullough in a
forthcoming dissertation.
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determined by the overarching purpose of the higher-order
competencies, i.e., technological, moral and fiducial
competencies.

The interrelated components of the Anisa

Theory of Curriculum, which are organized around the

higher-order competencies, may be outlined as follows:
I.

Process goals

II.

Content goals

III.
IV.

Formation and utilization of symbols
Interaction with particular environments
to achieve the goals.

Components of the Anisa
Theory of Curriculum
A description of the components of the Anisa Theory
of Curriculum will help to make clear their role in the

framework that is being proposed for the natural science
curriculum.

The specificity of the process and content

goals, symbol formation and utilization, and particular

activities is determined by the higher-order competencies.

I.

Process Goals
Five basic categories of potentialities have been

identified in the Anisa Model: psychomotor (moving), perceptual (perceiving)

,

cognitive (thinking)

(feeling), and volitional

,

affective

(willing) potentialities.

The

internalization of processes underlying each category of
compepotentiality results in the attainment of learning
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tence in that category.

There are numerous processes

underlying each category which have to be mastered if
learning competence is to be achieved.
Since the notion of process

is

central in organ-

ismic philosophy and so crucial in the Anisa theory of

Curriculum, it will be useful to understand the way in

which the word

is

being used.

Jordan defines process in

the following manner:

We use the word process to refer to the functioning
that is made possible by some structure in the
brain which is built up out of the organism's
particular interactions with particular environments.
Process is not to be confused with activity
that is provided for the child.
We reserve the
with
phrase interaction
the environment to deIt is the purpose of
scribe what the child does.
the process curriculum to specify what kinds of
environments and what kinds of interactions with
those environments are necessary for particular
structures to emerge, thereby endowing the child
with competence to function in terms of their
(Jordan, 1976:277)
associated processes.

The process goals then are concerned with the "how"
of learning as opposed to the "what" of the content cur-

riculum.

Children gradually learn how to move, how to

perceive, how to think, how to feel and how to formulate
goals and execute them.

The basic processes in each cate-

gory of potentiality assist children in learning how to
learn, thereby becoming competent learners.

Learning competence has been defined as the conscious ability to differentiate aspects of experience
voli(psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and
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tional experiences) and to integrate these aspects into

a

pattern in some new way and then generalize the integrated
pattern to other similar situations.

The word "conscious"

has been used to refer to knowing that one knows rather

than just knowing something without being aware of it.

Human beings employ symbols to represent what they do know
and the state of not knowing something.

Learning compe-

tence therefore depends on the conscious ability to use

symbols to differentiate, integrate and generalize aspects
of experience.

The attainment of learning competence in each

category of potentiality will result in the achievement of
psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitional competencies.

Each competency will depend on the con-

scious ability to differentiate, integrate and generalize

aspects of experience related to

a

particular category.

The five basic competencies are very closely related and

will be implicated in each interaction with the environment.

I I

.

Content Goals

The content of the curriculum depends on the in-

formation to be learned.
information:

(1)

There are two basic types of

descriptive information which includes

basic factual information, and

(2)

more formalized informa-

tion that can be generalized to different situations.

information to be learned

is

organized according to the

The
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ontological levels of the universe as described
by Whitehead.
III.

Formation and Utilization
~
of Symbols
The information that is to be conveyed will be

coded in symbols, i.e., mathematical symbols, language
symbols and the symbols of the arts.

purpose

tha>_

Depending upon the

the individual has in mind, different

symbolic forms will be utilized.
IV.

Interaction with Particular
Environments to Achieve the
Goals
One of the basic propositions of the Anisa Theory

of Development is that development is sustained through

interaction with the environment.

Children's interactions

with the environment will be organized in such

a

manner

so that the goals of the curriculum can be achieved.

The

particular environment's to be interacted with will be determined by

(1)

the information to be learned,

process goals to be achieved, and
level of the child.

(3)

(2)

the

the developmental

Activities that are organized for

children will incorporate the fusion of process and content
goals, foster the development of symbolic capacities and
the formation of values and the higher order competencies
so that the act of learning is an integrated, holistic

:

.. .

isb

experience
As the child interacts with the physical, human

and unknown environments, material, social and philosophical values are formed respectively.

On each of these

values rests the attainment of technological, moral and
fiducial competence, respectively (see Chapter III).

dissertation deals only with the presentation of
framework for

which

a

a

This

possible

natural science curriculum, the goal of

the attainment of technological competence.

is.

Components of the Natural Science
Curriculum in Accordance With the
Anisa Theory of Curriculum
The interrelated components of the natural science

curriculum will be organized around the overarching purpose
of achieving technological competence.

These components

are
I

Process goals

II.

Content goals

Ill

IV.

I

.

Formation and utilization of symbols,
primarily mathematics and discursive
language
Interactions to achieve the goals

Process Goals
Each of the five basic competencies will be impli-

cated in each interaction with the physical environment.
A.

Psychomotor competence will depend on the con-
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scious ability to use voluntary muscles in locomotion and
in manipulation, particularly fine motor skills for handl-

ing specimens and instruments.

Perceptual competence will depend on the conscious ability to process sensory data from the environment, i.e., visual, tactile, olfactory, auditory and

gustatory information.

The foundation of natural science

rests upon careful and detailed observation.
C.

Cognitive competence which

is

crucial in

science depends on the development of the intellectual processes that can be consciously used for thinking and reasoning.

Processes of scientific method such as observation,

hypothesis formation, experimentation, deduction, induction,

prediction and inference are vital in helping children discover the relationships between physical events.

Other pro-

cesses such as classification, seriation and conservation
are also important, particularly in the understanding of

quantitative relationships.
D.

Affective competence will depend on the con-

scious organization of emotions so that viability can be

accurately assessed.

Emotions that relate to hope and fear

affect the release of potential.

Hope-related emotions

lead to active involvement and enjoyment, whereas fear-

related emotions lead to avoidance reactions and anxiety.
is important
To avoid the development of superstition, it

with the
that the hope-related emotions become associated
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principles and methods of science which arc designed to

discover error in belief and so generate new knowledge.
E.

Volitional competence depends on the conscious

ability to attend to some aspect of experience, formulate
goals and persevere in the attainment of these goals.

The great discoveries in science are made by scientists

who toil laboriously over many years to achieve their goals.

Without volitional competence, the need to do things over
and over' again cannot be met.

Even though each of the competencies has been

separated for the sake of analysis and discussion, it must
be remembered that all of the competencies are implicated
in each interaction with the physical environment.

I I

.

Content Goals
In the natural science curriculum the content to be

learned is the knowledge or information that has been ac-

cumulated about the physical environment.
to be learned is of two basic types:

(1)

The information

descriptive infor-

mation, i.e., basic facts and definitions; and

(2)

abstract,

general i zable information such as the basic laws and principles of natural science, which express fundamental patterns of relationships in the physical world.

With the on-

and
set of more abstract thought processes, these laws

similar
principles can be learned and generalized to other

situations.

the two
A detailed outline and description of

.

.

153

types of information will be presented in this chapter.

Formation and Utilization
of Symbols

III.

A statement on the role of symbolization in natural

science was presented in Chapter III.

Mathematics and dis-

cursive language are used primarily by scientists to convey

information about the physical environment.

Music, visual

art, dance and poetic and dramatic uses of language con-

tribute to the development of sensitivity to, and appreciation of, forms, patterns and harmony in nature.

Metaphor

and analogy are often the means of new discoveries in the

sciences
IV.

Interaction to Achieve
the Goals
What children do to achieve the goals of the

natural science curriculum will depend on the kinds of
learning experiences that are planned.

Experiences will

be organized to impart information and understanding

about the major laws and principles of natural science
(content goals) and to strengthen the processes underlying
the basic competencies

(process goals)

To make natural science an exciting and challenging

experience for children, the activities that are planned
of
should be organismic in nature and relate to the lives

and to
children, to real problems that may be encountered,

.
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their developmental levels.

The overarching objective of the natural science

curriculum

is

the development of technological competence

in interacting with the physical environment,

i.e., the

development of the conscious ability to understand, discover
and apply the laws and principles of natural science in

such

a

manner that greater control over the physical en-

vironment can be exercised.
Process Goals of the Natural
Science Curriculum

There are many basic processes that must be internal
ized if technological competence is to be attained in inter-

acting with the physical environment.

The following brief

list identifies some of these basic processes that consti-

tute the process part of the natural science curriculum
(for definitions of each process see Jordan [1976]).

This

is not an exhaustive list and is presented here to give

examples of the kind of processes involved.

Psychomotor processes:

balance/posture, locomotion,
manipulation, vocalization.

Perceptual processes:

visual, auditory, olfactory,
taste, tactile, intersensory
integration

Cognitive
—

object permanence, deduction,
induction (includes observation
prediction, experimentation),
extrapolation, interpolation,
classification, seriation, conservation, number relations.

processes:

.

.

,

.
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Affective processes

evaluative (reflection, appraisal)
regulative (facilitation,
inhibition, coping), empathic
(imitation, identification,
reciprocation)

:

,

Volitional processes

:

attention, goal setting, will
(self arousal, perseverance,
effecting closure)

Science activities that are planned for children
can foster the internalization of many of these basic

processes to

a

greater or lesser extent.

For example, a

simple experiment on the expansion of metals will implicate processes from each category of potentiality: processes of manipulation in the handling of materials

motor)

,

(psycho-

visual processes of observation (perceptual)

thought processes such as classification, seriation, conservation, prediction, hypothesis- formation, experimentation (cognitive)

,

evaluative and regulative processes

involved in enjoying and coping with the task (affective),
and finally, persevering in the achievement of the goal

(volitional)
It

is

evident that the cognitive processes play

a

crucial role in the natural science curriculum, largely

because of the need for the development and refinement of
the intellectual processes that are necessary for thinking

and reasoning.

The particular expression of the cognitive

processes will be realized in the fusion with the content
part of the natural science curriculum.

A detailed out-

in this chapter.
line of the content goals will be presented
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A unique feature of the natural science curriculum
is

that the cognitive processes that are stressed in the

natural science curriculum are also

a

part of other cur-

ricula, e.g., the cognitive development curriculum, moral

development curriculum, social science curriculum.

From

an organismic point of view, such interrelationships are

inescapable and necessary.
Two examples will assist in clarifying the concept
of horizontal transfer of processes across various disci-

plines.

The process of seriation* i.e., arranging things in

terms of ordered differences, can be applied to animals and

plants

(largest to smallest), to people (tall to short,

happy to sad) and to ideas or goals (most significant or

important to the least significant or important).

Predic-

tion (inference) is a cognitive process that can be applied
in a specific manner to investigating whether it will rain

or not given the prevailing weather conditions, or else

prediction can be made about

a

a

person's general pattern of

behavior given certain information about personality, age,
and life experiences.

Being able to generalize processes from one area
of knowledge to another is one of the most outstanding

features of

a

competent learner.

Understanding and apply-

methodologv
ing the basic processes involved in scientific
competence.
will assist in the attainment of technological
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Content Goals of the Natural
Science Curriculum
From the definition of technological competence

which was presented in Chapter III, it is possible to determine the particular information that should form the

content part of the natural science curriculum.

Since the

patterns of relationships between and among events were
identified as being the keys to understanding the operation
of the physical environment, then it becomes clear that

these patterns should be systematically described and organized.

The numerous patterns of relationships are sum-

marized in the fundamental laws and principles of natural
science.

If one of the goals of a natural science cur-

riculum is to impart this information, then

a

system of

categories or a classification scheme needs to be established for the ease of learning and remembering the laws
and principles.

Proposed Classification Scheme for the
Fundamental Laws and Principles for
a Natural Science Curriculum

I

have found that having

principle can provide

a

a

definition of

a

law or

basis upon which the major laws

and principles of natural science may be classified.

A

law or principle is a statement about the organization,

storage, transfer, utilization or transformation of energy
that occurs during events in the physical environment.

It

.
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should be emphas i zed that all events in the universe are

ultimately understood in terms of energy.

Even the concept

of matter can really only be comprehended if we view

matter as organized energy configurations.
the classification scheme that

I

However, in

am setting forth, matter

will be viewed as one type of energy configuration so that
events such as the interaction between matter and energy
or the transformation of matter or energy can be considered.

Laws and principles that relate to the organization

of matter, the storage of energy in matter and the transfer

of energy between matter may be grouped together to form
the study of physics.

The interrelationship or interaction

between energy and matter, rather than structural changes
in matter, is usually examined in physics (except, of

course, in atomic physics, where the boundary between

physics and chemistry is less distinct and changes in

matter are studied)
Laws and principles that concern the organization
of matter, the storage of energy, and the transformation of

matter from one form to another constitute the study of
The interaction between matter and energy

chemistry.

results in

a

structural change in matter with the ac-

companying release or absorption of energy.
Laws and principles that involve statements about
a

living organism's capacity to utilize and store energy

form to another
by transforming matter or energy from one

.
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comprise the study of biology.

The energy which is ob-

tained by the living organism is utilized to support and

maintain the vital life functions.

This definition of

the study of biology in physico-chemical terms is not

meant to be taken in an extreme reductionis tic sense.
Some of the basic functions of living organisms may be

analyzed in terms of physico-chemical reactions, but
there are other characteristics such as life, integration
and wholeness that are unique to living organisms and

which cannot be analyzed in such terms (see Chapter II).
The study of physics and chemistry may be combined
into the more inclusive group of physical sciences (i.e.,

non-living aspects of the physical world).

Biology, which

is a study of living organisms, may be viewed as life

sciences.

Physical sciences and life sciences may be

combined to form the larger category of basic theoretical
sciences
A distinction is being made in this framework

between the basic theoretical sciences (physics, chemistry and biology) and the integrative theoretical sciences

(astronomy, geology, ecology).

In the integrative theo-

retical sciences aspects of the physical environment are

studied by using the laws and principles of physics,

chemistry and biology.

In astronomy,

the laws and prin

relate
ciples of physics and chemistry are studied as they
to the celestial bodies,

their composition, motions and

.
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evolution.

In geology,

the laws and principles of physics

and chemistry are studied as they relate to the solid

earth (internal and external processes) and the atmosphere
of the earth.

In ecology,

the laws and principles of

biology, physics and chemistry are investigated as they
relate to the interactions between the living and nonliving parts of the physical environment.

Ecology may

really be viewed as the most integrated theoretical science
since if incorporates the laws and principles of physics,

chemistry, geology and astronomy.
The distinctions between the various sciences are

only made for the ease of classification and study.

In

contemporary natural science some events in the physical
environment have to be analyzed from more than one perspective to be understood, and the need for real integration of knowledge is becoming apparent.

For this reason

many interdisciplinary fields have become necessary to
develop

a

more complete understanding of relationships

among phenomena in the physical world.

Some of these

fields are biophysics, biochemistry, molecular biology,

physical chemistry, physical geology or geophysics, and

astrophysics
Figure II presents a possible schematic outline
proposed
of the various categories of laws and principles
for the natural science curriculum.
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PHYSICAL SCIENCES

LIFE SCIENCES

Biology

BASIC
THEORETICAL
SCIENCES

INTEGRATIVE
THEORETICAL
SCIENCES

Figure II: A Possible Schematic Representation of the
Interrelationships Between the Categories
of Laws and Principles.

162

Outli ne of the Classification Scheme
of the Fundamental Laws ancT
Principles for a Natural
Science Curriculum
BASIC THEORETICAL SCIENCES

PHYSICAL SCIENCES
I.

PHYSICS
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

II.

Organization of Matter
Motion and Force
Motion and Work
Types of Force
Types of Motion

CHEMISTRY
A.
B.

Composition of Matter
Chemical Dynamics
Transformation of Solids in Liquids
1.
Transformation of Liquids in Liquids
2.
Chemical Reactions
3.
Thermochemistry
4.
Electrochemistry
5.
LIFE SCIENCES

III.

BIOLOGY
A.

B.

Functional Requirements
Life- supporting and Growth Functions
1.
Interactive and Integrative Functions
2.
Perpetuation of Life Functions
3.
Structural Principles and Diversity
Structural Hierarchies
1.
Patterns of Structural Diversity
2.
INTEGRATIVE THEORETICAL SCIENCES
PHYSICAL SCIENCES

IV.

ASTRONOMY
A.
B.
C.

The Solar System
Stellar Composition and Evolution
Galaxies
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V.

GEOLOGY
A.
B.

The Solid Earth
The Atmosphere of the Earth
LIFE SCIENCES

VI.

ECOLOGY
A.
B.
C.
D.

Ecosystem Ecology
Population Ecology
Community Ecology
Habitat Analysis

Detailed Description of the Classification of
the Fundamental Laws and Principles for a
Natural Science Curriculum
The laws and principles in this section are stated
in an abstract and complex form

(particularly in physics,

chemistry and astronomy) and will need to be modified in

^

specific ways for teachers and for children, i.e., making
them simpler and less abstract.

Developmental information

about specific children being taught

a

given law or prin-

ciple will be vital in modifying the laws and principles
so that the concepts will be appropriate to their develop-

mental levels.

Children at the pre-operational stage of

development, for example, will require vastly simpler
concepts than those at the early formal operational stage.
The following scheme is organized on logical

grounds and not on developmental grounds.
is used in planning learning experiences

When this scheme
for particular

be assessed
children, their developmental levels have to
in the process
terms of the processes that were outlined

in
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component of the natural science curriculum.

This assess-

ment will enable the teacher to make the appropriate modi-

fication or simplification in the scientific law or

principle being taught.
Together with the statement of each law and principle are certain definitions (or descriptive content information) which should be understood if the law or prin-

ciple is to be learned.

The definitions are not an exhaus-

tive listing at this point in time, but such

become necessary as the framework

is

a

listing will

worked out more fully.

Many of the laws and principles include mathematical concepts.

Rather than outline all the prerequisite

mathematical experiences,

I

have presupposed

a

certain level

of mathematical understanding appropriate to each category.
BASIC THEORETICAL SCIENCES

PHYSICAL SCIENCES
I

.

PHYSICS
A.

Organization of Matter
Certain types of energy configurations may be
identified as varying states of matter.
Definitions: organization, matter (solids,
liquids, gases), states, energy configurations.

B

.

Motion and Force
1.

Newton’s First Law of Motion (or Law of
Inertia)
"A body remains at rest, or if already
motion, remains in uniform motion with constant speed in a straight line, unless it
is acted on by an unbalanced external force"

m

:: :

.

.
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(Asimov

1966:24).

,

or
if any change in motion occurs it is due to
some force.

Definitions: motion, force, speed or velocity,
friction, length, time.
2.

Newton's Second Law of Motion
"The accel lerat ion produced by a force acting
on a body is directly proportional to the
magnitude of the force and inversely proportional to the mass of the body" (Asimov,
1966:31)
.

or

force is equal to the product of mass and
acceleration (F=ma)

Definitions: acceleration, mass, proportion.
3.

Newton's Third Law of Motion (or Action and
Reaction Law)
"When two objects interact, the force exerted
by the first on the second (the action) is
equal in magnitude and opposite in direction
to the force exerted by the second on the
first (the reaction)" (Cons tant, 1963 110)
:

or
for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.

Definitions: interaction, action, reaction, equal,
opposite, pressure.
C.

Motion and Work
1.

Principle of Kinetic Energy
When particles are in motion they possess
form of energy called kinetic energy.

a

Definitions: energy, heat, temperature, potential
energy, chemical energy.
a.

Heat and Solids
When solids are heated they expand and
when cooled they contract.

Definitions: expansion, contraction, boiling
point, melting point.

.

:

.
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b.

Meat and Liquids
When liquids are heated they evaporate
and when cooled they condense.

Definitions: evaporation, condensation.
c.

2.

Heat and Gases
Charles' (or Gay-Lussac's) Law
The volume of a gas expands when heated
and decreases when cooled.

Law of Conservation of Energy (or First Law
of Thermodynamics)
Energy may be transformed from one form to
another, but it cannot be created or destroyed,
or
The total energy content of a closed system
is constant.

Definitions: conservation, closed system, work
(simple machines transform small force into a
large force)
D

.

Types of Force
1.

Force and States of Matter
a.

Force and Solids
Hooke's Law
Strain is proportional to stress, i.e.,
objects undergo some deformation as a
result of a force.

Definitions: stress (deforming force), strain
(deformation caused by stress), elasticity,
limit of strain.
b.

Force and Liquids
Archimedes Principle (Principle of
Buoyancy)
A solid body less dense than the fluid
that surrounds it will float when the
volume (weight) of the fluid it displaces
is equal to its own original volume
(weight)
or
i

The upward force of liquids against submerged objects makes objects float.

Definitions: density, buoyancy, float, sink,
volume, force, weight.

: :

.
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Water particles are held closely together
by very strong forces (cohesion).
Definitions: cohesion, adhesion, surface tension, miniscus, capillary action.
c.

Force and Gases
Boyle's Law
The pressure of a gas varies inversely
with the volume, that is, if the volume
increases the pressure decreases and
vice versa.

Definitions: pressure, volume, increase,
decreas e
2.

Gravity

Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation
"Between any two objects in the world there
exists a mutual force of attraction that is
directly proportional to the product of the
masses of the objects and inversely proportional to the square of their distances
apart" (F = Gm^m^/d^) (Constant 1963:131).
,

or

Every body in the universe attracts every
other body with a particular force.
(Specialized instance is the law of gravity:
all objects close to the earth are attracted
to the earth.)

Definitions: gravitation or gravity, weight.
3.

Electricity
Coloumb's Law of Electrostatic Force
"Bodies with like charges repel and with
unlike charges attract one another; for point
charges (or small charged spheres) the force
of interaction is proportional to the product
of the charges and inversely proportional to
the square of their distances apart" (F
kqlqVr 2 ) (Constant 1963:201).
,

or
Bodies with like charges repel each other
with a certain force and unlike charges
attract each other with a certain force depending on the distance of separation.

Definitions: electrostatic, el ectric charge
unlike, electric current, electric circuit.
.

,

like

:

:

.
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4.

Magnetism
Coulomb's Law of- Magnetic Force (early
statement)
"Like poles repel, unlike poles attract, the
force being proportional to the product of
the pole strengths and inversely proportional
to the square of their distance of separation"
(F = const. (m,m /d2) (Constant, 1963:225).
?
or
Like poles of a magnet repel and unlike poles
attract depending on the distance of separation of the poles.

Definitions: magnet, attract, repel, poles.
5.

Electromagnetism
a.

Ampere's Law of Magnetic Force (more
recent statement in terms of electricity
and magnetism)
The magnetic force is attractive when
currents run in the same direction and
repulsive when the currents are opposite,
and the magnitude of the force is proportional to the product of the currents
and inversely proportional to their distance apart,
or
Electric currents can produce a magnetic
field or force.

Definitions: field, magnetic field.
b.

Faraday's Law of Electromagnetic Induction
Magnetic fields can produce electric
currents by induction.

Definitions: induction (causing an electromotive force)
E

.

Types of Motion
1.

Simple Harmonic Motion
Some bodies vibrate through alternate movement in opposite directions through the
action of an elastic restoring force.

Definitions: vibration, alternate, opposite,
restoring force, elastic, harmonic, music.

.

.
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2.

Wave Motion
a.

Huygen's Principle of Wave Propogation
A wave is a disturbance that is propagated through space and/or a medium of
some kind.

Definitions: mechanical waves (waves in which
material particles are displaced, e.g., sound
waves and water waves)

Electromagnetic waves (waves that are propagated in space, e.g., light).
Sound is created by mechanical waves which we
hear and interpret as sound.
Light is made up of electromagnetic waves
which we see and interpret as light.

Other electromagnetic waves: radio, television, infrared, ultraviolet, x-rays.
b.

Law of Reflection
When a wave encounters a new medium, the
wave is bounced off the medium in such a
way that the angle made by the incident
ray is equal to the angle made by the
reflected ray.

Definitions: medium, angle, incident ray,
reflection, reflected ray.
c.

Snell's Law of Refraction
When a wave encounters a new medium and
can pass through it, the speed of the ray
changes

Definitions: refraction, color, spectrum.
(principle of relativity) and
Atomic Physics (quantum principle and Pauli s
exclusion principle) involve complex concepts
and will not be included here.)
(NOTE: Relativity

II

.

^

CHEMISTRY
A.

Composition of Matter
which are
Matter is made up of small particles

.

:
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held together by bonds.

Definitions: particles, atoms, molecules, bonds.
(Details on atomic structure will not be introduced
until the formal operational stage.)
B

.

Chemical Dynamics

Matter can be transformed or changed by chemical
reactions
Definitions: chemical, dynamics, transformed, chemical reaction.
1.

Transformation of

a

Solid in

a

Liquid

Solids may dissolve in a liquid to form a
solution when the bonds holding the solid
together are broken by the liquid particles.

Definitions: solution, dissolve, diffusion,
saturation, supersaturation, crystallization.
Solids may be scattered as fine particles in
a liquid if they do not dissolve.

Definitions: suspension, emulsion, colloid, gel,
sol, protoplasm.
2.

Transformation of Liquids in Liquids
One liquid may dissolve completely in another
liquid (miscible).

Definition: miscible.
3.

Chemical Reactions
a.

Law of Mass Action
At constant temperature the rate of
reaction is proportional to the active
masses or amounts of each of the reactants
or
A chemical reaction depends on the amounts
of reactants that are present.
.

Definitions: chemical, reaction, reactant,
product, rate of reaction.

.

.

i7i
b.

Reversible Reactions
A chemical reaction that can proceed in
two directions (forward and backward) is
reversible.

Definitions: reversible, forward, backward,
equilibrium.
4.

Thermochemistry or Heat and Matter
When matter undergoes a chemical reaction, it
is transformed and heat is either absorbed or
released

Definitions: heat, absorbed, released, heat of
combustion, heat of neutralization, heat of solution, cooking.
5.

Electrochemistry or Electricity and Matter
Certain substances conduct electricity when
they are dissolved in a liquid.

Definitions: electrolyte, acids, bases and salts,
indicators, neutralization, batteries.
(NOTE: A large part of chemistry will be included
in biology as biochemistry and in physics as

physical chemistry.)
LIFE SCIENCES
III.

BIOLOGY
A.

Functional Requirements
1.

Life Supporting and Growth Functions
a.

Energy Production and Related Functions
Living organisms must obtain energy to
maintain life.
i.

Nutrient Procurement
Living organisms must either take in
or manufacture nutrients to obtain
energy for the maintenance of life.
Plants take in raw materials (water,
gases, light, minerals) to manufacture
nutrients

.
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Animals ingest manufactured nutrients.
Definitions: nutrients, living organisms,
energy, gases, light, minerals.
ii.

Nutrient Manufacture
Plants synthesize their own nutrients
through the utilization of solar
energy or light and basic raw materials (photosynthesis).

Definitions: photosynthesis, solar energy.
iii.

Nutrient Processing
Living organisms must process nutrients
into a simpler form so that they can
be utilized to obtain energy for
building new materials.
Plants utilize the manufactured
nutrients as they are in a simple
form already.

Animals have to digest the complex
nutrients which are taken in into
simpler forms so that they can be
utilized.

Definitions: processing, digestion,
enzyme action.
iv.

Transportation of Nutrients
Living organisms must transport
nutrients in a simplified form to
each part of the organism where they
can be utilized.
Plants transport water and manufactured nutrients throughout the plant
system (translocation)

Animals transport necessary gases and
simplified nutrients throughout their
bodies by the process of circulation.
Definitions: translocation, phloem, xylem,
circulation, blood, heart, blood vessels.
v.

Energy Production in the Cell (Cellular Respiration)
Living organisms must utilize (oxidize
_

.
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and reduce) the simplified nutrients
in the cell to produce energy which
can maintain the functions of life.

Definitions: oxidize, reduce, cellular
respiration, cell.
vi.

Removal of Unwanted Material
Living organisms must remove unwanted material which may be harmful
to the maintenance of life functions.
Plants mainly remove excess water
(transpiration) and gases at certain
times.
Solid waste products are
stored in certain parts of the plant.

Animals remove solid and liquid waste
products (excretion) and gaseous byproducts
.

Definitions: transpiration, excretion,
waste and by-products, kidney action.
b.

Structural Support Functions
Living organisms must support their
structures in the best possible manner so
that the functions of life may progress.
Plants possess specialized thickened cells
that function to hold the plant in a position where the maximum amount of sunlight
may be obtained.

Animals may possess specialized hardened
cells which support the body of the organism in the best possible manner.
Definitions: structural support, specialized
cells, skeleton, cellulose, bone, cartilage.
c.

Protective Functions
Living organisms must protect their more
delicate structures from environmental
influences so that the functions of life
may be maintained.
Plants need specialized outer cells that
protect and cover the delicate internal
structures

.

.

.
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Animals possess a variety of specialized
outer cells that protect and cover the
delicate internal bodily structures.
Definitions: protection, internal, external,
cellulose, cell walls, skin, scales, feathers,
fur
2.

Interactive and Integrative Functions
Living organisms must interact with the
environment and coordinate the functioning of
their systems in relation to environmental
stimuli if life is to be maintained.
a.

Chemical Coordination
Living organisms need an internal system
of chemical coordination to integrate
their growth and activity in response to
stimuli from the environment.
Plants integrate their growth and activity
through plant hormones (tropisms)

Animals utilize chemical hormones as one
means of integrating the various activities of their bodies.
Definitions: interaction, integration, hormones, chemical coordination,, tropisms, taxes,
endocrine system.
b.

Nervous Coordination
Animals only possess a nervous system to
coordinate the activities of their bodies
in relation to environmental stimuli.
i.

Sensory Input
Animals may possess a system of sensory receptors which receive and
transmit information about the environment
.

Definitions: sensory receptors, information, vision, audition, touch, taste,
smell
ii.

Internal Coordination
Animals possess an internal system
of nerves which transmit information
from the external environment.

.

.

.
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Higher animals possess a complex
system of nerves which transmit
information to the brain where
interpretation takes place.

Definitions: nerves, transmission of
information, brain, spinal cord.
iii.

Neuro-Muscular Coordination
Animals respond to stimuli from the
environment through neuro-muscular
coordination

Definitions: neuro-muscular, muscles,
muscle action, effectors.
c.

Patterns of Behavior
Animals interact with and adapt to the
environment through various patterns of
action.

Animals may achieve mastery in their
interactions with the environment through
learning

Definitions: behavior, adaptation, mastery,
learning, biologic clocks and circadian
rhythm, hibernation, migration, communication.
3.

Perpetuation of Life Functions
a.

Reproduction
Living organisms need to produce offspring
so that the species may be perpetuated.
Animals and plants produce offspring
through asexual or sexual means. Variation in characters results from sexual
reproduction

Definitions: reproduction, perpetuation, offspring, asexual, sexual, pollination, fertilization, gametes, zygote, male, female.
b.

Growth and Development
Living organisms need to produce offspring
which can grow and develop through various
stages till they reach full maturity so
that they can also reproduce.

Definitions: germination, embryogenesis

,

meta-
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morphosis, growth, development, maturation
life cycles.
c.

Heredity
Living organisms transmit characteristics from parent to offspring via the
genes in the chromosomes.

Definitions: heredity, parent, genes, chromosomes, mitosis, meiosis, somatic cells, sex
cells, spermatogenesis, oogenesis.
i.

Patterns of Inheritance
Living organisms follow certain patterns of inheritance in the transmission of characteristics from
parents to offspring.

Mendel's First Law of Segregation:
Genes exist in pairs and in the
formation of gametes, each gene
separates from its partner and passes
into a different gamete so that each
gamete has one and only one of each
kind of gene.

Mendel's Second Law of Independent
Assortment: Members of one pair of
genes separate during meiosis independently of other pairs of genes
and come to be combined at random
in the gamete.

Definitions: inherited and acquired
characteristics, recombination, variation.
d.

Evolution
Living organisms have evolved into their
present form over billions of years.
i.

Law of Natural Selection: In the
struggle for survival only the organisms with the most successful
variations survive and are selected
to transmit their characteristics
to offspring.
The variations in living organisms
are introduced by mutations and
through the recombination of characters during sexual reproduction.

.

.
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Definitions: variation, evolution, ancestor, survival, mutation.
ii.

Adaptive Radiation
Living organisms have evolved into a
variety of forms each of which is
adapted and specialized to live in a
unique way in a particular habitat.

Definitions: habitat, speciation, genetic
drift
B.

STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES AND DIVERSITY
1

.

Structural Hierarchies

Organisms are composed of small units which
are grouped together to form larger units.
Definitions: structural hierarchy, small units
(cells), tissues, organs, systems, organism.
2

.

Patterns of Structural Diversity
Living organisms are classified according to
structural and functional similarities.

Definitions: patterns, structural diversity,
funct ions
a.

Plant Kingdom
Organisms classified as plants usually
have stiff cell walls and chlorophyll,
and make their own nutrients.

Phylum
Phylum
Phylum
Phylum

Cyanophyta
Chlorophyta
Euglenophyta
Chrysophyta

Phylum
Phylum
Phylym
Phylum
Phylum
Phylum

Phaeophyta
Rhodophyta
Myxomycophota
Eumycophyta
Bryophyta
Tracheophyta

blue green algae
green algae
euglena
yellow-green 5
golden-brown algae,
diatoms
brown algae
red algae
slime molds
true fungi
mosses, liverworts
ferns, club mosses,
horsetails, pines
and flowering plants

a

.
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Animal Kingdom
Organisms classified as animals usually
lack a stiff cell wall and cellulose,
and have to ingest manufactured nutrients.

b.

Phylum Protozoa
Phylum Porifera
Phylum Coelenterata

unicellular organisms
sponges
true jellyfish,
corals sea
anemones
f latworms
roundworms
segmented worms
arachnids crustaceans
insects
snails, slugs,
clams
starfishes, sea
urchins
fishes, frogs,
reptiles, birds,
mammals
,

Phylum
Phylum
Phylum
Phylum

Platyhelminthes
Nematoda
Annelida
Arthropoda

,

,

Phylum Mollusca
Phylum Echinodermat
Phylum Chordata

c.

Protista and Monera
Classifications of organisms in each group
vary according to the preferences of
authors.
Unicellular organisms which are
difficult to classify either because they
share plant and animal characteristics, or
because of their differing modes of nutrition, are placed in this group. This
follows Weisz (1967)
Protista

euglenoids, protozoans, golden algae,
diatoms

Monera

bacteria, bluegreen algae

INTEGRATED THEORETICAL SCIENCES
PHYSICAL SCIENCES
IV.

ASTRONOMY
A.

The Solar System

The gravitational force exerted by the sun holds
together the planets and their satellites, asteroids and comets in a system.
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Definitions: solar system, names of planets,
asteroids
comets, satellites.
1.

’

Planetary Motions
All the planets revolve around the sun, which
is at one focus of the solar system.
a.

Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion (from
Wyatt, 1971:178)
i.

Law of Areas
"The line joining a planet to the sun
sweeps out equal areas in equal times,"
i.e., the speed of a planet is greater
when it is closer to the sun and
slower when it is farther away.

Definitions: equal, areas.
ii.

Harmonic Law
"The square of the orbital period of
a planet is proportional to the cube
of its mean distance from the sun"
(P^ = D^)

,

i.e., the time it takes for

planet to revolve around the sun
depends on its distance away from the
a

sun.

Definitions: period of orbit, orbit, cube.
b.

Rotation of the Planets and Satellites
Each planet rotates on its own axis once
in a certain period of time.
The earth rotates on its axis once every
twenty-four hours.

The moon rotates on its own axis once
every 28 days.

Definitions: rotation, axis, day, night,
phases of moon.
c.

Revolution of the Planets and Satellites
Each planet revolves around the sun once
in a certain period of time.
The earth revolves around the sun once in
365 days.

.

.
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The moon revolves around the earth once
in 28 days.

Definitions: revolution, one year, lunar
calendar, solar calendar, the seasons (spring,
summer, autumn, winter).

2.

d.

Newton's

e.

Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation

3

Laws of Motions

Planetary Composition
The composition of the planets depends upon
their position in relation to the sun.

.

Definitions: terrestrial planets, Jovian planets,
composition
3.

Earth-Moon System
a.

The earth, when it is positioned between
the sun and the moon, casts a shadow on
the moon.

Definitions: sun, shadow, eclipse.
b.

The moon, when it is in certain positions
relative to the earth, exerts a gravitational pull on bodies of water of the
earth's surface.

Definitions: tides (high, low).
B

.

Stellar Composition and Evolution
1.

Stellar Composition
a.

Our understanding of the composition of
stars depends upon the kind of light that
they emit.

Definitions: light, stars, light emission.
b.

The bright light of the sun is caused
by nuclear reactions in the interior of
the sun.

Definitions: sun, nuclear reaction (fission,
fusion)

).

.
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2.

Stellar Evolution
Stars evolve through various stages before
they finally cease emitting light.

Definitions: evolve, white dwarf, supernova,
neutron star, pulsar, black hole.
C

Galaxies

.

Stars gases and dust exist in great groups which
revolve in space.
,

Definitions: galaxy, Milky Way.
(NOTE: When children are formal operational, part of
the curriculum will be devoted to relative frames of
reference and the use of standard measurement of time
and distance (some time measurement is included in the
principles on rotation and revolution of the earth and
the moon)
.

V.

GEOLOGY
A

.

The Solid Earth
1.

Interior of the Earth: Internal Processes

High temperatures, pressure and molten
material exist in the interior of the earth.
Definitions: layers of the earth (core, mantle,
crust, atmosphere), interior, temperature, pure,
molten
a.

Earth Movements
Increasing temperatures and pressures
cause major movements in the earth’s
crust

Definitions: earthquakes (release of elastic
volcanoes (release of heat and presstrain)
mountains.
sure)
,

,

b.

Formation of Earth's Crust
Molten material that cooled rapidly formed
the crust.

Definitions: crust, rocks (igneous, sedimenminerals.
tary, metamorphic)
,

. .

.
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c.

Origin of the Continents
The continents may have drifted apart from
one continental plate billions of years
ago.

Definitions: continent, continental drift,
continental plates.
2.

Exterior of the Earth: External Processes
The surface of the earth (or crust) has been,
and continues to be, gradually worn away and
sculptured

Definitions: sculptured, external processes.
a.

Weathering
Rock waste is produced, partly by mechanical breaking and partly by solution and
chemical decay.

Definitions: rock waste, mechanical breaking,
chemical decay.
b.

Erosion
The surface of the earth is destroyed
when transporting agents carry away rock
waste

Definitions: erosion, transporting agents
(water, ice, wind), valley, desert and coastal
development
c.

Deposition
Rock waste carried away from higher levels
is deposited at lower levels.

Definitions: deposition, flood plain, deltas.
B

.

Atmosphere of the Earth
The atmosphere above the earth is held in place
by the gravitational force of the earth.

Definitions: atmosphere, gravitational force.
1.

Composition of the Atmosphere
Gases float in the atmosphere above the earth.

Definitions: gases, carbon dioxide, oxygen,
nitrogen gas.
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2.

Temperature of the Atmosphere
Solar radiation warms the atmosphere.

Definitions: solar radiation, temperature, heat.
3.

Atmospheric Circulation
Air moves from an area of high pressure to
an area of low pressure.

Definitions: circulation, pressure, air, wind,
convection.
4.

Moisture in the Atmosphere
When water is heated it evaporates into water
vapor (gas) which escapes into the atmosphere.

Definitions: moisture, water, water vapor, evapora
tion, clouds, humidity.
5.

Changes in Atmospheric Conditions
Changes of temperature, pressure and moisture
conditions in the atmosphere create weather.

Definitions: changes, heating, cooling, condensation, precipitation (snow, sleet, rain), hurricanes, tornadoes, weather.
LIFE SCIENCES
VI

.

ECOLOGY
General principles in ecosystem, population and
community ecology.
A

.

Ecosystem and Cyclic Use of Matter
1.

Ecosystem
Exchange of materials between living and nonliving parts follows a cyclical path.

Definitions: producers, consumers, decomposers.
2.

Habitat and Ecologic Niche
Place where organism lives and its status in
the community depends on structural adapta-

,

.

.

.

.
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tions, physiologic responses and specific
behavior

Definitions: habitat, ecologic niche, structure,
physiology, behavior.
3.

Biogeochemical Cycles
Elements (organic and inorganic) circulate
in the atmosphere and back to the environment and the organisms in it.

Definitions: water cycle, nitrogen cycle, carbon
cycle, phosphorus cycle.
4.

Energy in the Ecosystem

Energy is circulated in a cyclic manner so
that it is neither created nor destroyed
(cf
First Law of Thermodynamics)
.

Definitions: food chain, food pyramid, energy,
cyclic
B

.

Population Ecology
1.

Species Population Level

Individuals of the same species compete for
resources in the environment.

Definitions: species, density, birthrate, mortality, age distribution, population.
2.

Interspecies Population Level
a.

Interaction Between Species
Organisms living in the same environment
interact with each other in many ways.

Definitions: beneficial association, negative
interaction
b.

Competition Between Species
Gause’s Rule: only one species exists in
an ecologic niche.

Definitions: competition, ecologic niche,
species
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C

.

Community Ecolog y
Diverse species and populations can live together
in an orderly fashion.

Definitions: ecological succession, climax.
D

.

Exemplifications of Ecological Principles in
Different Habitats
Organisms live in different habitats.

Definitions: fresh water habitat, marine habitat,
terrestrial habitat.

Integration of the Natural Science
Curriculum with the Overall
Curriculum in the Anisa
Model
The overall curriculum in the Anisa Model

is

com-

prised of the following separate, but interrelated curricula
Basic Competencies Curricula

Psychomotor competence curriculum
Perceptual competence curriculum
Cognitive competence curriculum
Affective competence curriculum
Volitional competence curriculum
Formation and Utilization of Symbol Systems Curricula

Mathematics curriculum
Discursive language curriculum
Arts curriculum
H igher Order Competencies Curricula

Natural science curriculum (leads to technological competence)
Human science curriculum (leads to moral compentence)
Philosophical science curriculum (leads to fiducial
competence)
.

In the overall

context, the natural science curncu
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lum is only one facet that contributs to human growth and

development.

The natural science curriculum can foster the

development of the other curricula and vice versa.

From

an organismic point of view, all the components of the overall curriculum should be interconnected so that learning is
an integrated experience.

This is one of the unique

features of this natural science curriculum.
Each of the five basic competencies may be strength-

ened

and.

developed by science activities.

For example,

cognitive competence may be developed by science activities
that focus on the use of cognitive processes such as clas-

sification, seriation, prediction and experimentation.

Similarly, other activities (i.e., in the arts) which

strengthen these cognitive processes also help to support
the natural science curriculum.

The formation and utilization of symbols may also

be enhanced by science activities and vice versa.

Mathe-

matical understandings of basic concepts of number, space
and time can become an exciting and challenging experience

when integrated with science activities.

Discursive

language, vocabulary, grammar and reading can become more

meaningful to the child when interrelated with other ex-

periences such as natural science.

The arts and aesthetic

themes or
uses of language can also be developed by using

ideas from natural sciences.
compeAs discussed in Chapter III, technological
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tence cannot be considered apart from moral and fiducial

competence.

The relationship between natural science and

the social sciences

(morality, ethics, psychology, anthro-

pology and sociology) and the philosophical sciences
(religion and philosophy) require discussion and investi-

gation far beyond the scope of this dissertation.

The

basic principles for their integration, however, have been
presented.

What is needed now is

a

systematic application

of the organismic principles in filling out the details.

The next chapter will discuss how the proposed

framework for the natural science curriculum presented in
this chapter can be implemented.
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CHAPTER

VI

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATURAL SCIENCE
CURRICULUM: GENERATING LEARNING

EXPERIENCES

Implementation of the natural science curriculum
will necessitate the developmental sequencing of process
and content goals, planning appropriate experiences for

children so that the goals can be achieved and identifying
the kinds of integrations that can be made with the overall curriculum.

Developmental information that was pre-

sented in Chapter IV on the nature of children's scientific
thought can now be applied to the components of the frame-

work of the natural science curriculum as outlined in
Chapter V.
Careful sequencing of the content component of the

natural science curriculum is necessary if children are to
learn information about the physical environment.

Re-

searchers report that children can be introduced to the

fundamental ideas in natural science if the information to
be learned is developmentally- sequenced and accompanied by

materials that children can manipulate themselves (Inhelder,
in Bruner,

1960; Victor, 1971).

The laws and principles

to
that were identified in Chapter V can be presented

that match
children in simplified (but not trivial) forms
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their developmental levels.

This means that young children

can be introduced to the necessary, pre-requisite experiences that will make

fully

a

it

poss ible for them to understand more

given law or principle at each of several later

stages, until it is finally understood fully.

The natural science curriculum that

I

am proposing

rests on the idea that developmental sequencing of content
(so that children progressively encounter similar but more

complex ideas) can be organized in
Bruner (1960)

,

a

a

spiral.

According to

natural science curriculum can be developed

so that certain basic ideas can be examined repeatedly and

gradually built upon to achieve more complex understandings.
Bruner states that if students are to study physics or

biology later in high school, there
subjects should be

block to learning.

a

is no

reason why these

totally new experience and present

a

With careful planning and the applica-

tion of developmental principles it is possible to provide

certain basic ideas when children are young so that they
can be prepared for later studies.
Steps in Planning Developmental ly Sequenced
Experiences to Achieve Technological
Competence

The planning of developmental sequences of learning

experiences can be guided by the theoretical framework
that was presented in Chapter V.

Ultimately, such planning

of and
will depend on classroom teachers, their knowledge

.
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previous experiences in, and attitudes towards natural
sciences.

The issue of adequate teacher preparation pro-

grams in science education is too vast and complex

a

subject to be addressed in this dissertation (see Carney,
1977 )

However, the reason for the theoretical framework

presented in the previous chapter
teachers to be more generative.
to specific activities for all

is

that it will allow

Rather than being attached
the children in the class,

teachers can be guided by the theoretical principles of

development and curriculum to meet the needs and interests
of children of varying abilities.

To achieve success in

planning appropriate sequences of learning experiences in
natural science, teacher preparation programs will need to
expose teachers in

a

systematic manner to the major laws

and principles of natural science.
It should be made clear at the outset that there is

no "one specific way” of planning science activities for

children.

The direction of the planning process may be dic-

tated by the purposes that the teacher has in mind or by

what the children would like to do.

Teachers will have to

activity,
be flexible and gain the most mileage out of any

be it science or moral education.

From an organismic per-

and any
spective, all of life is the ground for learning

will tend
form of narrow compartmental i zat ion of subjects
To write
the child.
to suppress the full development of
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about

a

natural science curriculum," then, may seem to he

contradiction.

a

However, what should be emphasized

is

that

the natural science curriculum is inextricably connected
to the overall curriculum and this will be reflected in

the planning process.

The attainment of technological competence may be

facilitated by following the general guidelines provided in
the proposed framework in Chapter V.

There are several

possible starting points for developing
curriculum.

a

natural science

However, in emphasizing the attainment of

technological competence, the following three starting
points may be the most useful:
be learned;

and (3)

(2)

(1)

focusing on content to

focusing on processes to be strengthened

focusing on some application.

In most cases, pro-

cess and content will be fused as it is not possible to

teach some content without some process and vice versa.

The sequences of steps that follow from each of
the starting points mentioned above will now be presented.

The reason for outlining all three sequences is to illustrate how the pitfall of adhering too rigidly to one linear
set of steps in planning experiences can be avoided.

I

.

Focus on Content

A.

Select the law or principle (content) to be learned.

B.

Identify the developmental levels of the children

to be taught

(i.e., pre-operat ional

,

concrete operational,
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formal operational).

Break down the law or principle into concepts that

C.

are appropriate for each developmental level (i.e., break-

down into content goals).
Identify the specific processes to be strengthened

D.

and state the accompanying process goals to be achieved in

accordance with each developmental level.
State the learner objectives for each developmental

E.

level, i.e., statements which are fusions of specific pro-

cess and content goals which provide evidence for the

achievement of the goals.
F.

Identify the symbol systems to be developed as they

relate to the content to be learned at each developmental
level

..

G.

Outline the points of integration of the content

with the overall curriculum.
H.

Describe the learning experiences that children will

engage in to achieve the goals outlined above.
II.

Focus on Process

A.

Identify the developmental levels of the children

to be taught.
B.

Identify the processes to be strengthened and

at
state the accompanying process goals to be achieved

each developmental level.
C.

Select the law or principle to be learned.

.
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Break down the law or principle into concepts that

D.

are appropriate for each developmental level

content goals)

(i.e.,

into

.

State the learner objectives for each developmental

E.

level, i.e., fusion of process and content goals.

Identify the symbol systems to be developed as

F.

they relate to the content to be learned at each developmental level.

Outline the points of integration of the content

G.

with the overall curriculum.
Describe the learning experiences that children

H.

will engage in to achieve the goals outlined above.
Focus on Application

III.

A.

Select the area of application, e.g.,

a

problem or

issue to be solved such as pollution, building shelves,

developing
B.

a

vegetable garden.

Identify the laws or principles that are related

to the selected area of application.
C.

Identify the developmental levels of the children

to be taught.
D.

Break down the laws or principles into concepts

(i.e.,
that are appropriate for each developmental level

into content goals)
E.

State the learner objectives for each developmental

goals.
level, i.e., fusion of process and content

.

.

.
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F.

Identify the symbol systems to be developed as they

relate to the content to be learned at each developmental
level
G.

Outline the points of integration of the content

with the overall curriculum.
H.

Describe the learning experiences that children

will engage in to achieve the goals outlined above.

Example of a Sequence of Learning
Experiences in Natural Science
To make the process of planning learning experiences

explicit,

a

more detailed elaboration will be presented in

this section, using the steps A-H outlined in the sequence

that started with the selected law or principle, i.e.,
Focus on Content (see page 191)

Since the emphasis of this dissertation

is on

elementary school science, only two cognitive developmental levels will be discussed in detail, namely, the pre-

operational stage (about 3-5 years) and the concrete operational stage (about 6-11 years).

I

Focus on Content

A.

Select Law or Principle

I

have selected Huygen's Principle of Wave PropaThis is

gation from the area of Physics.
ciple about the transmission of

a

a

general prin-

disturbance (wave motion)
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through

medium and/or space, and as such

a

water waves, sound waves and light waves.
example to follow,

I

it

applies to

In the specific

am going to focus on Huygen's Prin-

ciple as it relates to the phenomenon of sound.
Huygen's Principle of Wave Propagation may be

defined in the following manner:
A wave is a disturbance that is propagated through
space and/or some medium.

B.

Developmental Levels of Children

A diagnosis of the children's stages of cognitive

development will indicate different levels of mental
functioning, i.e., pre-operat ional and concrete operational

Whatever content and process goals are established

levels.

will have to fit these developmental levels.

C.

Breakdown of Principle According
to Developmental Levels (Content
Goals)

Since Huygen's Principle is so complex, the task is
it
to find out what concepts essential to this principle as

relates to sound can be comprehended by children at the
pre- operational and concrete operational levels.

This means

simpler conthat the principle has to be broken down into

cepts to fit the developmental levels.

In this example,

I

operational stage
will present the concepts for the formal
as well,

complexity
so that continuity of the levels of

may be seen.
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The concepts of "wave" and "propagation" arc very

abstract and far too difficult for young children to comprehend.

However, simple analogies with general types of

waves can be introduced, e.g., water waves, skipping rope
waves, slinky waves.

When children are at the earlier

developmental levels, the connection between general waves
and sound waves should not be made as this will only serve
to confuse them.

However, when they can think in

a

more

abstract manner, the connection can be made.
It should be emphasized that there is great varia-

tion in the levels of understanding even within one de-

velopmental stage.

Thus, the statements of content goals

will have to match the developmental needs of children,
say at the early, middle and late pre-operat ional stages.

The following general content goals state what

concepts children should know about Huygen’s Principle and

Sound at different developmental levels:

Pre-operational Stage
Children should know that:
Many different kinds of waves can be created,
1.
e.g., waving arms, streamers, throwing stones
2.

3.

into water.
When objects collide or hit each other, they
shake (vibrate) and produce sound.
There are many different kinds of sounds that
we can hear with our ears.

Concrete Operational Stage
Children should know that:
Sound is caused by the vibration of objects.
1.
2*.
Certain parts of the ear vibrate and hearing
then occurs.
.

.
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A disturbance in a tank or pool of water moves
outward in the form of waves, such that a
large disturbance creates many, big waves and
a small disturbance creates fewer, little waves.
Sound can be reflected off objects.
Sound has different dimensions, each of which
can vary: pitch, quality (timbre), loudness

3.

4.
5.

and duration.

Formal Operational Stage

Students should know that:
1.
Sound is created by a disturbance that moves
outward in the form of a wave in some medium
such as air or water and not in a vacuum.
2.
Water particles and particles that create
sound differ in their direction of vibration,
i.e., water particles vibrate vertically in
the same place, whereas particles that produce
sound vibrate horizontally in the same place.
3.
The pitch of a sound is determined by the
number of waves that pass a certain point in
one second (i.e., notion of frequency, wavelength)
The speed of sound is determined by the medium
4.
in which the wave is being propagated.
Sound waves transmit energy to the surrounding
5.
medium
.

(At the formal operational stage, complex ideas
on sound and wave motion can be introduced,
since abstract concepts can now be processed.)

D.

Processes to be Strengthened
and Process Goals

Diagnosis of the developmental levels of children
gives an indication of the kinds of cognitive processes that
are being internalized.

Different processes will be

strengthened at the various developmental levels.
there is

a

Again,

great variation in what children are capable

pre-operational or
of understanding, even if they are all

concrete operational.

;
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The following process goals related to sound arc

stated in terms of what children should be able to do at
a

particular developmental level:
Pre-operational Stage
Children should be able to:
Psychomotor processes: manipulate materials;
vocalize sounds
Perceptual processes
discriminate auditory figure
and ground; perceive loudness
and the localization of sound
Cognitive processes
classify; make simple predictions; perform simple
tests (or "experiments")
make simple comparisons; differentiate simple cause and
effect relations.

Concrete Operational Stage

Children should be able to:
Psychomotor processes: manipulate materials;
vocalize sounds
Perceptual processes: discriminate auditory figure
and ground; perceive loudness
pitch, timbre, duration and
localization of sound.
classify; seriate, conserve;
Cognitive processes:
formulate simple hypotheses;
make simple predictions; perform simple experiments; make
comparisons; draw conclusions
and differentiate cause and
effect relations.

E.

Statement of Learner
Ob j ectives
Learner objectives are operationalized statements

which constitute fusions of specific process and content
goals.

Since an objective serves the purpose of determin-

teacher that certain
ing what evidence is acceptable to the

199

goals have been achieved, then it has to be stated
in the

form

Children will be able to" actually do something that

is observable.

To know whether a content goal

has been

achieved, the child will have to perform some action to
let the teacher know that the content has been assimilated

and understood.
Cjiild will

tion of

a

A process goal by definition means that

a

perform some action from which the internalizaprocess may be inferred.

Since there are numerous learner objectives that
can be listed,

I

will just present two examples that show

the fusion of process and content goals:
Pre- operational Stage

Children will be able to produce and describe
6 different sounds by using 6 different kinds
of materials.

Concrete Operational Stage
Children will be able to set up various simple
experimental situations where the vibration of
different materials can be observed and matched
They will be able
on the dimension of pitch.
to explain what they had to do to make the
pitches match.F.

Formation and Utilization
of Symbols

Information about Huygen's Principle, as it relates
to sound, will be conveyed largely through the use of words

(language) and mathematical symbols.

When children are at

the pre-operational level, mathematics will not play

great part, that is, in terms of number relations.

a

However,

:

:

.

,
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pre-requisite mathematical processes like classifying
or
grouping will be strengthened, and the understanding of
words related to sound can be enhanced.

Simple quanti-

tative relationships about sound can be introduced at
the late concrete operational stage, e.g.

frequency graphs

and measurements.

The following statements are some of the objectives
to be achieved in the formation and utilization of symbols:

Pre-operat ional Stage

Children will be able:
Mathematics:
to classify sounds (group into a set)
according to one dimension at a time.
Language:
to label sounds.
to describe different sounds.
Arts:
to compose simple rhyming sounds.
to follow simple rhythms (e.g.,
clapping, tapping).
Concrete Operational Stage
Children will be able:
Mathemat ics
to measure distances across which
sound travels.
to plot frequency graphs, initially
on general topics.
to explain the meaning of words reLanguage
lated to sound, e.g., vibration,
loudness, pitch, direction, source,
:

etc
to describe in words the moods

Arts

G

.

created by music,
to write stories on sounds,
to describe patterns in sounds.

Integration With the
Overall Curriculum

Within the theoretical framework of the Anisa Model,
to
the natural science curriculum is integrally connected

.

.

.

.
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other areas of learning, such as mathematics, language,
arts, cognition, perception, etc.

Natural science is

also closely related to the human and philosophical

sciences.

When children are young, the emphasis will be

more on the interrelationship between sound and its effects
on people and society (human sciences), rather than on

abstract philosophical issues.

Even within the natural

sciences, integrations can be made between sound (physical
science) and the life and earth sciences.

Examples of the kinds of integrations that can be

made now follow:

Pre-operational Stage
Human sciences:
Life sciences:

understanding the value of sounds,
speech, and music in the life of
man
understanding the role of sounds
in animal life.

Concrete Operational Stage
Human sciences:

understanding the vital role of
speech in human life i.e., in
communications
understanding the role of music in
civil i zat ion

Life sciences:

understanding the concept of noise
pollution.
understanding the relationship
between sounds and the creation of
fear in people.
understanding how knowledge of the
principles of sound transmission
have affected our lives, e.g.,
radios, televisions, telephones, etc
understanding in a simple manner the
working of the ear and the vocal
cords
understanding the role of sound in
the animal world, e.g., echolocation
communication, calls in mating, etc.

.

.
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Earth Sciences:

understanding how knowledge of
principles of sound transmission
can assist in the detection of
earthquake centers, location of
submerged objects (sonar), etc.

Interactions or Learning
Experiences to Achieve
the Goals

H.

The learning experiences or activities that are

planned by the teacher should meet the goals that are to
be achieved.

the whole class may do the

In some cases,

same activity and at other times, groups of children may

work on different activities.
where

a

There will also be instances

child may wish to work alone on some activity, or

it may be that a particular child needs individual atten-

tion, in which case specific activities will have to be

Knowledge of the cognitive, as well as the emo-

planned.

tional and social needs of the children will be an immense

asset to the teacher in planning activities in natural

science
Learning experiences, such as the following, can
assist in children’s understanding of sound and wave concepts.

These are general activities presented here as

examples.

However, when

a

teacher adopts

a

specific goal,

specific activities will be planned to meet that goal

directly

.
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Pre- operational Stage
1.

2

.

3.

4.

Provide children with opportunities to create
waves of different types, e.g., movement
activities, tubs of water, or field trip to
a pond.
Provide a variety of materials that children
can experiment with and identify objects that
shake to produce sound.
Take field trips to different settings so
that children can hear a variety of sounds
and identify the sources of the sounds, e.g.,
go to a large kitchen, to a game park, a bird
sanctuary, stand safely near a road, etc.
Place different types of sounds on a casctte
tape and have children listen and identify
them.

5.

6.

Encourage children to play with simple musical
instruments and identify sounds that they
enjoy and do not enjoy.
Invite musicians to come to the school to play
and explain about musical instruments to the
children

Concrete Operational Stage
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

Provide opportunities for children to set up
various simple situations in which they can
identify the vibration of objects and describe
the sounds created.
Provide a simple model of the ear so the
vibrating parts can be observed.
Provide opportunities for children to create an
indoor or outdoor situation where they can
investigate and observe the motion of waves,
e.g., indoor water tank.
Children can play with a "Slinky" (a walking
spring) and observe the wave-like motion.
Allow children to describe and go out and
locate places where sound is reflected and
echoes are created.
Provide materials and musical instruments that
children can play with and create sounds of
different pitch, loudness, quality and duration.
Take children on a bird-watching trip so that
they can locate the birds that are singing.
Children can learn the conservation of pitch
while varying the quality of the sound--they
can use a xylophone, metal lophone recorder
and a human voice.
,
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9.

10.

Provide pieces of music (recordings) or
pieces that children create for the analysis
of moods, atmosphere, rhythm, etc.
Children can undertake individual or class
projects on noise pollution, e.g., they can
visit an airport, interview people, etc.

The detailed elaboration just presented was de-

veloped by selecting
goal

,

a

particular principle as

and then following through

of steps.

a

content

a

predetermined sequence

If certain processes of scientific method were

to be taught, then the sequence entitled "Focus on Process"
(see page 192) would be followed.

In both cases,

tual learning experience or activity constitutes

of some principle and some processes.

the aca

fusion

While it is impos-

sible to separate process and content, it

is

possible to

emphasize one more than the other.
Starting with an area of application (i.e., tuning
a violin,

presents

dealing with a real problem in living)

an opportunity for making many integrations at the same

time.

Rather than just focusing on one principle in

physics or one law in biology, the selection of

a

problem

like pollution will include many principles from physics,

chemistry, biology, geology and ecology.

Once the key

principles have been identified then the sequence of steps

outlined in the detailed elaboration can be followed.

In

some instances the area of application may not be very

broad and in this case one or two major principles may be
isolated, e.g., in the building of shelves, principles

.
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relating

to

force, gravity and balance may be learned

(together with many mathematical concepts)
One of the most important aspects of the imple-

mentation of the natural science curriculum as proposed
in this dissertation is that teachers will be involved
in

actually building the curriculum.

Essentially, the laws

and principles, and the statements of the content and

process goals will be outlined in simple, understandable

language by the curriculum specialist so that teachers can

work with the ideas.

Teachers will then take the content

and process goals and generate their own learner objectives
and learning experiences to meet the developmental needs of

the children.

A resource file of activities should be

organized so that teachers will have easy access to

a

variety of ideas of what they can do to achieve the goals
of the natural science curriculum.
My purpose in this dissertation has not been to
list a set of activities or to present

natural science curriculum.

present

a

What

I

a

fully developed

have tried to do is

basic framework that will enable curriculum

specialists and teachers to work together in generating
and implementing a comprehensive natural science curriculum.
In this way the organic nature of the process will be

insured
The next chapter presents the distinguishing features
of an organismic approach to science curriculum development.
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CHAPTER

VII

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF AN ORGANISMIC

APPROACH TO SCIENCE CURRICULUM
DEVELOPMENT BASED ON THE
ANISA MODEL

would like to state at the outset that the frame-

I

work that

have proposed in this dissertation

I

alternative approach to the organization of
science curriculum.

a

is

only one

natural

This is not intended to mean that the

efforts exerted over the last decade in science education

have been without merit and value.

It

is

reasonably clear

that as the complexity and the sheer volume of our knowledge

increases, the necessity of making broader syntheses and

integrations becomes vital, especially in the educational
process.

My intention has been to draw on the knowledge

of the past and try to present one possible approach that

could assist in answering some of the issues in science
education, particularly in relation to our newly- emerging

world view.
Comparison of the Proposed Framework for
a Natural Science Curriculum with Other
Science Curricula
The distinctive features of an organismic approach
adequately
to science curriculum development can be most
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assessed by comparing it with the science curricula that

were developed during the sixties.

Components of the

framework presented in Chapter V, namely, process and
content goals, formation and utilization of symbols and
types of interactions, will be compared and contrasted with

three major science curricula: The Science Curriculum

Improvement Study, Elementary Science Study and Science- -A
Process Approach.

I

.

Process and Content Goals

Many of the new curricula developed in the sixties

were instrumental in breaking away from the traditional
nature study approach and rote memorization techniques
involved in science study.

Processes of discovery and

cognitive reasoning were emphasized together with

a

more

systematic organization of the most important ideas in
natural science that could be learned by children.

How-

ever, these curricula have not emphasized process and

content goals equally.

For example, Scicnce--A Process

Approach, as its name implies, focuses on the development
of processes which can be transferred to other areas of

study.

Such

a

goal is vital if children are to become

competent learners and take charge of their own learning.
However, the content of natural science is equally important if knowledge is to be generalized and utilized in

other situations.

In S-APA, content

is not

as

important

208

as process.

The Science Curriculum Improvement Study

emphasizes the learning of content to achieve scientific
literacy.

Processes are not neglected, but they do not

constitute the primary focus.

The Elementary Science

Study curriculum developers recognize the important of
o

1

gani zing a curriculum around the developmental levels of

children.

sented in
In

However, content and process goals are not prea

systematic manner.
the framework for the natural science curricu-

lum based on the organismic view, process and content goals
are both emphasized, and the means of achieving them inte-

grated in the interaction component are spelled out.

The

process goals are in fact more extensive than in the other
science curricula.

Cognitive processes are emphasized but

not to the exclusion of other developmental processes.

Each interaction with the physical environment implicates

psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitionand these implications are exploited to en-

al processes,

rich the natural science curriculum.

The content goals in the proposed framework were

presented in

a

detailed manner for two reasons.

(1)

Pro-

cesses, if they are to be strengthened, must be applied
to some content.

From an organismic point of view, compre-

hending the relationships between and amongst events
key means of understanding the physical environment.

is

the

The

laws and principles which express these relationships and

.
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which form the basis and content

oi

the natural science

curriculum were therefore identified in detail.

Focusing

on laws and principles rather than on activities in natural

sciences facilitates the generalization of content.

According to Bruner (1960), the knowledge of the
structure

of a subject is vital as it calls for the iden-

tification of the most fundamental ideas that will be
included in the curriculum.

If the fundamentals are com-

prehended, then later understandings can be built on them.
The point is that the fundamentals, verbally stated, com-

prise content and can be memorized by rote.

To understand

or comprehend fundamentals, however, requires that related

processes be developed as well.

Without the integration of

process with content, there will be little generalization
and content will be easily forgotten: rote memory can take
a

child only so far.

Learning

a

general idea is powerful because it can

form the basis for recognizing and applying the idea in

similar but new situation (generalization).

a

Bruner claims

that the ’’teaching of specific topics or skills without

making clear their context in the broader fundamental
structure of
31)

.

a

field of knowledge is uneconomical

(1960.

The reasons for this are that students cannot gener-

alize what has been learned and that the sense of intel-

lectual excitement is lost without

principles

a

grasp of general
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avoid the danger of just focusing on the logical

structure of natural science, the framework presented in
this dissertation relies heavily on knowledge of how

children’s scientific thinking develops.

A great deal of

work remains to be done in this area, but the developmental
knowledge that we do have can be used in

a

more fruitful

manner to present the fundamental concepts of natural
science to young children in appropriate sequences.

Making

the connection with children’s developmental levels will

avoid boring them on the one hand or setting them up for
a

guaranteed failure on the other.

II.

Formation and Utilization
of Symbols
The development of symbol systems (mathematics,

language, the arts) that convey information about the

world does not receive

a

clear emphasis in previously

developed science curricula.

Mathematics is considered to

be a most important tool in science and therefore receives

more attention than language and the arts in these science

curricula.

In the framework presented in Chapter V,

mathematics, language and the arts are integral parts of
the overall curriculum and also play

natural science curriculum.

a

definite role in the

Mathematics is used to convey

quantitative information; language conveys descriptive
information (words), and the arts are used to develop
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aesthetic sensitivity and appreciation of patterns
and

order in nature.
III.

Interactions to Achieve the
Goals of the Curriculum
In many of the previously mentioned science

curricula (S-APA, SCIS, and ESS), learning experiences are
described for all children to engage in if they happen to
be in a particular grade and in

a

certain age group.

Yet

age levels are not the appropriate criterion for grouping

children for instructional purposes.

The reason for the

detailed description of science activities

is

probably

based on the assumption that teachers are not familiar
enough with the concepts of natural science to plan their
own activities in accordance with developmental levels.
It

is

also probable that by not preparing teachers to

teach on the basis of

a

framework for

a

natural science

curriculum, the tendency is to become attached to specific

activities assigned

to-

age levels.

The students are then

left with a "bits- and-pieces" idea of natural science.

Teachers prepared in the framework for the natural

science curriculum that is based on an organismic perspective are exposed to the fundamental laws and principles of

natural science in

a

concrete and meaningful way together

with detailed developmental information on children.

The

addi
activities that they plan will fit the children and in
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tion be drawn from sources related to problems and
issues
that face man.

These sources would be the applied sciences

such as agriculture, engineering (highway, bridge, dam

construction, etc.), animal husbandry, horticulture, etc.
A focus on such applied fields would not have to be
on teachers, since this would provide

a

drain

a

wonderful oppor-

tunity of utilizing community people who are trained in

variety of fields.
discuss

.the

a

They could be invited to present and

basic principles of their work in

a

manner

appropriate for children.
Applied sciences are such

a

pervasive force in

our lives that they should be included in the natural

science curriculum.

The definition of technological com-

petence that was discussed in Chapter III reflects the
concern for including the notion of applications in interactions with the physical environment.

The importance of

the inclusion of the applications of scientific knowledge
is

emphasized by Hurd.

He states that many of the science

curricula of the sixties excluded applications in their
schemes.

However, there is

a

great need to involve

children in understanding the role of science and its relation to human welfare.

This can be accomplished by

"

.

.

using its concepts to attack the persistent problems of

human experience, and stressing its potential for improving the

’quality of living'"

(Hurd, 1975:27).

From an organismic perspective, the relationships

.

.
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between knowledge and its application are vital since
they
reflect the reality of living.. For Whitehead, the crucial
aspect of education is not the acquisition of inert ideas
but "the art of the utilization of knowledge"

(

1967b

:

4

)

Concluding Remarks
From the discussion in the previous section, it

should be evident that an organismic approach to science

curriculum development has certain distinctive features
that are missing in the numerous other science curricula.

The approach presented in this dissertation is not

a

wholly radical departure from previously developed schemes.
It does,

in fact,

incorporate elements from many of the

other science curricula; but it also adds significant

new features that can address the issues of relatedness,

integration and wholeness- -all of which are necessary if
science education is to be a meaningful experience for
children.
A major focus of this dissertation has been the

presentation of the philosophical and theoretical framework
of the Anisa Model, the central thesis of which is the

actualization of human potential.

In the Anisa Theory,

the natural science curriculum occupies a central role

with

a

clearly defined overarching objective which is the

attainment of technological competence.

The natural

other
science curriculum is also integrally connected with

,
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areas of learning such as cognition, perception, volition,

mathematics
sciences.
that

I

,

language, the arts, human and philosophical

The organismic nature of the type of framework

am proposing is captured in the following statement

by Whitehead:

The solution which I am urging, is to eradicate
the fatal disconnection of subjects which kills
the vitality of our modern curriculum.
There
is only one subject matter for education, and
that is Life in all its manifestations.
Instead
of this single unity, we offer children- -algebra
from, which nothing follows; geometry, from
which nothing follows, science from which nothing
follows; history, from which nothing follows, a
couple of languages, never mastered; and lastly,
most dreary of all, literature, represented by
plays of Shakespeare, with philological notes and
short analyses of plot and character to be in
substance committed to memory.
Can such a list
be said to represent Life, as it is known in the
midst of living it?
(1967b:6-7).

Disconnection between the developmental levels of
the children and the demands of the curriculum is equally

fatal.

I

have tried to show how the natural science cur-

riculum

I

am proposing, because of its genetic epistemo-

logical basis, can be tailor-made to suit the developmental
needs of children so that the actualization of their po-

tential can be continually sustained and nourished.

To

accomplish this goal fully calls for renewed efforts in
the training of teachers, who are not only exposed to the

fundamental ideas of natural science and developmental

knowledge, but who are also incorporated in the very process of curriculum-building.

Teachers are the people who
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are in closest touch with the developmental needs of

children and as such, must become an integral part in the
organic evolution of the natural science curriculum.
There is one last point that

I

important focus in this dissertation.

feel has been an
I

have stated that

the overarching objective of the natural science cur-

riculum

is

the formation of material values upon which

rests the attainment of technological competence.

As

children, interact with the physical environment, they will

learn certain patterned ways of using their energy.

All

such patterned uses of energy (i.e., material values) are
not equally acceptable.

Some are more effective than

others as determined by two criteria:

survival? and

(2)

(1)

do they insure

do they lead to the kind of technological

competence that can improve the quality of life?

It there-

fore becomes crucial that the formation of material values

should not be left to chance.

Material values that meet

these two criteria should be developed in children when
they are young so that there exists

a

deep regard for the

pursuit of truth in understanding the operation of the
physical environment,

a

heightened awareness of the need to

protect the environment and its resources, and

a

sincere

concern for the problems and challenges that face mankind.
of
It is upon such material values that the attainment

technological competence rests.

The hallmark of learners

will underwho are technologically competent is that they
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Stand,

d

isco\ ei

and apply their knowledge of scientific

laws and principles to effect changes in, and gain
control

over, the physical environment.

When technological compe-

tence is subordinated to moral and fiducial competence,

there is reasonable assurance that the quality of life on
this planet can be continually improved for all human

beings.
In terms of the
a

framework that

I

have proposed for

natural science curriculum, there are many issues yet to

be resolved.

Teacher preparation programs in natural

science, evaluation instruments that can measure the process
of learning, more complete developmental knowledge about
how children learn to think, and diagnostic instruments to
r

assess developmental levels more accurately are some of
the issues that will have to be worked upon in the years
to come.
It is my conviction that the role of natural science

in the lives of children is of paramount importance.

Every

attempt is worthwhile if it serves to assist children to

understand the physical world in which they live so that
they can make a contribution to improving the quality of
life.

,

.
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